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PAN-ISLAMISM AND THE *JIHAD* DISCOURSE OF THE GERMAN ORIENTALISTS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Abstract

Pan-Islamism and jihad became very popular topics in Germany before and during the First World War, in particular among journalists, politicians, diplomats and orientalists. After the declaration of Ottoman jihad against the Entente powers in 1914, some German orientalists in particular felt that it was their responsibility to write about jihad and pan-Islamism. This article first examines the approaches of the German academic orientalists to German Orient policy, pan-Islamism and jihad, by analyzing the similarities and contrasts between the texts of the orientalists as part of a network. It then tries to determine the role of the German academic orientalists in shaping German strategy towards Islam in the First World War. Although the focus is on texts written between 1914 and 1916, some works of orientalists written before the First World War are also considered, in order to understand how their thoughts changed over time.

Key words: Orientalist, First World War, pan-Islamism, Jihad

Introduction

In human history the First World War was a period of darkness and shame, which determined the fate of many nations and millions of people around the world. Furthermore, it was the one of the most important reasons for the Second World War. In this disaster, which broke out as the "inevitable result" of the development of nationalism, militarism and imperialism¹ the German public played a role, too. Talking about the war and supporting it became very commonplace. In particular, the war increased the interest of intellectuals in politics and made them more visible in the public discourse.² They regarded the war not only as an opportunity to become a world power, but also as a struggle for "national existence". Therefore, some Intellectuals considered themselves to be directly involved in this fight. During the First World War, some professors saw it as their "national task" to raise the public's awareness about world politics, to develop political concepts and to set up an agenda for the government. Historians in particular played an important role in the construction of an imagined future.⁴ At the outbreak of the war, while boys were going to the front, historians, philosophers and intellectuals from different fields of the social sciences provided ideological support through seminars, books, conferences and articles. These activities, which were the outcome of a nationalistic mindset, aimed to raise the public's expectation of the German victory.⁵ The German philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848-1931), who was very enthusiastic about the war, stressed that the national "harmony" of the German public should be protected and that the German population should focus on "common major goals" during the war. He expressed his opinion about the relationship between writing and war as follows: "...we old people only have the gun of the word". 7 Thus, he emphasized that the German intellectuals should take the initiative with their own weapons, that is, with their pens.

German intellectuals, orientalists and artists became directly and indirectly involved in the First Word War. The *Kundgebung deutscher Universitäten (German Universities Declaration)* signed by professors from different universities of Germany in mid-September 1914 aimed at refuting the

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¹ Oliver Janz (2013), Der Grosse Krieg, Frankfurt-New York: Campus Verlag, pp.13-17.

² Peter Hoeres (2002), "Ein dreißigjähriger Krieg der deutschen Philosophie? Kriegsdeutungen im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg," in Bruno Thoß, Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), Erster Weltkrieg Zweiter Weltkrieg: Ein Vergleich: Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, p. 472.

³ Klaus Böhme (2014), Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart: Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, p.10.

⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵ Hoeres, "Ein dreißigjähriger Krieg der deutschen Philosophie? Kriegsdeutungen im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg," p. 473.

⁶ Böhme, Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 14.

⁷ Cornelia Wegeler (1996), ... wir sagen ab der internationalen Gelehrtenrepublik: Altertumswissenschaft und Nationalsozialismus: Das Göttinger Institut für Altertumskunde 1921-1962, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, p. 49.

Entente's negative propaganda against the German army. 8 On October 4, 1914, a further declaration was published, called Der Aufruf an die Kulturwelt (Call for the Cultural World). This was a call for intellectuals to take part in the war, in order to protect the German culture, which was regarded as the basis of the future of the German nation and State. It had been written by Ludwig Fulda (1862-1939), Georg Reicke (1863-1923) and Hermann Sudermann (1857-1928), "liberal writers of the Goethebund", a federation, founded to protect the cultural freedom in Germany ¹⁰ and was signed by 93 internationally renowned German poets, scholars, writers and artists. It emphasized that Germany bore no guilt for the outbreak of the war and denied that German soldiers had committed war crimes against civilians in Louvain. Soon after, this manifesto, on October 13, 1914, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff wrote a memorandum, called Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des Deutschen Reiches (Declaration of University Teachers of the German Empire), which was signed by about 3000 university teachers on October 16, 1914. They declared their support for the German participation in the War. 11

The German-Ottoman rapprochement and its transformation into a war alliance created a debate about pan-Islamism among the intellectuals before and during the war. In particular, the proclamation of jihad by the Ottoman Empire against the Entente powers in November 1914 elicited responses from German academic orientalists. They not only wrote books, articles, and reviews, but often also popularized the topic through non-academic papers and conferences. The active participation of German academic orientalists in this discussion provoked a response from the Dutch Islam scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) who in January 1915 published an article with the title "Holy war made in Germany" in the Journal De Gids. 12 In this text, Hurgronje harshly criticized Germany for being an important agent behind the declaration of jihad by the Ottomans. He accused German orientalists, especially his colleague Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933), of sacrificing their worldview for the sake of the Ottoman-German alliance and of spreading religious hatred. Then, a literary exchange between Hurgronje and Becker ensued. This exchange has been the topic of many studies. 13

Until the end of the nineteenth century, the German orientalists did not have a close relationship with politics, so that they could not put their scientific work in the practice, with the exception of some diplomat-orientalists. By the beginning of the First World War, an area was opened that gave them an opportunity to use their expertise in different ways. Marchand's book gives detailed information, how far the German orientalists were involved in the war. 14 Like Marchand, Hagen, too, discusses in his article the role of the German orientalists in the war. He tries to reveal the practical application of orientalism in the case of German orientalists and focuses on the production-process of the war propaganda materials which was created by orientalists.¹⁵ Yet the general textual approach of the academic orientalists to German Islam policy, pan-Islamism and jihad has not been dealt in a single work. This article first examines how the German academic orientalists understood the German Orient policy, pan-Islamism and jihad. In a second step it then tries to establish, whether the orientalists played an important role in the shaping of the German Islam strategy in the First World War. It discusses the role of orientalists merely at the intellectual levels and does not focus on their military experiences in the war.

⁸ Angela Klopsch (2009), Die Geschichte der juristischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts Verlag,

⁹ Hoeres, "Ein dreißigjähriger Krieg der deutschen Philosophie? Kriegsdeutungen im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg," p. 474. 56 professors from different universities in Germany signed this declaration, too. Böhme, Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg, p.

¹⁰ Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg, "Making Sense of the War (Germany)," 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, 26 October 2018, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/pdf/1914-1918-Online-making sense of the war germany-2014-10-08.pdf, p. 3

^{11 &}quot;Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des Deutschen Reiches/ Déclaration des professeurs des universités et des écoles supérieures de l'Empire allemand Berlin" 23 Oktober 1914, 28-page list of names of professor, 26 October 2018, http://publikationen.ub.unifrankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2180.

¹² Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1915), *The Holy War Made in Germany*, New York, London: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

¹³ Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (2003), "Djihad Made in Germany. Der Streit um den Heiligen Krieg," Sozialgeschichte, 18, 2, pp. 7-34; Peter Heine (1984), "C. Snouck Hurgronje versus C. Heinrich Becker: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der angewandten Orientalistik," Die Welt des Islams, Bd. 23/24, pp.378-387: Léon Buskens (2016), "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje: Holy War and Colonial Concerns," in Erik-Jan Zürcher (eds.), Jihad and Islam in World War I, Leiden: Leiden University Press, pp. 29-51.

14 Marchand, Suzanne L. (2009), German Orientalism in the Age of Empire Religion, Race, and Scholarships, New York: Cambridge

University Press.

¹⁵ Gottfried Hagen (2004), "German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24, 2, pp. 145–162.

This article is divided into two parts: the first part provides a general framework for the approach of orientalists to German Oriental politics. The second part examines their thoughts on pan-Islamism and jihad in a textual network. Although the focus is on texts written between 1914 and 1916, some works of orientalists written before the First World War are also considered, in order to understand how their thoughts changed over the time.

The General View of the German Orientalists to the Oriental Politic

War enthusiasm and the expansionist programs of the *Alldeutsche Verband* had a very strong influence on scholars. This led to tensions between the demands of the scientific discourse and the nationalistic mindset. In July 1915, some German orientalists and scholars of Islam like Carl Heinrich Becker, Enno Litmann, Theodor Nöldeke, and Otto Franke signed the declaration so-called *Intellektuelleneingabe (Intellectuals' Memorandum)*, which was organized by the *Alldeutsche Verband* and conceived by the theologian Reinhold Seeberg. In this way, they officially declared their support for the war. This manifesto was signed by 1347 Intellectuals, among them 352 professors from different universities. Most German orientalists suddenly found themselves in the middle of a war – "the Great War came rather too soon", as Suzanne Marchand stated – without having the opportunity to practice their orientalist knowledge and expertise. They did not have sufficient time to engage in the policies of "peaceful penetration and cultural colonialism". This can be verified statistically, when one compares the number of German orientalists, who were already in the Orient during the war or had traveled there before, with that of the British and the French. However, the German orientalists got involved very quickly through propaganda activities and sometimes directly through military service.

The views of German orientalists on foreign policy were quite different from each other. The most striking example is the central thesis of the famous Sinologist-diplomat Otto Franke (1863-1946). He emphasized that German foreign policy should turn to China and help it solve its internal problems. Furthermore, Franke recommended this idea to the Foreign Office that it rather pursue a more active policy in China through modernist and secular institutions.²⁰ The German archaeologist and philologist Ernst Emil Herzfeld (1879-1948) demanded that Germany "should stop meddling in Persia and let the English run it properly". Theodor Nöldeke (1836-1930), professor of Oriental Languages, known as liberal and as a fervent German nationalist, supported "Bismarckian Realpolitik" which required the advancement of Prussia's political status and the achievement a larger supremacy within Europe. Therefore, he was very pleased to "leave the wasp's nest of Morocco to the French".²¹

Becker who published a magazine called *Der Islam* and is seen as one of the most important founding fathers of modern Islamic Studies in Germany supported an Ottoman-German rapprochement. According to him, Germany as a colonial power with a Muslim population was gradually turning into a state that needed to have an Orient policy. With his essays on Islam and the German colonies in Africa, Becker wanted to help the state with his experiences and knowledge. Furthermore, he strove to transform oriental studies so that it could make Germany a political and cultural power outside the borders of Germany, such as France in Africa. ²² His studies led him to the conclusion that the German colonial policy could not be carried out without considering Islam's role in the African Muslim society. According to him, the density of the Muslim population in the German colonies obliged the government to modify its political strategy. ²³ His friend Martin Hartmann (1851-1918) who made living Islam a part

¹⁶ Böhme, Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 18-20. Allgemeinen Deutschen Verband was founded in 1891 and renamed in 1894 as the Alldeutscher Verband (All-German Association). It was a nationalist, imperialist and colonialist organization and advocated German interests worldwide. Werner Lothar (1935), Der Alldeutscher Verband 1890-1918: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der öffentlichen Meinung in Deutschland in den Jahren vor und während des Weltkrieges, Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, pp. 46-47; Lothar Rathmann (1962), Berlin Bagdad: Die imperialistische Nahostpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, pp. 38-43.

^{17 &}quot;Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des Deutschen Reiches"; Klaus Schwabe (1966), "Ursprung Und Verbreitung des Alldeutschen Annexionismus in der Deutschen Professorenschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg. Zur Entstehung der Intellektuelleneingaben vom Sommer 1915," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 2. Heft/April, 14. Jahrgang, pp. 105-106. Against this rough statement, 70 university teachers such as Max Weber, Adolf von Harnack, Albert Einstein, Max Planck, under the leadership of Hans Delbrück made a call to government to act more moderately in the war program. Böhme, Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 19.

¹⁸ Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire Religion, Race, and Scholarships, p. 436.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 436.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 343.

²¹ Ibid., p. 343.

²² Carl Heinrich Becker (1932), "Der Islam und Kolonisierung Afrikas," in Hans Heinrich Schaeder (eds.), *Islamstudien: Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Bd. II, (1910), Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, pp. 185-186.

²³ Carl Heinrich Becker (1932), "Staat und Mission in der Islamfrage," in Hans Heinrich Schaeder (eds.), *Islamstudien: Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Bd. II, (1910), Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, p. 211.

of oriental studies in Germany and who founded *Die Welt des Islams*, the magazine for Islamic studies, frequently set out his views on German Orient policy in different journals and in his books. According to Hartmann, what Germany should do as a European State, was to follow an independent and authentic policy that took into account the "religious fanaticism" in the world of Islam. Therefore, he believed that Germany must work together with modern and secular Ottoman statesmen to prevent religious bias from turning into persecution of others. This he saw as Germany's great responsibility.²⁴ Although Hartmann stayed close to German Oriental policy during the war, he did not completely renounce the idea that Islam could provoke fanaticism in Muslim societies. In the course of the war, Hartmann played a more active role in the German-Ottoman and Islam policy than some other colleagues. After his previous writing on Islamic and Turkish hatred, it is quite remarkable to see the positive attitude towards the Ottoman-German rapprochement in his more recent texts.

According to the historian of religion and orientalist Josef Froberger (1871-1931), German Islam policy should not imitate the French and the British who exploited the wealth of the Orient but rather aim at developing culture in the Islamic world through planned strategies. In this context, he recommended that Germany should support the independence of Muslim countries because it was only in this way that the Islamic world could become a part of European civilization.²⁵ The Iranologist Friedrich Rosen (1856-1935) who worked as a diplomat for the Foreign Office in different countries at different times, revealed very clearly his views about German Oriental policy just before the war. Rosen claimed that the German Oriental policy was generated by "unqualified romantics". According to him, at that time, it became a fashion in the Foreign Office to advocate an expansionist policy. Rosen stated that there were high expectations of a success of pan-Islamism. ²⁶ Rosen believed that it was impossible to achieve the goals of the German Oriental policy. Therefore, he objected to the German military mission in the Ottoman Empire and instead demanded to reach a compromise with England. His letter to Wilhelm Heinrich Solf, secretary of state for the colonies, December 21, 1913, reveals his views on this topic. "Do we have to ensure the life of deceased Ottoman Empire? How does that help us?" By claiming that the Foreign Office tried to use "the Prophet's green flag", Rosen criticized the obscurity of this policy. He considered Karl May "as the father of the Oriental policy". All this shows that, the orientalists who feel responsible to speak out about politic had very different views on foreign policy. There were different dynamics that formed their thoughts before and during the war. The research fields and political ideologies played a very important role in shaping their political approaches.

German Orientalists Pan-Islamism and Jihad

The Intellectuals who supported the German pan-Islamic strategy were greatly influenced by a memorandum, which Max von Oppenheim had written in October 1914, before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, It was 136 pages long and had the title Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde (Memorandum regarding the revolutionization of the Islamic territories of our enemies). The aim was to draw "a road map for Germany's Islamic policy". 29 Study of the network of the German orientalists should allow to determine how independent they were intellectually, and how they affected each other. But did such network indeed exist? The orientalists, whose views are discussed here, did not express only their opinions on jihad. Some of them also engaged in propaganda activities for the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (NfO), (Information Service for the Orient), which was founded in September 1914 by the Political Department of the Foreign Office and managed by Oppenheim in cooperation with the General Staff. The most important tasks of the NfO was move "predominantly Muslim soldiers and officers from their side to the side of the Central Powers" and to instigate open rebellion among the loyal colonial troops of the enemies, especially through leaflets. ³⁰ Eugen Mittwoch (Director of the Department of Arabic), Martin Hartmann (Director of the Turkish Department), Willy Spatz, Iranologist Oskar Mann (Director of the Persian Department), Indologist Helmuth von Glasenapp, Iranologist Sebastian Beck, Herald Cossack (Department of

²⁴ Martin Hartmann (1914), "Islampolitik," Koloniale Rundschau: Monatsschrift für die Interessen unserer Schutzgebiete und ihrer Bewohner, 5, 11–12, p. 597.

²⁵ Josef Froberger (1915), *Weltkrieg und Islam*, M. Gladbach: Verlag Sekretariat Sozialer Studentenarbeit, p. 18.

²⁶ Friedrich Rosen (1959), Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben, Bd. 3/4, Wiesbaden: Limes-Verlag, p. 140.

²⁷ Friedrich Rosen (1932), Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben, Bd. 2, Berlin: Transmare Verlag, pp. 176-178.

²⁸ Rosen, Wanderleben, Bd. 3/4, p. 53.

²⁹ Kadir Kon (2013), Birinci Dünya Savaşında Almanya'nın İslam Stratejisi, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, pp. 62-63.

³⁰ Gerhard Höpp (1997), Muslime in der Mark: Als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in Wünsdorf und Zossen, Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, p. 22.

Russian), Sinologist Herbert Müller, Arabist Edgar Pröbster and Islamic scholar Becker were well-known orientalists who worked at the NfO.³¹ It can be said that Becker stayed at the center of pan-Islamism and jihad discourses. He attempted to describe and analyze pan-Islamism, producing many ambiguous definitions and approaches. It is quite remarkable to see how his interpretations and views on pan-Islamism changed over time.

According to him, pan-Islamism was a current in Islam that had gained a political and an ideological character, after the pattern of pan-ideologies as such as pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism etc. Etymologically, Becker defines pan-Islamism as "a tendency of Islam to bring all Muslims together". More specifically, he describes it as "the emergence of Islamic thought", namely, the revival of Islamic thought. ³² He considered the colonial advance of Europe in the Islamic territory as a triggering element of pan-Islamism. In this regard, pan-Islamism could be seen as a sentiment of solidarity of Muslims that emerged from and was nourished by modern anti-Colonial and anti-European thought. In other words, it could be said that pan-Islamism was ongoing process in the Islam World.³³ This approach led Becker to the idea of uniting all the Muslims in the World under "an Islamic empire". 34 According to Becker, jihad, as a highly effective "war vehicle", should not be denounced because it did not uphold the values of the "French Revolution", because the Ottoman Empire was the most important part of the Islamic World. Considered from this perspective, "the internationalization of Islam" could be an effective political force worldwide.³⁵ Shortly before the war started, in a letter to his friend Ernst Jäckh, Becker tried to justify jihad by the conditions of the war; "In times of peace, I have always been a big opponent of the so-called Islam-policy in foreign policy areas. Because, it was a play with the fire and I have personally experienced it myself... In times of war, the situation is naturally completely different and in this case, we need to use this relationship."³⁶ One can say that Becker did not regard Jihad as a purely religious bond. He perceived it as a political thought shaped by religious references. For him it was a political program, an effective tool of foreign policy and an Independence war against their enemies, which was developed by the Ottoman Empire for its own security.

As a part of the orientalist network, Hartmann did not hide his anti-Islamic views in his early writings. In 1915 he described pan-Islamism as a political thought not just a religious ideology, like Becker. According to him, pan-Islamism aimed at making Islam the only power on the world, "by bringing together all the Muslims of the world". ³⁷ What he means here, is the unity of Islam under a single political authority, in other words under a single Islamic state. His depiction of pan-Islamism is very close to Becker's etymological definition, as mentioned above. Hartmann believes that theoretically jihad encompasses the entire Islamic world. Because, according to Islamic law, "there should be only one Islamic country with a caliph". ³⁸ A year after this statement, his emphasis on the role of the Turks in the caliphate was quite striking. ³⁹ He defined here pan-Islamism as the unity of Muslims under the rule of the Turks. This transformation in his thought can be explained by Hartmann's close relationship with German foreign policy during the war.

Rudolf Tschudi (1884-1960), an assistant to Becker and later head of Becker's *Der Islam*, made a clear structural distinction between pan-Islamism and pan-Slavism. According to him, pan-Slavism aimed at uniting all Slavs and was shaped by "racial theory". However, pan-Islamism was a movement, which

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³¹ Kon, *Birinci Dünya Savaşında Almanya'nın İslam Stratejisi*, pp. 78-82; Salvador Oberhaus (2006), *Zum wilden Aufstande entflammen: Die deutsche Ägyptenpolitik 1914 bis 1918:Ein Beitrag zur Propagandageschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges*, (unpublished dissertation), Düsseldorf: Philosophische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität , pp. 50-51.

³² Carl Heinrich Becker (1932), "Panislamismus," in Hans Heinrich Schaeder (eds.), *Islamstudien: Vom Werden und Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Bd. II, (1904), Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, p. 232.

³³ Becker, "Panislamismus," p. 232. Becker claimed that the word pan-Islamism etymologically is a not an oriental term. This expression was created in the West. According to him, this view supported the argument of some Intellectuals who pleaded that pan-Islamism is more a European invention. Carl Heinrich Becker (1911), "Türkisch-italienischer Krieg und der Islam," *Hamburgischer Correspondent-Morgen Ausgabe*, Nr 537, 21 Oktober, p. 1.

³⁴ Carl Heinrich Becker (1932), "Ist der Islam eine Gefahr für unsere Kolonien," in Hans Heinrich Schaeder (eds.), *Islamstudien: Vom Werden und Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Bd. II, (1909), Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, p. 161.

³⁵ Carl Heinrich Becker (1932), "Kriegsdiskussion über den Heiligen Krieg," in Hans Heinrich Schaeder (eds.), *Islamstudien: Vom Werden und Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Bd. II, (1915), eds. Hans Heinrich Schaeder, Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, p. 291.

³⁶ From Carl Heinrich Becker to Ernst Jäckh, letter of 31 August VI. HA NI Becker, C.H. Nr. 2059 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz Becker stated in a letter to his student Hellmut Ritter that he actually understood what jihad means even in his first article. After the declaration of jihad, he tried to treat jihad as "a political tool". From Carl Heinrich Becker to Hellmut Ritter, letter of 12 May 1915 VI. HA. NI Becker, C. H. Nr. 3521 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz

³⁷ Martin Hartmann (1915), "Deutschland und der Heilige Krieg," Das neue Deutschland, Jahrgang III, Nr. 27/29, p. 268.

³⁸ Martin Hartmann (1915), "Die weltwirtschaftliche Wirkungen des Heiligen Krieges," Weltwirtschaft: Zeitschrift für Weltwirtschaft und Weltverkehr. Organ der Deutschen weltwirtschaftlichen Gesellschaft, IV. Jahrgang, Nr. 10/11, p. 255.

³⁹ Martin Hartmann (1916), "Turanismus," Das neue Deutschland, 5. Jahrgang, Heft 6, p. 150.

"had been a part of Islamic thought since the earliest times and aimed at bringing together all Muslims in one empire". ⁴⁰ Tschudi regarded the emergence of pan-Islamism as an important result of Europe's advance in the Islamic world. His notion that pan-Islamism was a modern concept was greatly influenced by Becker.

Tschudi believed that the circulation of Cairo-based Islamist journals in the entire Islamic world would allow pan-Islamism to spread worldwide. While he regarded Egypt as the capital of the "literal" pan-Islamism, he considered Mecca to be the center of "religious" pan-Islamism. From this point of view, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca provided an incomparable opportunity to "spread" the idea of pan-Islamism. When one studies his texts one can see that Tschudi adopted the idea of the relationship between Hajj and pan-Islam from Becker. Yet there are also differences. Becker identified Istanbul as a center of "political" pan-Islamism whereas Tschudi held no such view. Tschudi was in doubt about the religious and political functionality of jihad in the Islamic society. He did not believe that "all Muslims can be mobilized through a declaration of jihad, so as to form an army", especially those who lived in the European colonies. He claimed that pan-Islamism was just a sentimental reaction against the European advance and had no solid organization there. He regarded it also as a clash between Orient and Occident. If one day Orient won this conflict, pan-Islamism would disappear. Most likely, what he meant here is that, if the Muslims won the First World War, they would be free from the oppression of the European colonial powers and gain their independence. Thus, they would be able to integrate themselves more quickly into the Western civilization.

Georg Kampffmeyer (1864-1936) was a specialist for Moroccan Arabic and published *Die Welt Des Islams* together with Hartmann. He was very interested in topics concerning jihad. Although he was very active in the NfO, he had doubts about the functioning and the success of jihad. According to him, the violent suppression by colonial rule of a Muslim uprising would lead to an anti-French resistance in North Africa, because, he did not consider jihad to be just a holy war he also considered it as an anti-colonial movement, like Becker. However, these rebellions would not be successful there, due to the weakness of the national consciousness of Algerian and Tunisian Muslims and due to the lack of nationalist leaders. What he means here is that jihad can achieve its aims only through a religiousnationalist movement against colonial rules. In other words, religion is not the only power that stimulates Muslims.

As mentioned before, many orientalists worked in the NfO in different positions. Eugen Mittwoch (1876-1942) was one of them, who even directed the NfO by March 1916, following Karl Emil Schabinger von Schowingen. Like his other colleagues, he also expressed his thoughts on the First World War and Jihad and the role of Germany and Ottoman Empire in his different texts. According to him, the Ottoman Empire waged a war for its "national defense" and "a fight for its own existence". Furthermore he attempts to reject the claim that the present Ottoman jihad is a battle of conquest against the West. As can be seen in the case of Becker and Kampffmeyer, Mittwoch tried to understand jihad not only from a religious point of view in its classical form. He considered it to be a modern political instrument of the war, which had quite a secular character.

Like his colleagues Becker and Kampffmeyer, Enno Littmann (1875-1958), orientalist and professor of Oriental languages, regarded jihad as a modern vehicle of war. He tried to legitimize it in order to further German interests. According to him, the Turks fought for their "national, political and economic existence", as the Austrians and Germans did.⁴⁷ As some other orientalists, Littman also wished to participate in the First World War per se. By serving at the German Foreign Office during the war, he became a part of the war.⁴⁸

 $^{^{\}rm 40}$ Rudolf Tschudi (1914), *Der Islam und der Krieg*, Hamburg: L. Friedrichsen & Co, pp. 6-10.

⁴¹ Tschudi, Der Islam und der Krieg, p. 11.

⁴² Becker, "Panislamismus," p. 242.

⁴³ Tschudi, pp. 5-11.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁵ Georg Kampffmeyer (1914), "Nordwestafrika und Deutschland," in Ernst Jäckh (eds.), *Der Deutsche Krieg. Politische Flugschriften*, Stuttgart-Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, p. 20.

⁴⁶ Eugen Mittwoch (1914), *Deutschland, die Türkei und der Heilige Krieg*, Berlin: Verlag Kameradschaft, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁷ Enno Littmann (1914), "Der Krieg und der islamische Orient," *Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft Kunst und Technik*, 9 Jahrgang Heft 5, p. 291.

⁴⁸ Ludmila Hanisch (2003), Die Nachfolger der Exegeten: deutschsprachige Erforschung des Vorderen Orients in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, p. 78.

Unlike Mittwoch and Littmann, Froberger's thoughts on jihad were at the beginning not very precise and seem to be quite skeptical and complicated. Froberger claimed that the "Ottoman declaration of jihad against the Entente powers threw all Muslims into the fire and thus, the development of the Muslims in the future was put on the agenda". According to him, the political and religious aspects of jihad melded into each other. Therefore, it was not easy to separate them from each other. However, his approach is of considerable interest. Describing French and other European states as "enemy of the church", Froberger criticized in a very negative way their attempts to represent themselves as "the defender of the Christian World". 49 In his text he gave reasons for the decision of the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War on the side of Germany. By pointing to the concrete political and commercial interests of the Entente states in the Ottoman Empire, he tried to prove that the current jihad was politically justified. He, too, conceived of it as instrument of the war, as Becker and Kampffmeyer had done. 50 According to him, if a war for the sake of "freedom and independence" could be called sacred, then, Germany and its allies waged "a holy war". In this context, the current jihad is a holy war of Muslims for "law and freedom". 51 As can be seen from his text, Froberger tried to see jihad without its religious context, and then asked who created pan-Islamism? He sought the answer to these questions in the advance of the Europeans in the Islamic World. He argued that the French and the British, who tried to consider every local rebellion in their colonies as a part of fanatic political tendencies of Islam, indirectly contributed to the birth of pan-Islamism, although they were actually able to anticipate and prevent this movement. 52

Like his colleague Froberger, Friedrich Zacharias Schwally (1863-1919), a specialist of the Semitic languages, believed that the negative political circumstances of the Islamic World under the European rule forced the Muslims to come together for their "common interests". This phenomenon enabled the birth of the idea of pan-Islamism. He claimed that jihad was still a living idea in Islamic society and should not be regarded as a mere "slogan". Additionally, he asserted that the Muslims believed it to be the "fundament of their faith". Schwally conceded that the prestige of the Ottoman caliph had recently increased in the Islamic world, 53 but at the same time pointed out that "the expectations of the Muslims for jihad are very confused and absolutely uncertain". According to him, there was no organizational and programmatic structure behind the idea of pan-Islamism and the greater part of the Muslims "except those in the Ottoman Empire" were not able to wage a great war against colonial powers, because "they are not independent". He also was of the opinion that jihad had the potential to arouse religious fanaticism in the Islamic World. 55 As mentioned above, Hartmann also warned against the relation between jihad and fanaticism. In other words, Schwally while admitting its relevance for the German war interests warned that jihad as a political movement had to be kept under control.

Hubert Grimme (1864-1942), an Orientalist and specialist in Semitic languages, affirmed that Islam should not be regarded as only a religious power. He thought that Islam also had a significant political force. According to him, the most characteristic feature of the political power of Islam was its ability to organize and orientate the Islamic society, especially in the current Ottoman declaration of jihad. As seen above, it became very common among the German orientalists to discuss and analyze the political power of Islam in the Islamic world. This is also the case with Hubert Grimme. ⁵⁶ He claimed that pan-Islamism emerged in the Ottoman Empire, in order to extend the political existence of the state. In addition, he regarded the sermons, which were read on behalf of the Ottoman Caliphs in different parts of the Islamic world, as a significant concrete success of the pan-Islamism. In this respect, he differed from his colleagues, who were in doubt about the success of pan-Islamism and jihad. Grimme put the Ottoman Empire in the center and believed that pan-Islamism urged on 200 Million of Muslims against the colonial power. ⁵⁷ It was his opinion that, with the colonization of Islamic world by the Europeans, led to the "enslavement" of the Muslims. The colonial powers aimed "not at giving them something; rather they aimed at exploiting their resources". This phenomenon created great "hatred" against

⁴⁹ Froberger, Weltkrieg und Islam, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 3-5.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 5-9.

⁵² Ibid., p. 8.

⁵³ Friedrich Zacharias Schwally (1916), "Der Heilige Krieg des Islam in religionsgeschichtlicher und staatsrechtlicher Bedeutung," *Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, Bd. 10, p. 689.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 708-710.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 709-711.

⁵⁶ Hubert Grimme (1915), *Islam und Weltkrieg*, Münster: Verlag Borgmener, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-13.

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Europe.⁵⁸ Grimme's opinions on this subject seem to be very close to those of Becker and Tschudi. As mentioned above, these two scholars asserted that the colonial advance of Europe in the Islamic world created political and cultural reactions against Europe and regarded this situation as a triggering element of pan-Islamism.

It can be said that Grimme was very hopeful about the success of the current Ottoman proclamation of jihad. He claimed that when Muslims heard the word jihad, they could come together *en masse*, leaving aside their modern thought and reading themselves proudly for the holy war.⁵⁹ In contrast to Grimme's high enthusiasm, the orientalist Karl Süssheim (1878-1947) drew a very "pessimistic" picture of the role of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. He shared his negatives feelings about the war with his close friends.⁶⁰

Karl Emil Schabinger von Schowingen (1877-1967), former consul and dragoman-orientalist who served in the German Foreign Office, played a significant role in shaping the German jihad program. He then became successor of Oppenheim (1915-1916) as the director of the NfO.⁶¹ Being a part of German jihad policy, Schabinger himself observed the Ottoman proclamation of jihad on November 14, 1914 from the balcony of the German embassy in Istanbul.⁶² He was very active in the field of political jihad propaganda and also promoted it intellectually, especially by becoming involved in translation activities. During the First World War, a booklet was written by the Ottoman intellectual Muhammad Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi, entitled *Hakikat al Cihad*. Schabinger translated it from Arabic into German as *Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg* (*The Truth about the War of Faith*), which was published in Berlin. In the afterward he states his own opinion about jihad.⁶³

The well-known Hungarian orientalist Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1920) with Jewish ancestry, was one of the great figures in German-speaking orientalism. He did not take part in the discussions about jihad. However, he expressed his views occasionally in his lectures. He described pan-Islamism as follow: "In recent years, it turned often into a habit to define pan-Islamism as a ghost and a danger. This movement created a thought in the Islamic World, which tries to abolish sectarian separations between Muslims." He emphasized here, as Becker had done, that pan-Islamism was a movement intended to bring all Muslims together. According to Goldziher, pan-Islamism as a political movement "can be combined with the national demands of Egypt". 65 On the basis of this approach, he believed that, as Kampffmeyer also stressed, pan-Islamism could be intertwined with nationalism.

Conclusion

While the German army fought on the fronts, some German orientalists tried to legitimize the participation of their state in the war. An important aspect of these endeavors was to make jihad and pan-Islamism intelligible for the German public through conferences and writings during the war. In this context, it became very common among the German orientalists to consider jihad as a political vehicle. The orientalists mentioned above prioritized German interests and often defended what they in fact theoretically did not like, namely jihad and the Muslim uprising. Although they regarded jihad as an important tool for German interests, most of them worried that jihad could trigger fanaticism against all non-Muslims. Two significant reasons can be mentioned why they became a part of German jihad propaganda. Firstly, they were indeed influenced by war enthusiasm and the nationalism that was aroused during the war. Therefore, they tried to contribute to the German war interests in this way. Secondly, they regarded it as a career path, which would help them to find a good position in the army or in the German Foreign Office. The approaches of the Orientalists to jihad and pan-Islamism are not independent from each other. The examples given above have shown that there was a great deal of intertextuality. The notion that the emergence of pan-Islamism was a reaction to Europe's colonization

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁰ Barbara Flemming, Jan Schmidt (2002), *The Diary of Karl Süssheim (1878-1947): Orientalist Between Munich and Istanbul,* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 96-97.

⁶¹ Höpp, Muslime in der Mark: Als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in Wünsdorf und Zossen, p.22.

⁶² Lionel Gossman (2013), *The Passion of Max von. Oppenheim. Archaeology and Intrigue in the Middle East from. Wilhelm II to Hitler*, Cambridge: Open Book Publisher, p. 87.

⁶³ Kon, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Almanya'nın İslam Stratejisi, p.127.

⁶⁴ Ignaz Goldziher (1910), Vorlesungen über den Islam, Heidelberg: Carl's Winter, p. 317.

⁶⁵ Róbert Simon (1986), Ignác Goldziher: His Life and Scholarship as Reflected in His Works and Correspondence, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 47,48

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of the Islamic world, was commonly stated in their texts. It is very difficult to determine whether the German jihad program was invented by orientalists during the war. However, it is very clear that they played an important role in shaping, realising and developing it through the production of propaganda materials relating to Muslim uprisings against in Entente colonies and to the Ottoman war effort.

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