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Original Article

Democracy In Islam from The Political to The Religious and Ethical Perspective: Turkiye as A Model

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ABSTRACT

The study discusses the problem of democracy in Islam, from the political to the religious and ethical perspective in an Islamic country with a strict secular system (Turkiye). The study is aiming to monitor the role of democracy as a fair movement for peoples, especially Muslims, in secular regimes, in which it affects their lives by reconstructing the political system and its legislations and authorities in a way that consider their beliefs and moral ethics. Taking that into consideration as Muslims to answer the question: Can we, as Muslims, take a fair stance on democracy and other Western theories that can be benefited the lives of Muslims? As an analytical study, we will follow the Qualitative Methodology to achieve the goal of the study, which led us to the result of elaborating on the possible ways to benefit as Muslims from political concepts particularly democracy without allowing for these Western concepts to eliminate Islam and its ethics from our lives from one hand or make the extremists Muslims alienate others from this religion from another hand; by considering two main points: 1) Being convinced of the historicism of political practice in Islam and reconsidering the legal texts according only to Islamic ethics and the Shariah objectives. 2) Dismantling the relevant terms coming to us and activating the functional view of these interests and their abstract principles and giving them priority over the textual and idiomatic definition. Therefore, it is necessary for us as Muslims to develop new concepts in politics which are compatible with Islam and its ethical principles and stem from reality and civilizational requirements, to play the leading role in achieving both intellectual and applied advancement for the Muslim nation, which leads it to return to the forefront of its civilized role that combines Islamic values and civilized development.

Keywords: democracy; political Islam; Ottoman; the secular system & ethics.

Introduction

Many Islamic theorists fear the political system in Islamic countries (which have a Muslim majority from democracy) and what it can bring with its Western concepts of values and principles that contradict Islam and its moral principles and the Islamic political system that these theorists imagine deriving from the great historical practice of the Islamic state, especially the era of the rightly guided Caliphs. And based on a great reference from the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, expressing their fears that whoever wants to enter the game of democracy must be satisfied with all its laws and rules at various levels not to mention the exploitation of this term by western countries to dominate peoples

and nations, impose their civilized standards, and exploit the capabilities of these peoples under the pretext of spreading democracy through the use of a loose, undetermined concept that tempts peoples and makes them rush towards it, motivated by every yearning for virtue and values that they think are from democracy without real political awareness in all its dimensions, and also considering the changes and results that democracy and its principles can bring at the level of the individual, society, and nation that are different from the Islamic character. Such as the victory of a non-Muslim with the position of public guardianship and sovereign positions, the adoption of a constitution and non-Islamic laws for Muslims, or what you may import from the concepts of absolute personal freedom, unfettered by any values or principles that undermine the Islamic system of society and expatriate everything in it under the weight of the rules of the game of democracy itself.

Undoubtedly, such fears are justified, and they have their objective reasons and evidence, whether from Islam or even from reality, as are the opposite opinions, which see democracy itself as Islamic consultation or that it is an integral part of Islam with its principles and values and that it is a set of values and principles that go beyond the idea of election. The rule of the majority, but it is a culture and a value system in the first place, and Muslims must accept it without hesitation, and take it in its applied and clear form for all. But the dictum of wisdom says: You should not make matters lose, neither in the negative nor in the positive. Rather, relativity and the differentiation between evils and interests is the scale on which issues must be weighed, especially if they are of such importance.

And if there is a fear of the impact of the adoption of democracy, there are similar fears and perhaps more dangerous than not adopting its principles and mechanisms on contemporary society, due to the absence of a clear modern Islamic systemic vision of the mechanisms for choosing regimes and their elements, and realistic practical bases for representation that enables them to come up with appropriate ruling leaders with Ensuring the peaceful transfer of power (time-limited or indefinite) without falling between the jaws of dictatorship and tyranny, in addition to that all these fears are limited to the Muslim-majority society, but the matter presents itself strongly at the same time, what is the case for Muslims in countries where Are they a minority? Or those who are marginalized under the weight of strict secular regimes? which excluded religion in all its manifestations and foundations from the public life of society and restricted its children. Is it not just for these regimes to exercise exclusion and restriction and tighten their control and authority in an authoritarian manner that they see as long as democracy is an enemy and a system of unbelief in the view of Muslims themselves?

This research will study the subject of democracy in one of the Islamic countries with a strict secular system, where Turkiye will be a model for this study, this system excluded Islam from public life and fought it for several decades through the application of various legal, constitutional and social practices that contributed to the alienation of Islam from its people And re-forming it according to what the secularism of its rulers desires, then we will stand on the reality of the role played by democracy later on, and to what extent it contributed to restoring justice to Islam and Muslims and their fairness in their religion in front of the secular principles that exclude everything religious.

Is it possible for democracy to play this equitable role for people, especially Muslims, in such regimes? Or even in countries with a Muslim minority that are treated in the same way? And what are the lessons learned for both parties that we referred to at the beginning of our conversation from opponents and supporters of democracy? And how can we, as Muslims, really take a fair stance on democracy and other Western theories that can be benefited from in the lives of Muslims and their reality? And his family about their world and their reality, the pension is excessive.

1) Ottoman Turkiye between the state and democracy is historical:

Why is Turkiye a model? Perhaps it is the first question that may come to mind when reading the title of this research, and the answer is simply attributed to three main points:

- Turkiye represents another historical figure who carried the banner of the Islamic caliphate and steered its policy for more than four centuries through a sophisticated administrative system that the world witnessed until the date of its abolition in 1924 AD and thus represents the closest and optimal model to talk about the Islamic political system represented in the caliphate system and its effects on society and the state and its relationship to Islam, and the mechanism of its dealing with the roots of democracy which appeared in its last stages¹.
- During the last hundred years, Turkiye has undergone radical and unilateral political transformations, starting with the fall of Turkiye The caliphate and the transition to a secular nation-state under the rule of a dictatorship that fights religion, then to a model of the historical conflict between the dictatorship of the military and civil politicians pro-democracy, and then the end of the shining star of liberal democracy that was able to deal with religion and secularism outside the framework of the supposed contradiction between them, to present a new model of democracy Liberalism was known as "Conservative Democracy", and with this distinctive experience, Turkiye constitutes an exemplary research subject for the titles we studied in the democracy and public policy course, which included the concepts of democracy. And democratization, dictatorship, traditional democracy, and liberalism².
- The strict line of secularism taken by (Ataturk's Turkiye) in its hostility to Islam and the reformulation of And the privatization that is practiced on this religion at all levels (state, society, individual), until Islam became a warrior among its people, a stranger in its homes for several decades, and then the democratic transformation that took place with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party and its predecessors of parties with Islamic backgrounds or tendencies, who restored Islam Many of his stolen rights in Turkiye make Turkiye a living model for studying the impact of democracy on Islam as a religion and to what extent it can be used to obtain the rights of Muslims in countries where they constitute a marginal majority or even a minority³.

2) The Ottoman Caliphate and Islam Political (1517 - 1924 AD)

The system of government in the Ottoman Empire was characterized by a special character, in terms of administration and governance, and the basic character on which the state was based was Islamic law, even before it assumed the caliphate of Muslims, in addition to the old Turkish customs and traditions and some organizations borrowed from previous countries such as the Seljuk and Byzantine. The Ottoman Sultan, as the caliph of the Muslims in this state later, was the head of the state, who met in his person the two largest bodies ever, namely the great leadership and the Islamic sheikhdom, in his capacity as the protector of the country and the and he had to obtain a fatwa from the Sheikh of Islam, before taking any political, religious or social action, and this abuse, its method, and its purpose differed from one sultan to another depending on the sultan himself⁴.

The Ottomans, through the Sheikhdom of Islam, which they established, laid the foundation stone for the first governmental religious institution under the supervision of government in the history of

¹ Ural, Nazim. *Democratic Transformation in Turkey*, (Cairo: Dar Al Mahrousa for Publishing and Distribution, 2016). p 17.

² Ahmed, Fairouz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*, translated by Salman Al-Wasiti and Hamdi Al-Douri, (Baghdad: Dar Al-Hikma, 2000). p 394-397.

³ Aras, Bulent et al. *The Turkish Transformation towards the Arab Region*, (Amman: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2012). p.24.

⁴ Al-Aroud, Rakez Salem. *The Role of the Military Institution in the Turkish Political System: Between Democratic Transition and Secular State (2002-2017)*, Ph.D. Thesis, Mutah University, Jordan, 2017), p.79.

Muslims, and before them, the rulers dealt with the jurists according to needs and interest's enforcer of Islamic law, and despite that, the Sultan was not an absolute ruler, as He could not openly ignore the limits of Islamic law. Sometimes they approach the Sahafi's and sometimes they approach the Maliki's, and sometimes they resent them, and it was possible for the ruler to deal with the jurists of the four schools at the same time, just as the jurists and judges owed obedience and loyalty to the ruler, but they were not all speaking with his tongue, and they did not depend on him for their livelihood.

But the Ottomans, by declaring the Sheikh al-Islam institution, restricted religion to the circle of this institution, which was granted legitimacy according to the Hanafi school of thought adopted by the Ottoman Empire, while other sects and trends were removed from the circle of government protection, to turn into civil jurisprudence activities that cannot influence the masses. Rather, it has become the subject of monitoring the authority and surrounded by suspicions, and these jurists have turned into state officials who wait for its instructions, speak their tongue, and issue fatwas in its favor, to protect these job positions and the privileges that are associated with them. they and their role are contested, their influence is threatened, and there is a sign between them and the ruler⁵.

The position of Sheikh al-Islam appeared for the first time as an independent, integrated religious institution in the Ottoman Empire, during the reign of Sultan Murad II in 1425 AD, then since the reign of Sultan Selim I, or whoever held the title of Caliph of Muslims and Commander of the Faithful from the Othman family in 1517 AD, Sheikh al-Islam was considered the third figure of Where the importance in the state after the Caliph and the Grand Vizier, but his word was more influential in religious issues, and even the entire social, economic, political and cultural issues of the state needed fatwas, and he was also consulted in matters of war and peace, and in carrying out reforms and governmental changes, and the Ottoman Empire was exploiting the elders of Islam In the center and in the periphery as well, in champions Rakez Salem Al-Aroud.

The Role of the Military Institution in the Turkish Political System: Between democratization and secularism the legitimate state about popular revolutions within the borders of the state, the Sheikh of Islam's tasks, through his fatwa, were to decide whether the uprising against the state was legitimate or invalid. Accordingly, Sheikh Al-Islam issued a fatwa deposing the caliph, as happened with Sultan Murad V, Abdul Hamid II, and other sultans who were deposed by the fatwa of Sheikh Al-Islam⁶.

The Ottoman Sultanate and some of its sultans, such as Muhammad al-Fatih, Suleiman the Magnificent, and others, worked to consolidate the principles of Islam and spread it through the conquest movement, especially in Europe; Constantinople, the capital of the West in its time, defied even the honorable Companions and was conquered only by the Ottomans. There is also no doubt that the institution of the Sheikhs of Islam and its sheiks have also given a lot to this religion and its people. But the witness to what we went to is the problem of employing religion and its embodiment in an institutional administrative body that monopolizes the jurisprudential opinion and embodies Islam and its word and makes it part of the pillars of governance. Its dangers appear when corrupt rulers come to power and weak jurists who benefit from the head of these institutions, which work to devote religion and its strength in the hearts of people to establish political conditions that are from injustice and tyranny in a place, and it is not clearer than what we suffer in this time from the use of such religious institutions in the hands of rulers. tyrannical darkness, the year that the Ottomans enacted in the establishment of the Sheikhdome of Islam had the following catastrophic effects on Islam and its people,

⁵ Wardiani, Salih. *Defender of Jurists: Jurists and the Ottomans*, (Beirut: Dar Al-Gharb Al-Islami, 1998), p.64.

⁶ Shkirat, Ahmed Sedqi. *History of the Foundation of the Sheikhs of Islam in the Ottoman Era*, (Amman: Dar Al Kindi, 2002), p.39.

especially as it will pass with us when the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the policy that the secularists followed in molding and privatizing this religion even though the Sheikdom of Islam⁷.

3) Ottoman Democracy (1808 - 1923 AD)

The constitutional process in Ottoman Turkiye began with the "Deed of Agreement" issued in 1808 AD, which was signed by the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. With this agreement, the authority of the state was determined for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, this document is the first constitutional document in the history of the Turks. It is the first official document specifying the powers of the Ottoman Sultan. This document, which is the first step towards the concept of the state of law, is a document similar to a constitution, but it is not a constitution in terms of form. It is very similar to the Magna Carta Agreement concluded in England in 1215 in terms of content⁸.

During the period of Sultan Abdul Majeed, the Tanzimat Firman (Tanzimat Fermani) was issued in 1839 AD, which is the first stage of being influenced by the principles of Western law, and the Sultan assigned the oath following the principles and provisions of this Firman for the first time in the history of the Sultanate. It was not announced as a result of a popular rebellion or the pressure of some sects, but rather it was by the self-will of the Sultanate and its authorities headed by the Sultan. Furman Tanzimat - which represents the first reaction of the Ottoman Empire to French colonialism and the revolutions that spread in Europe from a legal point of view, it is the first Firman that includes major developments in various branches of law (such as penalties, administration, and trade). The Firman stipulates the need to issue new laws to manage the state well. It also includes many provisions and articles related to determining and using state power, in addition to providing basic rights and freedoms. for the Ottoman people Then Sultan Abd al-Majid himself issued the Islahat Fermani in the form and emphatic Firman Tanzimat in 1856 AD, which was known⁹.

In the Ottoman language as "Humayun's Line" (Hatti Humayun). This Firman has been established by England and France asked the Grand Vizier "Ali Pasha" in Istanbul as a reward for the support of these countries to the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War against Russia, and as a condition for the Ottoman Empire to join the European family. Legally, this decree of reforms is not a charter.

Rather, it is similar to the constitutional document, and the purpose of this Firman is to achieve equality between the Ottoman classes, as it contained many provisions that gave broader rights to people of other religions. over another because of religion, language, or nationality. He also gave all Ottoman classes the right to employment in state institutions with the application of the rules of specific institutions and based on this decree, the condition of Islam was "abolished" as a basic condition of employment¹⁰.

With the passage of time and the development of events and as a result of the expansion of freedoms and the entry of new elements into the governmental institution and spheres of influence as a result of the application of the Tanzimat Firman and after it the reforms, the young Ottoman intellectuals and writers in that period of the Tanzimat began to demand legitimate administration (the participation of the people in choosing who governs them) influenced by Europe, and indeed as a result of efforts The great thing that these intellectuals did and their influence on the decision-making joints.

⁷ Ghazali, Abdel Halim. *The New Islamists and Fundamental Secularism in Turkey, Shadows of the Silent Revolution*, (Cairo: Al Sharq International Library, 2007), p.56.

⁸ Butterfield, Herbert. *Magna Carta in the historiography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, University of Reading, 1969), p.21.

⁹ Saban, Suhail. *The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Historical Ottoman Terms*, (Riyadh: King Library Publications Fahd National, 2000), p.17.

¹⁰ Takamatsu, Yoichi. "Osmanlı Belge Yönetiminde Kesilmiş Hatt-ı Hümayunlar." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 51, no. 51 (2018): p.125.

Sultan Abdul Aziz was removed and deposed, and the first legitimacy in the history of the Sultanate was announced in 1876 AD, in the precedent of its history for the Ottoman Sultanate, and they appointed "Sultan Abdul Hamid II" in his place¹¹.

After assuming the Sultanate, Abdul Hamid II issued the Basic Law" in 1876, or what was known to the Ottoman Empire as "the conditional law" including legitimacy through the formation of the General Council, which is the first Council of the Ottoman State. By way of election and by the Council of Notables" whose members are appointed by the Sultan from among the state's employees¹².

This law is a constitution according to formal standards, and it is the first Ottoman constitution. The two constitutions of Belgium, issued in 1831, and Prussia, issued in 1851, were adopted as models during the drafting of this law, which was prepared by a special assembly headed by the Grand Vizier "Midhat Pasha" under the supervision of the same Sultan, who ratified it on December 23, 1876 AD, and this constitution became the legal document of the Ottoman state after it included the basic rights and freedoms of citizens, the state structure and its powers, and the relationship between them¹³.

Abdul Hamid II reactivated the Constitution of 1876 due to the military rebellion "Thessaloniki Rebellion" that occurred in 1908 AD, which was carried out by a group of officers from members of what was known at the time as the "Assembly of Union and Progress". The General Assembly was opened after the elections that took place on December 17, 1908 AD. The Assembly of Union and Progress obtained the majority in Parliament as a result of these elections, and thus the period of "second legitimacy" began with the dismissal of "Sultan Abdul Hamid II" due to the civil disobedience that took place on March 31, 1908 AD¹⁴.

After the dismissal of Abdul Hamid II, important amendments were made to the constitution, and a new version of it was issued in 1909. With these amendments, the 1876 constitution became the "constitution of a parliamentary monarchy". But despite the great changes that took place for a period of years to the Basic Law "Law of 1876" between the years 1908 - 1919, no kind of stability was achieved so he was unable to complete the formation of the elected councils¹⁵.

When Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrived in Ankara after the end of the First World War and the beginning of the War of Independence in 1919, the second statement was published in 1920 and the first building of Parliament was opened and its first session was held with less than half of the 323 members in a session described as secret, to fill the political vacuum that He was present at the time and began working for a new constitution. In this session, he took important decisions, including:

- Copying the decision to form the Turkish Grand National Assembly and naming Parliament in the name of the Turkish People's Assembly
- Election of Mustafa Kemal as Speaker of Parliament
- Defining the parliament's goal as "saving the great caliphate, ruling the country, and protecting it from foreign powers".
- Linking the decision to the phrase "Whoever opposes this law is considered a traitor to the nation."

The constitution of 1921 AD was issued later, which is the constitution of the state of Turkiye, which established the nation-state after the revolution. The first paragraph of this constitution included

¹¹Quataert, Donald. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (New Approaches to European History Book 34), Edition: 2 . (2005), p.83.

¹² Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, p.84.

¹³ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, p.85.

¹⁴ Mardin, Serif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East* Syracuse University Press; New edition. 2000), p.59.

¹⁵ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.60.

“that full sovereignty belongs to the state without conditions” and thus replaces Islam as a principle of political legitimacy¹⁶.

The Lausanne Conference in 1922, which was held to discuss the independence of Turkiye, and was headed by Kemal Mustafa, the delegation participating in, failed because of the English conditions that the government and the National Assembly objected to, which included four items:

- Abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in the country
- Expel all Bani Othman from Turkiye
- Confiscation of all the property of Bani Othman
- Transformation into a secular state.

As a result of this conference, a major dispute occurred between Mustafa Kamal, who supported the items, and the delegation next to him, with the National Assembly opposing it, and next to it, the Prime Minister. Early elections and the declaration of the republic were approved by the majority in the National Assembly, and the republic was declared on October 29, 1923, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected as the first president of the republic, Prime Minister Ismat Anonu was appointed.

The issue of declaring the republic led to the emergence of major differences between each of the supporters of the caliphate in Istanbul and the government of Ankara, and the main dispute at the time was what was the position of the caliph after the proclamation of the republic, and this dispute continued until it was terminated on March 3, 1924 AD, when the new parliament decided to abolish the caliphate and the sultanate and the caliph's departure from the country with all members of the Ottoman dynasty¹⁷.

4) Strict Turkish Secularism and Islam (1923 - 1938 AD)

Before the establishment of the republic, Islam helped legislate the patriarchal Ottoman rule and the secular authority owned by the sultans to control religion and the state, and their tool was to quell many revolutions and protest movements and call for wars through jihad fatwas, as we mentioned earlier, but the republic cut off everything that could link it to the empire. The Ottoman Empire had the legitimate authority derived from religion to become a strong, secular state that mimics the West¹⁸.

The emerging Turkish Republic had inherited the Ottoman Islamic culture and the Muslim majority among the population when it was established in 1923 AD, and then the founding elite chose the one-party system to achieve its vision of emulating the modernization project in the West, which was widely known for its secular procedures, and therefore instilling secularism became a priority before the application of democracy, but on the other hand, the modernization project and secular procedures conflict with Islam itself, so it became the main goal of the state, it is the privatization of this religion and thus the reformulation of Islam in terms of form and belonging¹⁹.

The first paragraph of the Constitution of 1921 AD declared that full sovereignty belongs to the state without conditions and thus replaces Islam as a principle of political legitimacy. Hence, the founding fathers of the modern Turkish state, led by Atatürk, set out to put in place a series of

¹⁶ Arat, Yesim. *Islam and Liberal Democracy in Turkey: Islamic Women in Politics*, Translation: Mona Hassan Al-Sawy, (Beirut: The Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 2013), p.29.

¹⁷ Arat, *Islam and Liberal Democracy in Turkey*, p.30.

¹⁸ Wargi, Jalal. *The Turkish Islamic Movement: Milestones of Experience and the Limits of the Path in the Arab World*, (Beirut: Dar Arab Science Publishers, 2010), p.59.

¹⁹ Lewis, Bernard. Why Turkey is the only Muslim democracy, *Middle East Quarterly*, March, 41-49. (1994), p.56.

institutional and legal changes to separate religion from the state and to separate religious institutions in the state from societal institutions²⁰.

The beginning was to separate the rule from the authority of the Caliph and make the position of the Caliph a symbolic and moral position and nothing more, than the fall of the entire Islamic Caliphate and the expulsion of the Caliph and his family in 1924 AD, then many changes followed, on top of which was the decision to appoint the position of Sheikh Al-Islam (the highest Islamic authority in the Ottoman Empire) in the hands of the government after it was done by election among the jurists of the Sheikdom Institution and appointment by the Sultan himself, as well as the abolition of the ministries concerned with religious institutions and as an alternative to that, the General Department of Religious Affairs was established in addition to the General Department of Endowments, In addition, a law on the unity of religious education was issued and the state was granted the right to monitor it, and in 1926 a new civil law was adopted from the Swiss laws. Confused by the authority of Islamic law "Muslim law" from the political and social lives. There was a clear desire not only to separate Islam from the state but also to control and mold it through the scientific process carried out by the founders of the Turkish Republic²¹.

The quest continued to impose control over Islam and its role in the lives of individuals, not only at the official or legal level but also at the level of the whole people. Many decisions were taken, the most important of which are²²:

- Closure of religious institutions, mosques, monasteries, and all holy places and diversion of the department from them to museums, which in turn led to the severing of all links that were used by individuals in spreading Islam in public life.
- Preventing men from wearing the fez and religious dress, which was one of the Islamic customs. It was replaced by new Western hats imposed under the hat law promulgated by Atatürk.
- Translating the call to prayer from Arabic into Turkish and issuing laws prohibiting the call to prayer and prayer in the Arabic language.
- Abolishing Islamic courts and replacing them with civil courts.
- Abolishing the Hijri calendar and switching to the Gregorian calendar
- Officially adopting secularism and canceling the constitutional article that states that the state's official religion is Islam
- Abolishing the Ottoman alphabet and replacing it with Latin The legitimacy.

“The power of the state and the control of the founding fathers” that was reached with difficulty could not change the fact that the state was governed by a one-party system until 1950 AD, and this system put secular reforms at the expense of implementing democracy²³.

The strict measures taken by the secularists against everything religious in Turkiye, especially Islam, were imposed by the reality of dominating the powers of the presidency, parliament, government, and even the judiciary. The Arab-Islamic culture, which is only suitable for Bedouin (according to Atatürk's opinion), where Europe stipulated that Turkiye should implement secularism and ignored democracy, as we saw in the Treaty of Lausanne, although from Ma'rib this reprehensible disregard by the democrats, It is to make room for this strict dictatorship in the abolition of Islam from this country that was the gateway to Islam to Europe, whether through the previous Ottoman conquests or through the migrations that followed the fall of the Ottoman Empire, where there was a prevalent belief among these Europeans that Islam constitutes a real threat to European culture. Christianity and this religion

²⁰ Arat, *Islam and Liberal Democracy in Turkey*, p.32.

²¹ Lewis, *Why Turkey is the only Muslim democracy*, p.74.

²² Wargi, *The Turkish Islamic Movement*, p.70.

²³ Arat, *Islam and Liberal Democracy in Turkey*, p.34.

must be reformulated following European culture, and because democracy can be exploited by Muslims in imposing their Islamic culture and teachings, it was necessary to make the changes that we saw far from democracy under a strict dictatorial totalitarian rule. Atatürk was the right man for him by his religious background and politics which cannot be discussed here²⁴.

5) The struggle for dictatorship and democracy (1938 - 2002 AD)

The dictatorship was established in Turkiye through the implementation of the one-party system, the Republican People's Party, which imposed its hegemony over the army, government, and parliament, beginning with Ataturk's presidency until he died in 1938 AD, then headed by his successor Ismet Inonu, who followed the same approach. The one-party system continued until 1950 AD, during this period the actual democratic life was disrupted, and it was limited to some legal reforms, especially those related to women and their emancipation and granting them some political rights, according to which they obtained the right to vote and nominate for parliament and to hold governmental and judicial positions²⁵.

In light of these tyrannical practices that prevailed in the nascent Turkish Republic, especially those related to religious life, which was completely excluded from the life of the individual and society as well as the state, it was natural that the application of democracy in the state and aspirations to achieve it passes through the easing of state control in public and religious life so was a founding "The Democratic Party" in 1946 marked the beginning of this change, as the party promised to establish democracy at least in part, allowing religious expression in public life. In 1950, in the first democratic elections to take place in the Turkish Republic, the Democrats came to power directly at the expense of Ismat Anonu, the leader of the Republican People's Party, which has dominated politics since 1923. The CHP lost in the first real democratic entitlement to the Democratic Party led by Jalal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, who led the process of change through democracy so that the first of these changes is to allow the call to prayer again in Arabic, open schools for imams and preachers, and try to satisfy the people's desire to openly perform religious rites²⁶.

But these transformations and changes that took place in the name of democracy did not live up to the patrons of secularism and its sons who support it, and it was the first coup of the army On the legitimacy of the Turkish state in 1960 when the democratically elected government was dismissed and the ruling Democratic Party was accused of undermining the sacred constitutional principle of "secularism and the separation of religion from the state" by granting influence to Islamists. In light of this coup and these accusations, the death sentence was carried out against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers. Ismet Inonu took over the government again after the coup led by army officers from his party, where a constitutional amendment was approved dividing the legislative authority into two chambers (two chambers similar to the General Council established by the Ottomans) an elected and another appointed council to control more of the legislative authority by the influential People's Party in all parts of the state, after which the army retreated and returned to submit to civilian rule, and elections were held. A new democracy in 1965 was again lost by Ismet Inonu and the Republican People's Party, but this time to the Justice Party and its leader, Suleyman Demirel²⁷.

The advocates of democracy did not despair and continued their struggle, exploiting the development of the state and its demands for more democracy, until the first Islamic political party, the

²⁴ Al-Allaf, Ibrahim Khalil. *The Historical Roots of Secularism in Contemporary Turkey*, Social Affairs Magazine, Year (15) Issue (60), (UAE: United Arab Emirates, 1998). P.36.

²⁵ Ghalioun, Burhan. *About the democratic option: a critical study*, (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1994), p.62.

²⁶ Kuru, Ahmet T. and Stepan, Alfred. *Democracy, Islam, and secularism in Turkey: (Religion, Culture, and Public Life*, 11, 2012), p.54.

²⁷ Yavuz, M. Hakan. *Secularism and Muslim democracy in Turkey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.132.

"National Order Party" appeared in 1970 AD, but soon this party was dissolved based on the decision of the Constitutional Court, which claimed that the party exploited religion and threatened Secularism, and thus violated the Constitution. It didn't take long for an alternative from this party to appear, It is the "National Salvation Party" that established a customary value and pointed to the importance of history in community life, and through this approach linked to Turkish traditions and heritage, it became a critic of Western modernization that suppressed the religious role in people's lives²⁸.

But this democratic process did not last more than six years, and it ended in 1971 AD, the army intervened and forced the government and its president to resign, under the pretext of the violence that prevailed between the fascist capitalist right and the communist left. After that, the country continued under the indirect control of the military in a state of political stalemate, chaos, and civil unrest, which necessitated the army's intervention more violently and directly this time by declaring the military coup in the country in 1980 and imposing martial law²⁹.

In 1982, the ruling military council of the country made constitutional amendments in which it restored the legislative authority (Parliament) to its previous era in one council and set the presidential term of seven years, after which the military council dissolved itself and new democratic elections were held. In 1983, the Homeland Party won it, headed by Turgut Ozal, whose time of rule constituted a truce in the identity struggle between Islamists and secularists, as he held the premiership and the Republic, respectively, for about a decade without clashing with the army, and only ended his political life with his death.

During Ozal's era, religious schools expanded and Islamists entered the field of culture and media, where they issued a newspaper and established publishing houses and private radio and television stations, and they merged greatly into the neo-liberal environment, and when Ozal assumed the presidency in 1991, his (Islamic) behavior reached its climax when the presidential palace was established, Hosting Sufi religious celebrations of the Prophet's birthday, and this was one of the scenes that Turkiye has not witnessed since its founding, and it has not been repeated after that stage³⁰.

Despite all this, the army stood motionless. Ozal even spent two electoral terms as prime minister while the army was taking over the presidency through its former commander Kenan Evren, while the Turkish generals were moving against any government for less than that, as happened in a coup. The bloody 1960's. Analysts attribute the reasons for this to external factors represented in the war at the time in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and America's desire to expand religious sentiments in Islamic countries, including Turkiye, to nourish the mujahideen there. As well as to internal reasons represented in the attempt to absorb the Islamic movements within the framework of the state and its secular system to pull the rug out from under the feet of the political Islamic current³¹.

After Ozal died in 1993 (who was said to have been poisoned and his case is still standing), Transco Çiller succeeded in becoming the first female prime minister in Turkiye from the conservative True Path Party and led an anti-Islamist coalition government in partnership with the Republican People's Party, but this coalition did not last more than two years, it collapsed in front of the big victory of the parties loyal to the Islamic Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, but these winning parties were not able to form a bloc that would enable them to form a government, which opened the way for the formation of a new anti-Islamist coalition, which again fell a resounding fall in elections 1996 AD in front of the Islamic Welfare Party³².

²⁸ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim democracy*, p.74.

²⁹ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.75.

³⁰ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.76.

³¹ Kuru, et.al., *Democracy, Islam, and secularism*, p.55.

³² Rabasa, Angel. Larabee, F. Stephen. *The rise of political Islam in turkey*. (RAND Corporation. Edition: 1, 2008), p.63.

When the Islamic Welfare Party was established, it was planned to follow in the footsteps of the National Order Party and insist on seeking to implement the moral system.” Unlike the previous other parties that played an active role in the coalition governments in the seventies, but remained small parties, the Islamic Welfare Party became the largest opposition party in the state, then it became the largest coalition partner in the government after the 1996 elections, where it obtained the largest percentage of votes. The Welfare Party supported the system of “multiple legal systems” and the freedom of citizens to choose the legal form they like, allowing them to live the class of their beliefs. Then the party presented A proposal to Parliament to amend the principle of secularism, which is considered “according to what the party deems inappropriate to the requirements of the times, this initiative failed.” The initiative, however, was indicative of the direction adopted by the party, whose members declared that the concept of secularism, which is one of the basic principles of the republic, was inappropriate to the needs of most of the people³³.

The ongoing secularism process and the Islamists' challenge to its spread led to a sharp polarization within society that made each side suspicious of the other, and then each side began to consolidate its values over time, but the few electoral groups that criticized republican secularism and the state's rule of religion were not strong enough to end this polarization Or close the chasm, the military memorandum was present to decide the fall of the Islamist government led by welfare from power after only one year of its existence. But the storm of the military and the secularists that engulfed the Islamists did not end there. The debate continued over the extent of the Welfare Party's commitment and contribution to supporting democracy in the state, especially with the bold statements and moves of the Islamic spirit of Erbakan, which was understood as a challenge to the generals despite their many warnings to him, and it did not end. This storm only came with the issuance of the Constitutional Court's decision to dissolve the party in 1998 on the accusation that it had become a headquarters of anti-secular activity, and Erbakan was sentenced to ban him from political work for life, although the nature of Turkish secularism and its limits were questionable, it was a necessity for democracy, which made for many, the court's decision is sufficient evidence that the party posed a threat to democracy³⁴.

After dissolving their party and banning Erbakan from political work, the leaders of the Welfare Party formed a new party, which they called the Virtue Party. However, this party also soon met the fate of the Welfare Party of dissolution and ban because it was an extension of welfare and anti-secularism. After that, the leaders of the Virtue divided among themselves and formed two parties. The Happiness Party led by Rajani Qutan and the Justice and Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, shared the legacy of the welfare of parliamentarians, but happiness failed in the elections that took place in 2002, while the Justice and Development Party swept the parliament and won (363) seats out of (550)³⁵. With this victory, a new phase in Turkiye's history began.

6) Conservative democracy and the reformulation of Turkish identity

During the decades in which we reviewed its political path from the history of Turkiye, a broad social and political current emerged and developed, which was concerned with preserving the common Turkish values, traditions, and heritage, and at the same time sought to develop and modernize society and the state. Secularism - Islam, which often meant that the presence of one means the exclusion of the other, especially in the public sphere. This trend "developed little by little, as we have noted, until it moved from the margins of political life to its center through many different experiences; It was a loose movement that expressed general traditional forces and was expressed by many social and political

³³ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.64.

³⁴ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.65.

³⁵ Kaddoura, Imad. *Conservative Democracy and the Future of Turkish Secularism*; (Qatar: The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2014), p.9.

figures such as Saeed Nursi, Adnan Menderes, Turgut Ozal, Necmettin Erbakan, and Fethullah Gulen, and then its momentum and prestige increased until it became the most prominent and broad in Turkiye on the official and popular levels with the adoption of the ruling Justice and Development Party Conservative democracy is a political identity. And the identity "Preservation" means³⁶:

- Commitment and promotion of the common values and traditions of the Turkish people, including Islam
- Economic liberalization
- Political reforms
- Expanding freedoms

The official recognition of the conservative movement began after the military coup in the eighties. The conflict between the left and the right exhausted the country. To prevent further social divisions due to this conflict, the military institution launched an initiative described as "a new philosophy for the state"; based on A combination that combines Turkish nationalism and Islam, and this combination aims to create a homogeneous and stable society using religion, traditions, and conservative values, so the family has become the most important "institution" ensuring social stability³⁷.

The military coups also led to the collapse of socialist solidarity networks in the cities, leaving a void that was quickly filled by Sufi orders and religious groups, which provided for the needs of workers and the urban poor, which led to the strengthening of conservative awareness. Another profound socio-economic factor that helped in the rise of the governorate was also represented by immigration, the largest in the country since the sixties, People moved from eastern and central Anatolia to the western coast, and from villages to major cities, and many immigrants did not adapt to the urban lifestyle, and remained to preserve their village traditions and values, using traditional networks (family, family and religious ties that often formed a resource for them). Economic and social support is a result of the spirit of solidarity that these networks fulfill³⁸.

In this climate of great socio-economic and political changes, a new social group emerged called the "Anatolian bourgeoisie". The members of this class originally belonged to the social margins whose parents were small farmers, craftsmen, or merchants. This class was able to employ and benefit from several things in building construction. itself and its strength, and among these things³⁹:

- The education campaign carried out by the state since the thirties to build a "civilized and western society, so the members of this class acquired important skills.
- "Cultural Capital" gained from their affiliation with Sufi orders and religious and distinguished networks with great solidarity among themselves.
- A large part of the capital that was invested in their first investments was obtained from the savings of Turkish immigrant workers in Europe or investments coming from other Islamic countries.

³⁶ Kaddoura, *Conservative Democracy*, p.11.

³⁷ Devereux, Robert. *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* Baltimore, (Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), p.236.

³⁸ Joppien, Charlotte. "A Reinterpretation of Tradition? The Turkish AKP and its Local Politics", (Hamburg: Hamburg University. May, 2011), p.112.

³⁹ Ameen, Salahuddin A. M. "Study And Analysis Of The Effectiveness Of Turkey's Economic Policies On Economic Diversification." *Tanmiyat Al-Rafidain* 37, no. 119 (2018): 161-178.

Thus, these businessmen represent Islamic modernity that revived new elites and a strong civil society, and accordingly turned them into an important social force that formed the “financial backbone” of the Justice and Development Party⁴⁰.

The Justice and Development Party developed a new political identity, through which it wanted to reshape the existing system of social, political, and economic relations in Turkiye, by adopting a program that approximates the components of society and the existing political spectrum, placing itself in its midst based on the common Turkish values that unite these components, he adopted a loose ideology called "Conservative Democracy", to create a concept on which party members and supporters of Islamic orientations, conservative currents, nationalists, liberals, and even some of the traditional secular elite would meet. Thus, the party established a political discourse and an identity that combines conservative, democracy, and liberalism.

A broad coalition of the Turkish people, Islamists, bourgeoisie, liberals, and even secularists gathered on him. Perhaps the repeated ban on pro-Islamist political parties, such as those formed by Necmettin Erbakan, prompted some of their leaders, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Bulent Arinc, to search for a solution to this seemingly endless dilemma. They established a party with a new vision, taking advantage of all the mistakes of the previous parties, especially the caution against falling into a confrontation with the principles of secularism⁴¹.

The political vision of the Justice and Development Party confirms that the party, with this new identity, has become “the center of political action and not in the margins, and that it has transformed the capabilities of the conservative movement into an “institution,” and that Conservative democracy "combines societal differences based on a culture of compromise in the political sphere," and that the party, through a policy of incubating unity, "positions itself as a uniting point for individuals coming from different political currents based on established values and principles"⁴².

The Justice and Development Party has been more careful in approaching the issue of the role of religion. (Islam) in politics, benefiting in this from previous experiences. The party focused on a new approach in which it avoided the direct role of religion in politics. It endeavored with every effort to maintain its commitment to keeping Islamic symbols outside Turkish public policy, as the party’s program emphasized this vision in the text. However, it is not acceptable to use religion for political, economic, and other interests.” But at the same time, the party did not ignore Islam but considered it an authentic element that represents the traditional values of most of the Turkish people, so it does not need those Islamic slogans or programs, but rather sought to expand the field of religious, political, and cultural freedoms for all in the country, enabling the components of society Turks are free to practice what they believe in⁴³.

Through this conservative social vision (Islamic values) and the pragmatic policy pursued by the Justice and Development Party, it was able to achieve a lot of progress on the level of religious freedoms, especially concerning the fairness of Islam as a religion and the expansion of the circle of ritual practices and even the Islamic identity among its adherents on the one hand, and on the level of consolidating liberal democracy and its principles on the one hand. After it was fictitious, it would be overthrown, if

⁴⁰ Joppien, A Reinterpretation of Tradition?, p.33.

⁴¹Al-Qatari, Al-Safsafi Ahmed. the Justice and Development Party and the Contemporary Turkish Experience, International Ambassador For publication, Cairo, 2012. 4- Burhan Ghalioun, On the Democratic Choice, a critical study, (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1994), p.199.

⁴² Company, Richard. Turkey and the United States, the arms embargo period, (USA: CEMOTI, Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien. Année, 1980), p.44.

⁴³ Al-Nuaimi, Ahmed Nouri. *Islamic Movements in Turkey, Present and Future*, (Amman: Dar Al-Bashir for printing, 1983), p.43.

the military willed it, and among the most important of these results achieved by the Justice and Development Party at the level of Islam and democracy^{44, 45}:

- Ease restrictions on freedom of expression
- Granting rights to the Kurdish language and broadcasting the first Kurdish language program on the official channel
- Reducing the role of the army in political life
- A new protocol abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances
- Strict measures to criminalize violence against women
- Withdrawal of the controversial proposal made by the Justice and Development to criminalize adultery
- Overturn the veto of President Sezer on the government's proposal to ease restrictions on teaching the Holy Qur'an
- Constitutional amendment to allow women to wear headscarves in universities
- Giving civilian courts the authority to try military personnel for crimes related to national security and organized crime.
- Constitutional amendments to make Turkiye more democratic.
- Constitutional amendments that give parliament greater power over the army and judiciary
- Appointment of the army chief for the first time by a civilian chief (Abdullah Gül)
- A constitutional amendment to elect the president directly from the people.

7) Turkiye and the future of change:

The Justice and Development Party has achieved impressive success in transforming the conservative "marginal forces" into an effective institutional system, placing them in the "Center of Power" (the institutions of the presidency, government, and parliament). The control of a party with Islamic roots and the traditional conservative forces allied with it over the state, especially with its announcement of seeking to establish a new republic⁴⁶:

- Is there a real threat posed by this proposal to the secular system of Marginal forces?
- Will a new system be established on its ruins?
- Or does the Justice and Development Party aim to reformulate Turkish secularism in a manner consistent with common values and traditions?

Very sensitive and complex questions await the Justice and Development Party, and it is ready for the days to answer them, but according to the "political vision of the Justice and Development Party, the party believes in the policy that normalizes the system." Which is based on three main points⁴⁷:

- Rebuilding relations (Religious-Political, Traditions-Contemporary, Religion-State, State-Society - The Individual) and removing the elements of tension between them.
- Rebuilding these relationships by referring to the "natural components inherited in society"
- Turkiye and its common values. Not to impose a strict philosophy of the state that excludes traditions under the pretext of modernization, exclusion of religion under the pretext of Westernization, and exclusion of other cultural and ethnic identities.

⁴⁴ Kemal, Yildiz. The Justice, and Development Party: Systems, Programs, and Ideas, *Journal of Islam and World Studies* 11. (2015), pp.67-71.

⁴⁵ Kazem, Ahmed Adnan. The Justice and Development Party and the problem of the transition towards a presidential system in Turkey: The vision of analyzing political reality and facing challenges, *Tikrit Journal of Political Science*, 10th, (2017), p.28.

⁴⁶ Al-Qatari, The Justice and Development Party, p.204.

⁴⁷ Kuru, et.al., Democracy, Islam, and secularism, p.37.

Despite all that, this vision suggests a clear targeting of Turkish secularism founded by Kemal Ataturk, the party, and its leaders' constant emphasis on maintaining secularism as an identity for the state, and their determination to rebuild "that identity so that it does not collide with Turkish values, indicates that they aspire to a regime Secular "but of a different nature. In this regard, scholars give different names to the form of secularism that the AKP goes along with; Some of them call it "Negative Secularism"⁴⁸, as an expression of the desire for the secular system to allow the practice of religious rites freely without interference in the way of life of citizens. "Elimination Solid"⁴⁹.

Whatever the Justice and Development Party aspires to, no doubt going back has become impossible, despite the fears that still exist in the party, and the hope that is still held by the secularists. People's lives, even including clothing, social and family customs, will have no return, not for nothing but the people who tasted the successes that led Turkiye from a poor, backward developing country with the tyranny of its rulers to an influential regional and international state and one of the ten largest and fastest-growing economies. As this prosperity is reflected in people's lives, livelihood, security, freedoms, and justice that they live in, these people can't turn back on their heels and return to the yoke of tyranny and dictatorship, at least in the foreseeable future, as nothing is guaranteed in politics^{50,51}.

But what appears on the horizon as a result of the Turkish political experience, especially the experience of the Justice and Development Party, is that the future of Muslim societies, in general, is moving towards crystallizing a real political thought with Islamic values in which it deals with reality and establishes moral and Islamic values and principles and moves away from the vulgar use of religion in slogans and banners held on the foreheads of politicians who, whether they cloak themselves in religion, are hypocritical and ingratiating to mobilize peoples and carry out guardianship over them in the name of religion. Or are those who are sincere in their intentions, but fact lack much understanding of the great historical lessons that Islam reaped as a result of the use of religion in politics as analyzes and slogans by poor knowledgeable, and philosophical elites with political science and no experience to walk in its corridors, taking from the understanding of reality and trying to adapt to it and exploit it in the best way to exploit the investigation The gains are far from the "Don Quixote" confrontations.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the politics of nations and peoples is one of the most complex and most difficult tasks that can be entrusted to a person. If a person is righteous, his policy will be correct, and if his policy is corrupted, his policy of corruption will be faster. There is also no doubt that we have in our Islamic civilizational history human examples and examples that are not prophetic, which have given humanity great lessons in the people's policy, establishing justice, achieving development and prosperity for the state and society, but the reality is different. This is no longer the time of the loyal and the heroes, nor the time of the individual. It has become the time for the systems and institutions that lead nations.

Because of our lack of this in our contemporary reality as Muslims, we have been living for quite some time in a state of double dispersion, the dispersion between the memory of a glorious past of the one state, rational politics, and the just ruler, and the bitter reality of injustice, tyranny, backwardness, and division, and an intellectual dispersion also between legal texts and historical heritage. The greatness of the palace of the Muslims is many in its development according to the jurisprudence of reality for various reasons, so the language of many of its banner campaigners turned into a deaf

⁴⁸ Çağaptay, Soner. "The Empires Strike Back," *The New York Times*, January 14. (2009), p.38.

⁴⁹ Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p.39.

⁵⁰ Baghdadbay, Naima. The Political Experience of Turkey and Its Repercussions on the Local Level and the Arab Reality, *Journal of Cultural Dialogue*, University of Abdelhamid Ben Badis - Faculty of Social Sciences - Laboratory of Dialogue of Civilizations, Cultural Diversity and Philosophy of Peace, Vol. 6, no.1, (2016), p.251.

⁵¹ Shaira, Omar. Challenges Facing Turkey as a Democratic Regional Power, *Journal of Democracy, Foundation Al-Ahram* 16, no.64. (2016), p.160.

language that speaks detached from reality, trying to be covered with the veil of history to take refuge in it when it wanted a correct understanding of the text and was unable to harmonize it with reality, so it exposed its weakness and lack of resourcefulness, and between modernity and development. Big, no carpentry, no idea or application, the strange West is the pioneer of civilization and the captain of its ship. We were happy to wander at its doors and in its streets to catch what is thrown at us of the sick and fat, so we sanctify it and be dazzled by it and lock our understanding on its molds and restrict our opinion to what it is.

In the conclusion of the study, we are not in the position of promoting democracy on the approach of those who adopt it with everything in it and those who are wrong with those who oppose it for launching them, nor are we in favor of supporting the policies of the Turkish Justice and Development Party and setting an example that should be followed, no matter how much we admire it, but the purpose of this research is to indicate the tensions, contradictions and difficult conditions that Turkish democracy has gone through until it reached what it has reached, and the vital and constructive role it plays today in the life of Turkiye as a country and a Muslim people who enjoy practicing their religion after a history of deprivation from it, through the practice of this democracy and patience with it and making good use of it. Its principles are from well-informed, conscious, and capable elites. This role, which had the longest hand in the justice of Islam as a religion and not as a political doctrine, and the biggest sale in achieving justice for Muslims as children of a lofty religion entitled to enjoy its rituals and laws that were denied them by both strict secularism and brutal dictatorship.

Away from the controversy of terminology, the chaos of debates, and the play on words, we need to re-read our Islamic self from the perspective of reality with its challenges and circumstances. If we look at the opponents and supporters of democracy among the Muslims and ask the following question:

- *Why do Muslims not want democracy? And why would they want it?*

If we find that both groups take their stand for the same goal, which is (the application of God's law) because they believe, and it is a true belief, that it is the best system for man and his life, but their difference and opposition is based on the difference in the means to reach this end. Through the pure Islamic heritage and historical practice, and the team that embraces democracy completely, it seems that the end can only be achieved through adaptation to reality, innovation, and concepts of good governance. If we continue to discuss the matter from the starting points of each group, the intellectual and theorizing debate about Islam and democracy will not end as long as it is based on the illusory duality between them, whether inequality among the opponents or containment and identification with the supporters. Therefore, if we are eager for a solution and we want to get out of this vicious circle to enjoy the benefits of our reality and enjoy the application of the principles of our true Sharia and come up with a general policy in Islam that is based on the correct religious text and fits the reality and promotes it, we must get out of this closed box and think of solutions based on a general methodology (Applied to democracy) is based on two main points:

- Being convinced of the historicism of political practice in Islam and reconsidering the legal texts according only to Islamic ethics and the Shariah objectives.
- Dismantling the relevant terms coming to us and activating the functional view of these interests and their abstract principles and giving them priority over the textual and idiomatic definition.

Therefore, it is necessary for us as Muslims to develop new concepts in politics which are compatible with Islam and its ethical principles and stem from reality and civilizational requirements, to play the leading role in achieving both intellectual and applied advancement for the Muslim nation, which leads it to return to the forefront of its civilized role that combines Islamic values and civilized development.

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