AL-TAFTĀZĀNĪ'S SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE IN *SHARḤ AL-TALWĪḤ 'ALĀ AL-TAWḌĪḤ LI MATN AL-TANQĪḤ FĪ UṢŪL AL-FIQH*

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Abstract

This study discusses the sources of knowledge based on Sa'd 'Umar Mas'ūd al-Taftāzānī's (d. 492 A.H/ 1390 A.D) exposition in his *uṣūl al-fiqh* work *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ li Matn al-Tanqīḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. This study focuses on the active and dynamic inter-relational function of the senses (*al-ḥiss*) and the intellect (*al-'aql*), which are the two key channels of knowledge established for the *mukallaf*, besides the true reports (*khabar ṣādiq*). Al-Taftāzānī expounds the nature of *mukallaf*'s external senses functioning to perceive sensible objects of knowledge, the function of the internal senses to perceive the intelligible object of knowledge, and the locuses of each of the internal senses are in the brain. Al-Taftāzānī asserts the prominence of the fifth internal sense, the Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*), above all the other internal senses. The function of the Rational Imaginative is not for reproduction only, but it also performs in creating (*ibtikār*) new form, which the form has not been imagined by the senses before it. In other words, it points to the potentiality of the soul of the *mukallaf*, to create new knowledge. Al-Taftāzānī discusses the four stages of the intellect, which he indicates that for the *mukallaf*, it is at least to acquire at the second

level of the intellect; *al-'aql bi al-malakah* (intelligence in habitus; *intellectus in habitu*), because the intellect at this level has already acquired the necessary knowledge and the conceptual knowledge of the Sharī'ah, that allow *mukallaf* to act accordingly. This study found that al-Taftāzānī's exposition on the senses and the intellect as channels of knowledge are not only descriptive, but prescriptive. As a result, the students, researchers, and scholars in the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* can analyse the *mukallaf* not as a passive recipient of the legal judgment, but *mukallaf* is also the active interpreter of God's legal judgment. It can therefore be concluded that al-Taftāzānī's exposition contributed significantly to the deeper understanding of the epistemological and psychological aspects of *mukallaf*, as one of the key pillars in the science *uṣūl al-fiqh.*

Keywords: Al-Taftāzānī; *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*; *Mukallaf*; External Senses (*al-Ḥiss*); Intellect (*al-'Aql*).

Khulasah

Kajian ini membincangkan mengenai saluran-saluran ilmu yang dihuraikan oleh Sa'd 'Umar Mas'ūd al-Taftāzānī (m. 492H/ 1390M) dalam karya *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ li Matn al-Tanqīḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Kajian ini menumpukan kepada hubung-kaitan yang aktif dan dinamik di antara deria luaran (*al-ḥiss*) dan akal (*al-'aql*), yang kedua-dua ini adalah saluran ilmu yang sah pada diri *mukallaf*, selain dari khabar yang benar (*khabar ṣādiq*). Al-Taftāzānī menghuraikan hakikat deria luaran *mukallaf* untuk menerima objek-objek ilmu yang *sensibilia*, fungsi deria dalaman untuk mencerap objek-objek ilmu yang *intelligibia*, dan lokasi setiap dari deria dalaman dalam otak. Al-Taftāzānī menekankan kepentingan deria dalaman kelima, iaitu 'imaginasi rasional' (*al-mufakkirah*), di atas semua deria dalaman yang lain. Peranan deria dalaman 'imaginasi rasional' ini bukan sekadar untuk

reproduksi sahaja, akan tetapi berperanan untuk melahirkan *rupa* baru, yang mana *rupa* tersebut tidak pernah diimaginasikan oleh deria dalaman yang lain. Dalam erti kata yang lain, ia menunjukkan kepada potensi jiwa *mukallaf* untuk mencipta ilmu yang baru. Al-Taftāzānī membincangkan mengenai empat peringkat akal, dan memberi indikasi bahawa *mukallaf* itu perlulah sekurang-kurangnya tiba di peringkat akal yang kedua, iaitu *al-'aql bi al-malakah* (*intelligence in habitus*; *intellectus in habitu*), kerana akal pada peringkat ini sudah memiliki ilmu yang daruri, memahami konsep Shariah, yang membolehkan *mukallaf* beramal menuruti ilmunya. Kajian ini mendapati huraian al-Taftāzānī mengenai deria dan akal sebagai sumber-sumber ilmu bukan sekadar deskriptif, akan tetapi preskriptif. Sebagai hasilnya, para pelajar, penyelidik, dan sarjana dalam ilmu *uṣūl al-fiqh* boleh menganalisis diri *mukallaf* bukan sebagai penerima undang-undang Tuhan yang pasif, akan tetapi *mukallaf* juga sebagai penterjemah undang-undang Tuhan yang aktif. Maka dapat disimpulkan bahawa huraian al-Taftāzānī ini memberi sumbangan penting dalam mendalami epistemologi dan psikologi *mukallaf*, sebagai salah satu rukun penting dalam ilmu *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Kata kunci: Al-Taftāzānī; *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*; *Mukallaf*; Deria Luaran (*al-Ḥiss*); Akal (*al-'Aql*).

Introduction

Al-Taftāzānī (d. 792. A.H/ 1390 A.D)'s fame in scholarship is remarkably prominent because of his brilliant expositions and commentaries of many great works of scholars in *'aqīdah*, *tafsīr*, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *ṣaraf*, *balaghah*, and many others. His fame was already recognized when he was still alive. For instance, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808 A.H/1406 A.D) who was contemporary to al-Taftāzānī, found al-Taftāzānī's works were widely

discussed when he was visiting Egypt.[1] He also acknowledged al-Taftāzānī's profound knowledge in rational sciences. Al-Taftāzānī's works are still studied and commented by later generations such as in the *madrasah* and Islamic higher education institutions today.[2] One of his remarkable influences is his brilliant expositions on the channel of knowledge (*asbāb al-'ilm*) in Islam recognizable from his well-known commentary of *'Aqā'id al-Nasafī*.[3]

The discussion on the channel of knowledge has a great place in Islamic epistemology because of its capacity to explain the way human being acquires knowledge. Muslim scholars establish the importance of the channel of knowledge because they affirm about the knowledge of realities and the knowledge about it can be acquired through the established channels: the senses (*al-ḥiss*), the true reports (*khabar ṣādiq*), and the intellect (*al-'aql*). This is in contradictory to the Sophists (*ṣufastā'iyyāh*) who denies about knowledge of realities and claims that the knowledge about it cannot be acquired.

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[1] See Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, 7 Vols. (Beirūt: Dār al-Fikr, 2001), 1: 633; English translation is *Ibn Khaldūn: The Muqaddimah An Introduction to History*, translated by Franz Rosenthal, edited by N.J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[2] Based on author's humble and limited knowledge, al-Taftāzānī's works, especially the *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id*, is widely read and studied in traditional higher education institution, for example, al-Azhar University. In Malaysia, the work used to be studied at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). Today, the work is still being referred and studied at the Raja Zarith Sofiah Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science, and Civilization (RZS-CASIS), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM).

[3] See the collection of al-Nasafī's main text (*matn*), al-Taftāzānī's commentary (*sharḥ*), and Ramḍān Affandī's, al-Kastalī's and al-Khayālī's supercommentaries (*al-ḥawāshī*) in a single volume, al-*Majmū'ah al-Sanniyah 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah*, compiled by Mur'ī Ḥasan al-Rashīd (Midyat: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012), 153-154.

In the contemporary Muslims religious and intellectual atmosphere, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas is among the one who bring them into the fore by writing about them, giving their classification, and persistently reminding about their detrimental influence to the modern society under the different facets of neo-sophism.[4] Not only that, al-Attas also provides the solution by asserting the importance of the channels of knowledge as the established channel to affirm the objectivity of knowledge and the existence of realities.[5]

A. J. Wensinck's study in *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development* points to a thought-provoking fact on the origin of the doctrine of the channel of knowledge.[6] According to Wensinck, the earliest printed work, which is well known in a summarized and technical form, is the *'Aqīdah* by Abū Ḥafs 'Umar al-Nasafī (d. 537 A.H/1152 A.D). It was presented in a concise and well-knit phrasing indicated a progression of some kind. Wensinck argues that Abū Ḥafs's concise

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[4] In Islām, al-Baghdādī (d. 1037 A.D) was one of the earliest authorities to write on them, and continued by al-Nasafī and al-Taftāzānī. In the Malay world, al-Rānīrī (d. 1666 A.D) deriving from al-Taftāzānī's commentary, introduced and mentioned this group in *Tibyān fī Ma'rifat al-Adyān*. Al-Attas writes about them and reminds of their beliefs whom "represent fundamental deviations from religion and from science and can bring about destructive consequences in human society". See, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the 'Aqā'id of al-Nasafī* (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Publication, Universiti Malaya, 1988), 48. For more details explanation of the Sophists and their current forms of sophism that contributing to the detrimental problems of this day, see Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, *The Educational Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas: An Exposition of the Original Concept of Islamization* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), 1998), 84-85.

[5] Al-Attas, *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript*, 48.

[6] A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development* (London: Frank Cass & C. Ltd., 1965).

doctrine on *asbāb al-'ilm* goes back to earlier works by Abū al-Mu'īn al-Nasafī (d. 508 A.H/1114 A.D), *Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*,[7] and *Tabṣirat al-Adillah*,[8] and also by 'Alī Muḥammad 'Alī al-Kiyā al-Harāsī al-Ṭabarī (d. 504 A.H/1110 A.D), *Uṣūl al-Dīn*.[9]

Of a similar nature, though less elucidate, are the work by al-Juwaynī (d. 478 A.H/1085 A.D), *Kitāb al-Irshād fī Uṣūl al-I'tiqād*,[10] which deals with the rules of reason (*aḥkām al-naẓar*) and the nature of knowledge (*ḥaqīqat al-'ilm*). Wensinck adds further, perhaps, it is 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429 A.H/1085 A.D) who was the earliest one to make it in a proper method or arrangement in his *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn*.[11] All the works stated by Wensinck are the theological works, including the *Sharḥ 'Aqā'īd al-Nasafī* by al-Taftāzānī.

However, al-Taftāzānī's great contribution and brilliant breakthrough is his extensive elucidation of the channel of knowledge which he discussed in his *uṣūl al-fiqh* work, *al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ fī al-Tanqīḥ Uṣūl al-Fiqh*.[12] His contribution on this work has not been studied.

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[7] MS. Cairo 2417, fol. i v. quoted in Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*.

[8] MS. Cairo 2287, fols. 2-14. quoted in Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed.*

[9] MS. Cairo 17,753, fol. 4 *sqq*. quoted in Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed.*

[10] MS. Leiden, Golius, No. 146. quoted in Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*.

[11] 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Matba'ah al-Dawlah, 1928).

[12] Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah composed a *matn* known as *al-Tanqīḥ* and he also made a self-commentary on it, known as *al-Tawḍīḥ*. These two works were put together with al-Taftāzānī's *al-Talwīḥ*. Initially each of these works was published separately: the one known in Delhi (1267 A.H), in Laknow (1281 A.H), in Constantinople (1322 A.H). It began in India, in year 1291 A.H that these three works were put together as one volume. Not only that, this volume also contained the supercommentaries by al-Fannārī, Milā Khasirū and Shaykh Zakariyā al-Anṣārī. See 'Alī Juma'ah, *al-Kutub al-Mukawwanah li Fikr al-Islāmī al-Sunnī* (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣāliḥ, 2018), 245. Recently there is a Ph.D study on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Talwīḥ* which has been

His discussion on the channel of knowledge in *al-Talwīḥ* is a brilliant extension of elucidation from his brief and concise discussion of the channel of knowledge in his theological work, *Sharḥ al-'Āqa'īd al-Nasafī*.

Al-Taftāzānī's explanation in *al-Talwīḥ* is more coherent, comprehensive, and prescriptive because he incorporates the nature and inter-relational function of the intellect (*al-'aql*) and the senses (*al-ḥiss*) and the close relation between these two faculties that potentially creating new knowledge. In this perspective, al-Taftāzānī does offer an interesting and insightful discussion of channel of knowledge.

Uṣūl al-Fiqh and Epistemology

Uṣul al-fiqh is 'a science with a methodology that by virtue of it, it arrives at the understanding' (*al-'ilm bi al-qawā'id allatī yatawaṣṣalu bihā ilā al-fiqh*).[13] This definition signifies three key interrelated aspects; firstly, the nature of knowledge (*al-'ilm*); secondly, the methodology (*qawā'id*); and thirdly, the object of knowledge that is intended to arrive. Al-Ghazālī explains that the definition of *uṣūl al-fiqh* cannot be comprehended except by knowing the meaning of *al-fiqh* first, because it is object of knowledge that is intended by the *uṣūl al-fiqh*.[14] *Al-Fiqh* literally means 'knowledge' (*al-'ilm*) or 'understanding' (*al-fahm*).[15] Technically, it means 'knowledge that deals with the ruling of *Sharī'ah* established upon the *mukallaf*'.[16]

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made by an Oxford scholar, Najah Nadi Ahmad, entitled "Theorising the Relationship Between Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh: The Theological-Legal Epistemology of Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī," Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Oxford, 2018.

[13] Al-Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rifāt*, s.v. "uṣūl al-fiqh".

[14] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Muṣtasfā*, 1: 25.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid.*

Therefore, the ultimate purpose of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is to arrive at the understanding of the Sharī'ah. The one who is responsible and incumbent to understand the Sharī'iah is *mukallaf*. *Mukallaf* refers to a sound human being; a person—not animals, plants, things, animate objects. *Mukallaf* is the real subject of Religious Law, known also as *al-maḥkūm 'alayh*.

Drawing from the definition in the above, one cannot deny the fact that there is a metaphysical assumption under the study of *mukallaf* because he is fundamentally a man (*insān*). The understanding on the nature of man is *conditio sine qua non* to *mukallaf*, since the defining nature of *mukallaf* is man itself. *Mukallaf* is a technical concept in Islamic law to depict the one who is subjected to God's Laws. Without the right knowledge and understanding of what man (*insān*) is, the understanding of *mukallaf* will be defective. On the contrary, right knowledge and understanding on man will buttress the concept of *mukallaf*.

The Muslims philosophers, theologians, and metaphysicians have thoroughly expounded the metaphysical and psychological nature of man — which includes among others the origin of man, his conception of knowledge, the nature of soul, the cognitive process, and the functions of perceptive senses. These aspects are traditionally discussed in the domain of *falsafah*, *kalām* and *taṣawwuf*.

However, al-Taftāzānī makes a breakthrough contribution in the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* by incorporating the metaphysical and philosophical discussion of man. He discusses the epistemological requirements of the *mukallaf*; the person who is subjected to the rulings of Sharī'ah. He explains on the nature of *insānī* of *mukallaf* and the way *mukallaf* obtains knowledge and understanding. In al-Taftāzānī's view, the nature of man is real, while the *mukallaf* as a legal concept is conditional

by virtue of the Sharī'ah. In addition, al-Taftāzānī would not want to restrict *mukallaf* as a dull and legal subject.

Why the epistemological questions are important in the discussion of *mukallaf*? It is because *mukallaf* is in essence a man who intrinsically deals with knowledge and understanding. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge. According to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, epistemology is from Greek *episteme*: means 'knowledge', and *logos* means 'explanation'.[17] It deals with the study of the nature of knowledge and justification, specifically, the study of; i) the defining features; ii) the substantive conditions or sources; and iii) the limits of knowledge and justification.[18] Its central questions include the origin of knowledge; the place of experience in generating knowledge, and the place of reason in doing so.[19] Muslims scholars have dealt with epistemological questions not because they are doubtful on knowledge and its sources, which ultimately come from God, but they want to understand and distinguish between God's knowledge and man's knowledge, the classification of man's knowledge, and the channel by which man arrives at knowledge.

Franz Rosenthal observes the epistemological discussion and development in *uṣūl al-fiqh* literatures, unfortunately, is a slow phenomenon. It is unlikely the intense and immerse discussion that the *mutakallimūn* bring in theology (*kalām*). However, Rosenthal sees the importance of epistemology in *uṣūl al-fiqh* because it does play a key role in strengthening the understanding of God, His attributes, the definition of knowledge, and the attributes of knowledge. In addition, the science of *uṣūl*

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[17] Robert Audi ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 123.

al-fiqh is not only a strict method of arriving a judgment based on the Qur'ān and Sunnah, but more fundamentally, it must be able to explain the ontological realities that the science is dealing: the God, the man, the knowledge.

If all these realities are not comprehended and not being able to be explained, they serve no purpose for the ultimate objectives of the sciences itself. Wael Hallaq is also of the view that it is difficult to conceive of *uṣul al-fiqh* without the epistemological train of thought that runs through the entire gamut of its constitutive subject matter.[20] The issue of what is certain and what is probable has a far reaching impact on the legal decision that will be made by the jurists. That is why the epistemological domain in *uṣūl al-fiqh* is critical.[21]

In other words, these are the pre-requisites requirements of the epistemological framework of *mukallaf* in order to acquire the right knowledge and understanding of God's injunction. In this case, al-Taftāzānī demonstrates profound and unifying framework by synthesizing the philosophy, theology and metaphysics harmoniously in his work *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *al-Talwīḥ.*

Al-Taftāzānī's Background

Studies on al-Taftāzānī's scholarly and intellectual background in non-Arabic languages are still very limited. Especially in European languages, the available studies in English are such by C. A. Storey and W. Madelung in the *Encyclopedia of Islām*[22] and in the German language by

[20] Wael Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 256.

[21] Of this matter, the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literatures of the *mutakallimūn* or the *al-Shāfi'īyah* are deemed as rich and enormous on the subject matter that synthesize between the *kalām*, *falsafah* as well as the legal judgment.

[22] See C. A. Storey, "al-Taftāzānī", *Encyclopedia of Islam, First Edition (1913-1936)*, edited by M. Th. Houtsma, T. W. Arnold, R. Basset, R. Hartmann, 9 Vols. (Leiden: Brill, Reprint 1993); W.

Thomas Würtz published recently.[23] Remarkably, al-Taftāzānī's works in Arabic are enormous and printed in various places, but most of them have not been translated into English, yet, except the *Commentary on the Creed of Islam* by E. E. Elder.[24]

Al-Taftāzānī's intellectual background can be found from the early and primary sources, as follows: Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī's (d. 852 A.H) *Inbā' al-Ghumr bi Abnā' al-'Umr*,[25] and *al-Durar al-Kāminah fī A'yān al-Mi'āh al-Thāminah*,[26] al-Suyūṭī's (d. 911 A.H) *Bughyah al-Wu'āh fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawīyīn wa al-Nuḥāh*,[27] Ibn 'Imād's (d. 1079 A.H) *Shadhrat al-Dhihāb fī Akhbār man Dhahab*,[28] Ismā'īl Bashā al-Baghdādī's *Hadīyah al-'Ārifīn Asmā' al-Mu'allifīn wa Athār al-Muṣannifīn*,[29] al-Shawkānī's (d. 1250 A.H) *al-Badr al-Ṭāli' bi Maḥāsin man ba'd al-Qarn*

Madelung, "al-Taftāzānī", *The Encyclopedia of Islam New Edition*, edited by P.J. Bearman, TH. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, 11 Vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), X:88-89.

23 Thomas Würtz, Islamische Theologie im 14. Jahrhundert: Auferstehungslehre, Handlungstheorie und Schopfungsvorstellungen im Werk von Sa´d ad-Din at-Taftazani, 2016.

24 E. E. Elder, *Commentary on the Creed of Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

25 His full name is Shaykh al-Islām Ḥāfiẓ Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad bin 'Alī bin Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad bin 'Alī bin Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-Ghumr bi Abnā' al-'Umr,* Ḥassan Ḥabshī (*taḥqīq*) 4 Vols. (Cairo: 1969).

26 Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-Kāminah fī A'yān al-Mi'āh al-Thāminah* 4 Vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, n.d).

27 His full name is al-Ḥāfiẓ Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd. al-Raḥman al-Sayūṭī, *Bughyah al-Wu'āh fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawīyīn wa al-Nuḥāh, taḥqīq* Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 Vols. (Cairo: Maṭba'ah 'Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1965).

28 His full name is al-Imām Shihāb al-Dīn Abī al-Falāḥ 'Abd al-Ḥayy bin Aḥmad bin Muḥammad al-'Akrī al-Ḥanbalī al-Dimashqī, *Shadhrat al-Dhihāb fī Akhbār man Dhahab,* Maḥmūd al-'Arnā'ūṭ (*taḥqīq*), 10 Vols. (Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1996).

29 Ismā'īl Bashā al-Baghdādī, *Hadīyah al-'Arifīn Asmā' al-Mu'allifīn wa Athār al-Muṣannifīn* (n.p: Mū'assasah al-Tārīkh al-'Arabī, n.d).

al-Sābi',[30] Yūsuf bin Taghrī Bardī al-Atābikī Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsin's (d. 874 A.H/ 1470 A.D) *al-Minhal al-Ṣāfī wa al-Mustawā fī Ba'd al-Wāfī*,[31] al-Kafawī's (d. 990 A.H/1586 A.D) *Katā'ib A'lām al-Akhyār min Fuqahā' Madhhab al-Nu'mān al-Mukhtār*,[32] Ṭashkubrā Zādeh's (d. 968 A.H/ 1561 A.D) *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah wa Miṣbāh al-Siyādah fī Mawḍū'āt al-'Ulūm*,[33] and Ḥājī Khalīfah Ketib Chellebi's (d. 1658 A.D) *Kashf al-Ẓunūn 'an Asmā' al-Kutub wa al-Funūn*.[34]

Al-Taftāzānī's full name is Mas'ūd bin 'Umar bin 'Abd Allāh, known as Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī. Ibn Ḥajar in *Inbā' al-Ghumr* mentions his name as Maḥmūd bin 'Umar, instead of Mas'ūd.[35] He was born in Ṣafar year of

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[30] His full name is al-Qāḍī al-'Allāmah Shaykh al-Islām Muḥammad bin 'Alī al-Shawkānī, *al-Badr al-Ṭāli' bi Maḥāsin man ba'd al-Qarn al-Sābi'*, 2 Vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d).

[31] Yūsuf bin Taghrī Bardī al-Atābikī Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Minhal al-Ṣāfī wa al-Mustawā fī Ba'd al-Wāfī*, *taḥqīq* by Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, 13 Vols. (n.p: Markaz Taḥqīq al-Turāth, 1984).

[32] His full names is al-Mawlā Maḥmūd bin Sulaymān al-Kafawī. See Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1769 In this book he recorded the dispute between al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī's debate at the court of Timurland. See al-Mawlā Maḥmūd bin Sulaymān al-Kafawī, *Katā'ib A'lām al-Akhyār min Fuqahā' Madhhab al-Nu'mān al-Mukhtār*, 'Abd. al-Laṭīf 'Abd. al-Raḥman (*taḥqīq*), 2 Vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2018), 2: 1472-1473.

[33] His full name is al-'Allāmah I'ṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad bin Muṣṭafā Ṭāsh Kubrā Zādeh, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah wa Miṣbāh al-Siyādah fī Mawḍū'āt al-'Ulūm*, 3 Vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1985).

[34] His full name is 'Allāmah al-Shaykh Muṣṭafā Afandī Kātib Chellebī. Known as historian, bibliographer and geographer; the most conspicuous and productive scholar, particularly in the non-religious sciences of the 11th A.H/17th A.D century Ottoman Empire. Due to that, the Orientalists called him as the 'Ottoman Suyuti', an honor that attributed to Imām al-Suyūṭī who is known as the master of all Islamic sciences. *Kashf al-Ẓunūn* is printed by Dār al-Iḥyā' in Beirut.

[35] Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr bi Inbā' al-'Umr*, Ḥassan Ḥabshī (ed.) (Cairo: 1969), 1: 389-390.

722 A.H in the village known as Taftazan.[36] The village Taftāzān was situated in Nasa in the city of Khurasan. When he was a child, he travelled around the city of Nasa to learn the art of Arabic scripture (*qawā'id al-khaṭ*), dictation (*imlā'*), al-Qur'ān and all the religious sciences (*umūr al-Dīn*). From Nasa, he went to Samarqand and in there he joined the circle of 'Adud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 780 A.H).[37]

Little is known about his early childhood education because most biographical and historical works did not indicate so much. However, there is one popular story as reported by Ibn 'Imād in his *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab* that tells his early childhood education. This story has attracted mixed attentions by generations of scholars after him. Ibn 'Imād quoted as saying that it was narrated by some distinguished people (*al-afāḍil*) that al-Taftāzanī was very slow in understanding (*ba'īd al-fahm jiddān*).[38] He sat in the circle of al-'Aḍūd al-Ījī but none was too slow to understand except him (*lam yakun fī jamā'ah al-'Aḍūd ablada minhu*).[39] Due to that condition, al-Taftāzānī was struggle and required a lot of training.

Until one day, while al-Taftāzānī was resting in his seclusion place, came one person unknown to him. He said: "Stand, O Sa'd al-Dīn, let us walk". The young al-Taftāzānī replied to the strange person: "I am not made to do walking. Since I do not understand at all from the reading, how come I can understand it from walking?" The person left and then returned to him, inviting him to walk again, for several times. It made al-Taftāzānī annoyed and angry. He said to him: "I have not seen a person who is so slow to understand me (*ablada*) other than you. Have I not told you that I am not made to

[36] Al-Shawkānī, *Badr al-Ṭāli'*, 2: 303.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 548.
[39] *Ibid.*

walk!?" Relax and composed, the man said to al-Taftāzānī: "The Prophet is summoning you". Al-Taftāzānī stunned and hurriedly stood up and followed the man to see the Prophet.

When al-Taftāzānī arrived at one big tree, he saw the Prophet was already sitting under it and surrounded by his Companions. The Prophet saw he came and smiled, and told al-Taftāzānī: "I sent you someone to bring you to come here many times, but you were reluctant". Al-Taftāzānī was too timid, shy, and guilty because he did not accept the invitation. He sounded genuinely regretful: "O Prophet, I did not know that you summon me through him". And he conveyed his problem to the Prophet: "But you know that I am extremely suffering from bad understanding (*sū' al-fahm*) and very little memorization (*qillah ḥifẓī*)."

The Prophet emphatically listened and asked him to open his mouth (*iftaḥ famuk*), and the Prophet spit to his mouth and prayed for him. The Prophet asked him to return and gave good news to him that his heart has been opened up. After returning, he attended his regular circle with al-'Aḍūd al-Ījī. His sudden and tremendous change was realized by al-'Aḍūd and his colleagues. They were impressed with al-Taftāzānī's new appearance, quick-witted and sharpness that al-'Aḍūd eventually allowed him to sit at his prestige chair of teaching, and replacing him.[40]

This narration is reported to be the miracle (*karāmah*) of al-Taftāzānī.[41] 'Abd. al-Raḥman 'Umayrah in his edited work of *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, however, is of the view that al-Taftāzānī's experience cannot be regarded as a *yaqaẓah* (meeting Prophet consciously) as Ibn 'Imād claimed.

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[40] *Ibid.*

[41] See for example by Muḥammad Jāsim al-Muḥammad in his introduction to al-Taftāzānī's biography in *Sharḥ Taṣrīf al-I'zzī* (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 2011), 15-16.

'Umayrah asserts this is a dreaming of sleeping (*rū'yān manāmiyah*).[42] Despite the disagreement by scholars on al-Taftāzānī's personal miracle experience, it is reported that after the experience, he was given the insight and wisdom by God to make a commentary on al-Zanjānī's celebrated Arabic morphology (*ṣarf*), *Taṣrīf al-'Izzī*,[43] while he was at the age of 16 years old. It was also indicating al-Taftāzānī's young age while he was studying with al-Ījī.

After several years sitting with al-Ījī, at the age of 20, he travelled to Jurjaniyah[44] where he was exposed to more circles of knowledge. In Jurjaniyah, he taught and started to recruit students, and completed *al-Mūṭawwal 'alā al-Talkhīṣ*.[45] At the age of 26, he moved to Herah[46] where he presented his work *al-Mūṭawwal* as a gift to the King of Herah, Mu'iz al-Dīn Abī al-Ḥusīn. After four years in Herah, he then made a move to Mazarjam. In Mazarjam, he finished his work on logic, *Sharḥ al-Shamsiyah*.[47]

At the age of 34, after spending some years there, al-Taftāzānī moved to Ghajdawan, which is part of the village in Bukhara. There he completed the *al-Mukhtaṣar 'alā al-Talkhīṣ*. After two years there, he moved again to Kaltastan, one of the city of Turkistan, which he completed the work of *uṣūl al-fiqh*—that is being the subject of this study—*al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ*. At the

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[42] See footnote in page 88 in al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*. Some even goes further saying it is entirely fictitious. See W. Madelung, "Al-Taftāzānī", *Encyclopedia of Islām. New Edition*.

[43] Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ Taṣrīḥ al-'Izzī* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2011).

[44] It is a popular and wonderful city between Ṭabarstan and Khurāsan. See al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Buldān*, 5 Vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977), 3: 119-122.

[45] Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *al-Mūṭawwal 'alā al-Talkhīṣ*, taḥqīq by 'Abd. Al-'Azīz bin Muḥammad al-Sālim & Aḥmad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sudaysi, 5 Vols. (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 2019).

[46] Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547.

[47] Ṭāsh Kubrā Zādeh, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah*, 2: 191.

age of 37 in year 759 A.H, he returned to Herah where he composed the *Fatāwā al-Ḥanafiyah*.[48] His stay in Herah did not long, however, because he moved again to Jurjaniyah where he spent there about 14 years. While in Jurjaniyah for the second time he wrote several important works, such as *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'īd al-Nasafiyah*, *al-Irshād fī al-Nahw* and many others.

The milieu that al-Taftāzānī lived was during the time of Tīmūrid dynasty, a dynasty of Persia and Central Asia. The founder of the dynasty was Tīmūr Lang b. Taraghay Barlas, known also as Tīmūr the Lame.[49] He ruled in Central Asia and Eastern Iran from 1370 A.D to 1507 A.D. J. H. Sanders argues that he is one of the world's great conquerors, of the same class of Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Attila, and Napoleon.[50] The Tīmūrid dynasty was important in religious history because Tīmūr the Ruler's patronage of notable scholars like al-Taftāzanī and al-Jurjānī, which later, the dynasty produced their commentaries that were used widely in madrasah curriculums.[51] Tīmūr begin to have his interest on al-Taftāzānī when Tīmūr seized Khawarizmi in year 781 A.H/1379 A.D. The King Muḥammad al-Sarkhī bin Malik Mu'iz al-Dīn Ḥusīn requested from his nephew Bīr Muḥammad Ghīyath al-Dīn Bīr 'Alī, who was under the Tīmūr's court, to ask from Tīmūr's permission to bring al-Taftāzānī to al-Sarakhs.

Tīmūr gave the permission to bring al-Taftāzānī. Al-Taftāzānī was brought to al-Sarakhs in 782 A.H at the age of 60, where his eminence in scholarship as professor got

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[48] *Ibid.*, 2: 192.

[49] See his biography in Istānlī Būl, *Ṭabaqāt Salāṭīn al-Islām* (al-Dār al-'Alamiyah, 1986), 246-250; Beatrice F. Manz, "Tīmūr Lang", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition.

[50] See Tamerlane *or Timur the Great Amir* (trans), Ahmed Ibn Arabshah (London: Luzac & Co., n.d), xv.

[51] Betrice F. Manz, "Tīmūrids", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition.

Tīmūr's attention.[52] Because of his eminence and influence, Tīmūr, then, ordered him to move to Samarqand, a capital city of Tīmūrid dynasty, 900 kilometers from Sarakhs. His presence in Samarqand is regarded the peak of his intellectual maturity because he completed writing the great book in *kalām*, *al-Maqāṣid*.[53]

In Samarqand, al-Taftāzānī had a scholarly rivalry with al-Jurjānī, a younger scholar than him. They were having debate on several occasions.[54] In one of the event, they were debating on al-Zamakhskarī's exegesis of the Qur'ān. Al-Shawkānī reported in *al-Badr al-Ṭāli'* that the debate centered around the following questions: first, on "whether the will to revenge (*irādah al-intiqām*) is because of provocation, or provocation that cause the will to revenge?"[55] Al-Taftāzānī was of the view that revenge is due to provocation, while al-Jurjānī was of the opposite view. Al-Shaykh Manṣūr al-Kāzrūnī who was the judge during that time was in favor of al-Jurjānī's argument. Second debate was on the verse 7 al-Baqarah:

خَتَمَ ٱللَّهُ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمۡ وَعَلَىٰ سَمۡعِهِمۡۖ وَعَلَىٰٓ أَبۡصَٰرِهِمۡ غِشَٰوَةٞۖ
وَلَهُمۡ عَذَابٌ عَظِيمٞ ٧

In this debate, the judge was the Mu'tazīlī scholar, Nu'mān al-Dīn al-Khawarizmī who was again, in favor of al-Jurjānī's argument and Tīmūr also backed him up. After having intense debates with al-Jurjānī, it was reported that al-Taftāzānī defeated to al-Jurjānī. Al-

[52] Madelung, "Al-Taftāzānī", *EI2*; Carl Brockelman, *History of the Arabic Written Tradition* 2, 215.

[53] Completed in year 784 A.H.

[54] See the biographical study of al-Taftāzānī by Aḥmad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sudaysi, *al-Muṭawwal*, 358. See also the compilation of disputes between al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī made by al-Fāḍil Maḥshā al-Bayḍāwī known also as Masjī Zādih in *Risālah al-Ikhtilāfiyāt al-Sa'd wa al-Sayyid* (n.p: 1278 A.H).

[55] Al-Shawkānī, *Badr al-Ṭāli'* 2, 305.

Taftāzānī was prolific and extremely sharp in his writing but his speech is not eloquent as his writing.

According to Shaykh 'Alī al-'Umārī, al-Taftāzānī's defeat to al-Jurjānī was not because al-Jurjānī's knowledge is superior than him, but due to several reasons: i) His degrading age and healthy condition because he was already old during that time; ii) Al-Jurjānī's political patronage was at the advantageous position than al-Taftāzānī's; and iii) His defect in speech.[56] Although al-Jurjānī was younger than al-Taftāzānī, he admired al-Taftāzānī and showed his due respect to him. In one of his remarks, he praised al-Taftāzāni's overwhelm in the 'sea' of verification and mastery of gathering the 'pearls' in its precision.[57]

Al-Taftāzānī's educational upbringing was travelling from one city to another city. Throughout the journey, he studied under the tutelage of many prominent scholars. Among the notable one are 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī,[58] Ḍiyā' al-Dīn 'Abdullāh bin Sa'd Allāh bin Muḥammad bin 'Uthmān al-Quzwaynī (d. 780 A.H),[59] Quṭb al-Dīn

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[56] See Maqāl al-'Umārī, "al-Sayyid al-Jurjānī", *Majallah al-Azhār* 20/126 quoted in Aḥmad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sudaysi's biographical study of al-Taftāzānī, *al-Muṭawwal*, 361. About his defect in speech (*kāna fī lisānihi luknah*), see al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyah al-Wu'āh* 2, 285, Ṭāsh Kubrā Zādeh, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah* 2, 191.

[57] Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, *Kitāb al-Fawā'id al-Bahīyyah fī Tarājim al-Ḥanafiyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifah, n.d), 136.

[58] His full name is 'Abd. Al-Raḥmān bin Rukn al-Dīn 'Abd. Al-Ghafār al-Bakrī al-Shabānkārī. He was a notable jurist in Shāfi'ī and theologian in Ash'arī. He produced many important works, such as, *Akhlāq 'Aḍud al-Dīn*, *Ādāb al-'Allāmah*, *Ashraf al-Tawārīkh*, *Jawāhir al-Kalām*, *Risālah fī al-Waḍ'*, *al-'Aqā'id al-'Aḍūdiyah*, al-*Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyah*, *Sharḥ Kitāb Muntahā al-Suwal*, and *al-Mawāqif*. See Mohd Zaidi Ismail's biographical study on al-Ījī in *Existence and Quiddity in the Later Ash'arite Kalām: A Study on al-Ījī's al-Mawāqif and al-Jurjānī's Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic and Strategic Studies Institute, 2017).

[59] Renown in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *fiqh*, *al-ma'ānī* and *al-bayān*.

Muḥammad bin Muḥammad al-Rāzī (d. 766 A.H),[60] Nasīm al-Dīn Abū ʻAbdullāh Muḥammad bin Saʻīd bin Masʻūd bin Muḥammad bin ʻAlī al-Naysābūrī (d. 801 A.H), and Aḥmad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Qūṣī (d. 803 A.H).

Besides studying with great teachers, he also opened his circle of learning and teaching students, among them are: Ḥisām al-Dīn bin ʻAlī bin Muḥammad al-Abīyūrdī (d. 816 A.H), Ḥaydar al-Shīrāzī known as Ṣadr al-Harawī (d. 854 A.H),[61] ʻAlāʼ al-Dīn al-Rūmī (d. 841 A.H),[62] ʻAlāʼ al-Dīn al-Bukhārī,[63] Ḥaydar al-Rūmī (d. 854 A.H),[64] ʻAlāʼ al-Dīn al-Qūjaḥṣārī, Muḥammad bin ʻAṭāʼi Allāh bin Muḥammad, al-Shams al-Karīmī (d. 861 A.H),[65] Yūsuf al-Jamāl al-Ḥalāj al-Harawī al-Shāfiʻī, the father of al-Shams al-Karīmī, Jalāl al-Dīn Yūsuf bin Rukn al-Dīn Masīḥ, Mīrak al-Ṣīrānī, Laṭf Allāh al-Samarqandī, Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad, Shams al-Dīn al-Fannārī,[66] al-Āthīr al-Baghdādī,[67] Saʻd al-Dīn Lur, Qurrahu Dawd, Fatḥ Allāh al-Shirwānī (d. 857 A.H),[68] and Maḥmūd al-Sarāʼī.

His fame rests mainly on his commentaries on eminent works in various sciences of learning, which the works, later, are widely used in the traditional as well as

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[60] His full name is Abū ʻAbdullah Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Muḥammad al-Rāzī known as al-Taḥtānī.

[61] His full name is Burhān al-Dīn Ḥaydar bin Muḥammad bin Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī al-Khawāfī.

[62] His full name is ʻAlā al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʻAlī bin Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Mūsā bin Ibrāhīm al-Rūmī al-Ḥanafī.

[63] His full name is ʻAlā al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Muḥammad bin Muḥammad bin Muḥammad al-Bukhārī al-ʻAjamī al-Ḥanafī.

[64] His full name is Ḥaydar bin Aḥmad bin Ibrāhīm Abū al-Ḥasan al-Rūmī al-Aṣl al-ʻAjamī al-Ḥanafī.

[65] His full name is Muḥammad bin Faḍl Allāh bin al-Mujid Aḥmad.

[66] His full name is Muḥammad bin Ḥamzah al-ʻAllāmah Qāḍī al-Quḍah.

[67] His full name is Jibrīl bin Ṣāliḥ al-Āthīr al-Baghdādī.

[68] His full name is Fatḥ Allāh bin ʻAbdullāh al-Shirwānī.

the modern education.[69] His major works can be classified in the following fields:

a) *'Ilm al-Ḥadīth*: 1) *al-Arbā'īn fī al-Ḥadīth*;[70] 2) *Risālah fī al-Ikrāh*;[71]
b) *Al-Tafsīr*: 1) *Talkhīṣ li Kashshāf 'an Ḥaqā'iq al-Tanzīl*;[72] 2) *Kashf al-Asrār wa 'Iddah al-Abrār Fārisī*;[73]
c) *Al-Fiqh*: 1) *al-Fatāwā al-Ḥanafiyah*;[74] 2) *Sharḥ 'alā Farā'iḍ al-Sirājiyyah*;[75] 3) *al-Miftāh al-Fiqh*;[76] 3) *Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Jāmi'*;[77]

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[69] W. Madelung, "Al-Taftāzānī", *Encyclopedia of Islām*, New Edition.

[70] Published as *Sharḥ al-Taftāzānī 'alā al-'Aḥādīth al-'Arba'īn al-Nawawiyah*, Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismā'īl (*taḥqīq*) (Beirut: Dār al-Kutb al-'Ilmiyyah, 2003). However, the original work entitled *Sharḥ Ḥadīth al-'Arba'īn li al-Nawawī* published by the Ottoman in 1316 A.H by Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-'Āmirah indicated the work is not to be associated with al-Taftāzānī because the work was written after al-Taftāzānī's death. Ḥājī Khalīfah in *Kashf al-Ẓunūn* lists the *Sharḥ Ḥadīth al-'Arba'īn li al-Nawawī* works but none belongs to al-Taftāzānī. But in the same work, the work *al-Arba'īn li Sa'd al-Dīn* is mentioned. See in Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Qālish, *al-Taftāzānī wā Ārā'uhu al-Balāghiyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir, 2010), 52; Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 1: 56, 60; 2: 1037.

[71] Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1478.

[72] It is a brief commentary of *al-Kashshāf 'an Ḥaqā'iq al-Tanzīl* by 'Allāmah Abī al-Qāsim Maḥmūd bin 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī al-Khawārizmī (d. 538 A.H). Al-Taftāzānī made a brief commentary based on super-commentaries of al-Ṭībī with an addition of the lessons, but it was not completed. It is said the work stopped as *Sūrah al-Fatḥ*. See Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 1: 847.

[73] Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1487. See also Ismā'īl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyah al-'Ārifīn Asmā' al-Mū'allifīn wa 'Āthār al-Muṣannifīn*, 3 Vols. (Beirut: Mu'assasah Tārīkh al-'Arabī, n.d), 2: 430

[74] It was written on 9th of Dhū al-Qa'idah 829 A.H. See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547; see also Ismā'īl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyah al-'Ārifīn,* 2: 430.

[75] Ismā'īl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyah al-'Ārifīn,* 2: 430.

d) *Al-Uṣūl*: 1) *al-Talwīḥ* (in this study); 2) *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar 'alā Kitāb Muntahā al-Su'āl wa al-'Aml fī 'ilmī al-Uṣūl wa al-Jidal*;[78] *Sharḥ al-Waraqāt*;[79]

e) *Fiqh al-Lughah*: 1) *al-Ni'm al-Sawābigh fī Sharḥ al-Kalām al-Nawābigh*;[80] 2) *Bustān li Diwān Sa'dī*;[81]

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[76] Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547; Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1769, and Ismā'īl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyah al-'Ārifīn,* 2: 430.

[77] Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 548. It was mentioned by al-Taftāzānī in supercommentary of *al-Kashshāf*, MS B/166 and it was quoted by al-Fannārī in supercomentary of *al-Mūṭawwal*, and by al-Shihāb in his supercommentary of al-Bayḍāwī 1/49 as quoted in Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Qālish, *al-Taftāzānī wā Ārā'uhu al-Balāghiyah,* 54.

[78] See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 548. It is also known as *Ḥashiyah Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Uṣūl*. This work is al-Taftāzānī's supercommentary based on al-Qāḍī 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's commentray of Ibn Ḥijāb al-Māliki. The work has been published together with al-Jurjānī's supercommentary and Ḥassan al-Harawī in *būlāq* edition by Maṭba'ah al-Kubrā al-Amīrīyah Miṣr, 2 Volumes in 1316 A.H.

[79] This work is recently discovered and edited by Ḥātim bin Yūsuf al-Māliki. He refers to two manuscripts in Paris and Madīnah which was earlier pointed by Dr. 'Abd al-Raḥman Badawī's study in *Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn*. The manuscripts initially known as *Irshād al-Fuḥūl,* but after close examination, it is al-Juwaynī's *al-Waraqāt*. (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 2019).

[80] It is a commentary of 'Allāmah Abī al-Qāsim Maḥmūd bin 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī al-Khawārizmī's (d. 538 A.H) *Kitāb Nawābigh al-Kalam*. It contains enormous lesson in language and grammar. See Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1978.

[81] This work is considered rare because no other works in the Arab as well as Western languages have indicated the existence of this work. It was Veled Chelebi who discovered it, not in Arabic, but in Turkish. The work was completed in 755 A.H, which according to E.J.W. Gibb's study, it was translated by a very learned and accomplished qāḍī, Ahmed Burhān-ud-Dīn. He was the very earliest of the literary lyrics poets of the Western Turks. See E.J.W Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry* 1, (London: Luzac & Co. Great Russle Street, 1900), 201-214.

f) *Al-Naḥw*, 1) *Sharḥ li Kitāb al-'Izzī fī al-Taṣrīf*;[82] 2) *al-Irshād* or *Irshād al-Hādī* ;[83]

g) *Al-Balāghah*: 1) *al-Sharḥ al-Muṭawwal*;[84] 2) *Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī*;[85] 3) *Sharḥ 'alā Kitāb al-Miftāḥ*;[86]

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[82] The work belongs to 'Abd. al-Wahhāb bin Ibrāhīm al-Zanjānī (d. 655 A.H), a notable grammarian, linguist, rhetoric, and poetry. He was born in the state known as Zanjān, now nearby Azbrabaijān. His father was a renowned jurist in Shāfi'ī. Among his important works, *Taṣrīf al-I'zzī*, *al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā Ghayr Ahlih*, *Mi'yār al-Naẓār fī 'Ulūm al-Ash'ār* and *Taṣḥīḥ al-Miqyās fī Tafsīr al-Qisṭas*. Although *Taṣrīf al-I'zzī* is one of the remarkable works, it did not stop al-Taftāzānī to make a commentary on *Taṣrīf al-I'zzī* when he was still young at the age of 16 years old. See al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ Taṣrīf al-I'zzī* (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 2011); also Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547, Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 4: 350.

[83] This work was written in year 778 A.H in Khawārizmi as a dedication to his son. Considered as a refined text (*matn laṭīf*), which was commented by his students: Shāh Fatḥ Allāh al-Sharwānī, Shaykh 'Alā al-Dīn 'Alī al-Bukhārī, and 'Alā al-Dīn 'Alī bin Muḥammad al-Basṭāmī. In the book he divided the discussion into an introduction and followed by three chapters (*ism*, *fi'l* and *ḥarf*). See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547, Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 1: 67.

[84] It is a commentary on Shaykh Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Quzwaynī's (d. 739 A.H) *Kitāb Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ fī al-Ma'ānī wa al-Bayān.* See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547, Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, 1: 390, Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 1: 473.

[85] This is the second commentary by al-Taftāzānī of al-Quzwaynī's *Kitāb Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ fī al-Ma'ānī wa al-Bayān.* In this work, he incorporated the first commentary that he made in *Sharḥ al-Muṭawwal* and added some more explanations. The work is also known as *Mukhtaṣar Sharḥ Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* or *Ikhtiṣar Sharḥ al-Talkhīṣ* or *al-Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* or *al-Mukhtaṣar*. See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547, Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 4: 350.

[86] It is a commentary on Sirāj al-Dīn Abī Ya'qūb Yūsuf al-Sakkākī's (d. 626 A.H) *Kitāb al-Miftāḥ*.

h) *Al-Manṭiq*: 1) *Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq wa al-Kalām*;[87] 2) *Sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyah*; [88]

i) *'Ilm al-Kalām*: 1) *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī 'ilm al-Kalām*;[89] 2) *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyah*;[90] 3) *al-Radd 'alā Zindiqah Ibn 'Arabī*.[91]

His date of death is disputable among the scholars, primarily because of the different dates of birth that the scholars obtained. According to al-Sudasi, two opinions emerge: First, among the groups of scholars, such as Ibn Ḥajar, al-Suyūṭī, Ṭāsh Kubrā Zādeh, and Ibn 'Imād. Second, among the scholars such as al-Laknawī, al-Shawkānī, Ismā'īl Bashā, and Ṭāsh Kubrā Zādeh. After

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[87] It is a refined text of logic (*manṭīq*) and theology (*kalām*). The first part on logic, he discusses on: the introduction, the first objective on assent (*al-taṣawwūrāt*) and the second objective on judgment (*al-taṣdīqāt*). The second part, he arranges the discussion on six chapters: the introduction, the *umūr al-'āmmah, al-a'rāḍ, al-jawāhir, al-ilāhiyāt* and *al-sam'īyāt*. It is a brief summary from his *Kitāb al-Maqāṣid*, which was enormously commented and given supercommentaries. Among the best commentary is by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (d. 907 A.H) (but it was not completed).

[88] *Al-Shamsiyyah* is a refined text of logic by Najm al-Dīn 'Umar bin 'Alī al-Qazwaynī who was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūṣī. Al-Taftāzānī made a specific commentary on the assent (*al-taṣawwūrāt*). See Ibn 'Imād, *Shadhrāt al-Dhihab*, 8: 547, Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 4: 350, Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 2: 1063.

[89] It is his extensive commentary of his own text *al-Maqāṣid*. Taḥqīq by 'Abd. Al-Raḥman 'Umayrah, 5 Vols. (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyah li al-Turāth, 2016).

[90] The most popular work of him which attracted dozen of supercommentaries. See *al-Majmū'ah al-Sanniyah 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'īd al-Nasafiyyah* by al-Taftāzānī and its supercommentaries by Ramaḍān Affandī, al-Qasṭalānī and al-Khayālī (Midyat: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012).

[91] It is said to be his refutation to Ibn 'Arabī's concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*. The work is still in manuscript form in Berlin under No. 2791. See in 'Abd. Al-Raḥman 'Umayrah's biographical study on al-Taftāzānī in *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, 1: 111.

going through each of the arguments, al-Sudasi inclines to say that al-Taftāzānī's death was on 792 A.H because it is corroborated with the report by his close student, Jalāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Ibn Rukn al-Dīn who was accompanying al-Taftāzānī until his death.[92] *Wallāhu A'lām.*

Al-Talwīḥ 'Alā Al-Tawḍīḥ Fī Al-Tanqīḥ Uṣūl Al-Fiqh

Al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ fī al-Tanqīḥ al-Uṣūl al-Fiqh is a unique work of *uṣūl al-fiqh* because it is a synthesis between the *ṭarīqah al-mutakkalimūn* and *al-fuqahā'*,[93]

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[92] See the biographical study of al-Taftāzānī by Aḥmad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sudaysī in *al-Muṭawwal*, 61.

[93] Ibn Khaldūn identifies two approaches (*ṭarīqah*) in *uṣūl al-fiqh*: first, the *ṭarīqah* al-Shāfi'iyyah or al-Mutakallimūn or al-Jumhūr, and second *ṭarīqah* al-Ḥanafīiyyah or *ṭarīqah* al-Fuqahā'. The first approach is known as the *ṭarīqah* al-Shāfi'iyyah or al-Mutakallimūn or al-Jumhūr because this method is distinguished by the way the principles of law have been established. They establish the principles based on sound logic and rational argument and they only accept those which are supported by strong evidences, even though, their decision might go against their earlier jurists of the same *madhhab*'s decision. For instance, they might disagree on the matter of principles (*uṣūl*) with al-Shāfi'ī, but they would agree on the branches (*furū'*). Ibn Khaldūn mentions the works under the *ṭarīqah* al-Shāfi'iyyah or al-Mutakallimūn namely *Kitāb al-Burhān* by Imām al-Juwaynī (d. 478 A.H/1078 A.D), *al-Mustaṣfā* by Imām al-Ghazālī (d. 505 A.H/1111 A.D), *Kitāb al-'Ahd* by 'Abd. al-Jabbār (d. 415 A.H/1025 A.D) and its commentary *al-Mu'tamad* by Abū Al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣarī (d. 436 A.H/1044 A.D). These four works, Ibn Khaldūn considers as the chiefs and pillars of the *ṭarīqah* al-Shāfi'iyyah or al-Mutakallimūn. From the four main works, there are the abridged versions which were composed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in *Kitāb al-Maḥṣūl* and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī in *Kitāb al-Aḥkām*. These two works then left an impact to the following *uṣūlī* scholarship, where the *al-Maḥṣūl* was summarized by al-Rāzī's student al-Imām Sirāj al-Dīn al-Armawī in his *al-Taḥṣīl*. This approach is also known as the *ṭarīqah al-jumhūr* because most *madhdhāhib*, namely al-Mālikiyyah, al-Shāfi'iyyah, al-Ḥanābilah, al-Ẓāhiriyyah and also al-Mu'tazilah employ this approach. The second approach known as *ṭarīqah* al-Ḥanafīiyyah or *ṭarīqah* al-Fuqahā' because this method verifies the basic rules outlined by the precedent jurists and then the following jurists discussed them

which represents the *ṭarīqah al-mutā'akhirīn*. The work is originally composed by 'Ubayd Allāh bin Mas'ūd bin Tāj al-Sharī'ah bin Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī (d. 747 A.H),[94] who wrote a *matn* of it, and he also did a commentary of the same work, entitled *al-Tawḍīḥ*. Besides, he also produced a commentary on the *Wiqāyāt* of his grandfather Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah al-Awwāl, the *Nuqāyah*, an abridgment of the commentary on the *Wiqāyāt*.[95]

Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's *Tanqīh al-Uṣūl* is a summary of al-Rāzī's *al-Maḥṣūl*, al-Bazdawī's *Uṣūl* and Ibn al-Ḥājib's *Mukhtaṣar*. Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's *al-Tawḍīḥ* is brilliantly commentated by al-Taftāzānī known as *al-Talwīḥ*.[96] All these books, *al-Tanqīh*, *al-Tawḍīḥ*, and *al-Talwīḥ* are combined in a single publication that being referred here.

Ḥājī Khalīfah in *Kashf al-Ẓunūn* describes Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's *Tanqīh al-Uṣūl* is a refined text (*matn laṭīf*), which was well known by many scholars of his time.[97] The work was composed due to the intellectual circumstances of the time, where immense scholars of high reputation were rigorous to study, teach, and discuss

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extensively. In Ahmad Hassan's view, this approach emphasizes on the textual and real cases. Ibn Khaldūn lists the best works under this approach: 'Abd Allāh bin 'Umar al-Dabbūsī (d. 430 A.H/1028 A.D), 'Alī bin Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (d. 484 A.H/1089A .D), Aḥmad bin 'Alī Ibn al-Sā'ātī (d. 694 A.H/1295 A.D). See Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, 1: 573-579; Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah An Introduction to History*, translated by Franz Rosenthal, 19.

[94] He is a scholar of profound knowledge. His works, among others *Sharḥ al-Wiqāyah*, *al-Washāḥ fī al-Ma'ānī*, *Ta'dīl al-'Ulūm fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyah*, and *Tanqīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ*. See al-Qannūjī, *Abjād al-'Ulūm*, 775.

[95] Ahmad bin Mohamed Ibrahim, *Sources and Development of Muslim Law* (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, Ltd. 1965), 114.

[96] Ṭāhā Jābir al-'Alwānī, *Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, 57.

[97] Ḥājī Khalīfah Kātib Chellebī, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn 'an Usāmā wa al-Kutub wa al-Funūn*, 2 Vols. (Istanbul: n.p, n.d), 1:496.

on al-Bazdawī's *Uṣūl*.[98] However, some scholars were overzealous in al-Bazdawī's thought. Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah was aware of the overzealousness of the scholars of his time, as such he took the initiative to address the problem and to clarify the misconception on al-Bazdawī's thought and teaching.[99]

The great commentary of Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's *Tanqīḥ* which was made by al-Taftāzānī, known as *al-Talwīḥ 'alā al-Tawḍīḥ*. It is also known as *al-Talwīḥ ilā Kashf Ḥaqā'iq al-Tanqīḥ.*[100] Al-Taftāzānī's *al-Talwīḥ* was made super-commentaries (*ḥawāshī*) by many scholars after him, for instance: Burhān al-Dīn Aḥmad bin 'Abd Allāh al-Siyūwāsī (d. 800 A.H),[101] al-Sayyid al-Jurjānī (d. 816 A.H),[102] al-'Allāmah Muḥammad bin Firāmaraz, known as Milā Khasirū (d. 885 A.H),[103] al-'Allāmah Ḥasan bin Muḥammad Shāh al-Fannārī (d. 886 A.H),[104] al-'Allāmah 'Abd. al-Ḥakīm bin Shams al-Dīn al-Sayalakutī,[105] al-'Allāmah Aḥmad bin Sulaymān bin Kamāl Bāshā (d. 940 A.H),[106] and Abū al-Sa'ūd bin Muḥammad al-'Imādī (d. 983 A.H).[107]

Ḥājī Khalīfah reports in *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, that Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's *Tanqīḥ* (*matn*) and its *al-Tawḍīḥ* (*sharḥ*) were regarded as a top-notch work of the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* because it contains a great summary of the ideas from the renowned scholars from their voluminous works

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[98] *Ibid*. Ḥājī Khalīfah regards al-Bazdawī's *Uṣūl* as a great work that contains subtelities contemplation and condensed explanation.
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] See 'Alī Juma'ah, *al-Kutub al-Mukawwanah*, 245.
[101] *Ibid*., 246
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] *Ibid.*
[105] *Ibid.*
[106] *Ibid.*
[107] *Ibid.*

(*mabsūṭ*).[108] Al-Taftāzānī's commentary *al-Talwīḥ* added to the greatness of the whole work to become a beckon to bring light of the realities of the work; hence it is called as *al-Talwīḥ ilā Kashf Ḥaqā'iq al-Tanqīḥ*.[109] Al-Taftāzānī's *al-Talwīḥ* was completed when he was at 36 years old, at the end of Dhū al-Qā'īdah in year 758 A.H/November 1357 while he was at Gulistani, one of the states of Turkistān.[110]

Al-Taftāzānī's method in composing *al-Talwīḥ* is unique, original, and brilliant because he incorporates *falsafah*, *kalām* and *sharī'ah* harmoniously and coherently, which demonstrates his creativity and overarching knowledge framework that allow him to identify, assimilate, and appropriate those sciences into an integral one. His style of writing is tough for novice because it is eloquent with full of *balaghī* (rhetorical) expression[111] that the work seems suggested to be used for students of advanced level.

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[108] Ḥājī Khalīfah Kātib Chellebī, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, 1: 496.

[109] *Ibid*.

[110] *Ibid*. See also Carl Brokelmann, *Geschichte der arabishen Litteratur (GAL)*, 2 Vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), II: 280.

[111] Al-Taftāzānī is cognizant of the integral relation between the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *al-balāghah*, *al-ma'ānī*, *al-bayān*, and *al-badī'*. These sciences facilitate the clear, intelligible, and eloquence understanding of the expression in the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth in order to derive the Rulings from them. Al-Taftāzānī offers an insightful thought on the limitation of these sciences if they are stricted to their own domain and made separated from other sciences. Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Qālish rephrases al-Taftāzānī's remark based on his work, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, "most language expression examples are vague, it is because they are matter of the taste only. Their nature of truth will be different according to the nature of man's respective understanding" (*anna kathīran min al-i'tibārāt al-balāghiyah ẓannī lianna manāṭahā al-dhawq wa huwa yakhtalif bi ikhtilāf al-afhām*). In some circumstances, al-Taftāzānī develops his own terms to explain the sciences which demontstrates his innate talent (*malakah*), mastery of the subtelty and refined of the languages and eloquent in those

His brilliant elucidation exhibits his in-depth knowledge of *falsafah* (philosophy); for instance, in the ideas of the intellect (*'aql*) as not only the cause for the *mukallaf* (person subject to law) but also the established channel of knowledge. The concept of developmental stages of intellect from latent potency to absolute perfection is originally derived from the Neo-Platonism, but al-Taftāzānī's courage infused the idea to the concept of *mukallaf* implies a *mukallaf* is a person who is going through the perfection of the intellect in understanding fully God's injunction (*khiṭāb*). The intellect (*'aql*) is not a passive substance, but indeed, it is a source of knowledge as well as the knowledge in itself.

Sources of Knowledge According to al-Taftāzānī

In Islamic epistemology, there are three established channels of knowledge: the sound senses (*al-ḥawwās al-salīmah*), the true reports (*al-khabr al-ṣadīq*), and the intellect (*al-'aql*).[112] Al-Taftāzānī is among the one who has brilliantly elucidated the channel of knowledge in Islām recognizable from his well-known commentary of *'Aqā'id al-Nasafī*.[113] Furthermore, he makes a more intensive elucidation on the channel of knowledge in his

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sciences. See Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Qālish, *al-Taftāzānī wa Ārāuhu al-Balāghiyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir, 2010), 140-145.

[112] See in the works of Muslims theologians: *'Aqīdah* by Abū Ḥafs 'Umar al-Nasafī (d. 537 A.H/1152 A.D), Abū'l-Mu'īn al-Nasafī's (d. 508 A.H/1114 A.D), *Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* and *Tabṣirat al-Adilla,* 'Alī Muḥammad 'Alī al-Kiyā al-Harāsī al-Ṭabarī's (d. 504 A.H/1110 A.D), *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, al-Juwaynī's (d. 478 A.H/1085 A.D), *Kitāb al-Irshād fī Uṣūl al-I'tiqād,* 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī's (d. 429 A.H/1085 A.D) *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn*. In the contemporary scholarship, see al-Attas in *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript,* 48 and "The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul", Chapter 4 in *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islām*, and Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, *The Educational Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas,* 84-85.

[113] See in al-*Majmū'ah al-Sanniyah 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah*, compiled by Mur'ī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, 153-154.

uṣūl al-fiqh work *al-Talwīḥ*, which involves the intimate and reciprocal relationship between the intellect and the senses, and its ability to create new knowledge.

Intellect (*'aql*), according to al-Taftāzānī, is 'a faculty of the soul that by virtue of it, prepared oneself to acquire knowledge and perceive it'.[114] It is also 'a substance that acquire the *invisibilia* (*al-ghā'ibāt*) through the medium of knowledge[115] and *sensibilia* (*al-maḥsūsāt*) through the external senses.

In *al-Talwīḥ*, al-Taftāzānī expands the discussion on the function of the senses (*al-ḥiss*) *vis-à-vis* the intellect (*'aql*). There is a mutual, innate, and inter-relational function between the senses (*al-ḥiss*) and the intellect (*'aql*), as there is in both aspects the state of beginning (*bidāyah*) as well as the state of ending (*nihāyah*). The external senses acquire the sensible objects and processed it with the aid of the internal senses (*al-maḥsūsāt al-dākhīlī*). At this point, it marks the ending function of the senses, and simultaneously, marks the beginning function of the intellect.

Al-Taftāzānī explains briefly the five faculties of the external senses, which are the basic and entry point for all human being from which the sensible knowledge is derived. They are the touch (*al-lamas*), taste (*al-zawq*), smell (*al-shamm*), hearing (*al-sam'*), and sight (*al-baṣar*). The touch is the faculty of attainment in the body, where it conceives the hot, cold, wet, and dry;[116] the taste is the faculty that is extended upon the body of the tongue, by whose virtue of it, it can taste food;[117] the smell is the

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[114] *Ibid.* See al-Taftāzānī's commentary.

[115] Ramaḍān Affanḍī (d. 979 A.H/1571 A.D) in his supercommentary of the *'Aqā'id* explains the medium of knowledge is by the evidences and conception in *al-taṣdīq* and *al-taṣawwur* respectively. See *al-Majmū'ah al-Sanniyah 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah*, 153-156.

[116] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 158.

[117] *Ibid.*

faculty or power of perceiving odours or scents;[118] the hearing is the faculty of knowing sounds;[119] and the sights are faculty of perceiving the colours, lights.[120]

All these external faculties perceive the sensible objects. Al-Taftāzānī clarifies that the sensible objects are perceived by virtue of their forms only not their physical essences. He gives an example of colours: the eyes perceive the form of colours, not the essence of the colours. It is because the essence of the colours exists outside of the mind, while the forms only exist in the mind.[121] This transitory stage of acquiring *sensibilia* from the external senses marks the end of the function of the external senses and beginning function of the internal senses, according to al-Taftāzānī.[122]

On the nature of the internal senses, al-Taftāzānī echoes Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghāzālī in understanding of the function of the five internal senses. These internal senses are generally agreed by most *faylasūf*, *mutakallimūn*, and *ṣūfī*s, but some *mutakallimūn*, for example, Abū Barakāt al-Bahgdādī (d. 560 A.H/1165 A.D) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606 A.H/1209 A.D) — disagree with the individual function of the faculty of the internal senses. They argue that the perceptive faculties have a single function, which refers to the soul (*al-nafs*); it is not an individual function of each of the faculties.

In other words, each of the faculties of the internal senses has no independent power and perceptive faculty to function. They criticize Ibn Sīnā's proclamation that each of the perceptive faculties possesses the power to make judgments and conclusions on their own.[123] In *Sharḥ al-*

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[118] *Ibid.*
[119] *Ibid.*, 2:159
[120] *Ibid.*
[121] *Ibid.*
[122] *Ibid.*
[123] Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165 A.D) reports that among the philosophers disagree on the exact number of the faculties of the

'Aqā'id, al-Taftāzānī alludes to such critics anonymously, stating that they do not establish the function of the internal senses (*walammā lam yathbut 'indahum al-ḥawwās al-bāṭinah al-musammah bi al-ḥissi al-musytarak wa al-wahm wa ghayr dhalik...*).[124]

The five internal senses, according to al-Taftāzānī are as follows: first, the common senses (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*); second, imaginary (*al-khayyāl*); third,

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internal senses. There appears to be a contradiction in some of their claims: he does not see the specific functions of the faculties that make a real contribution to the man's action—for instance, in the case of producing creativity. But he sees the whole self of man that is actually functioning. The same goes for Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who even rejects Ibn Sīnā's categorization of the internal senses. He argues that the functionality of man's faculties should be perceived in unity — for instance, while a carpenter is doing all his works, he uses different sort of tools, but he is still a carpeneter. Likewise when a man uses all his external senses in his daily activities—for instance, reading via the eyes, listening via the ears—all these refer to a single man, not the action of the specific senses. That is the reason al-Rāzī vehemently argues that only one single faculties of the same capacity and power would be able to acquire the complete picture of the objects of knowledge and its meaning. See Abū al-Barakāt Hibbatullāh al-Baghdādī, "al-Faṣl al-'Ashr: Fī al-Idrākāt al-Dhihnīyah," in *al-Kitāb al-Mu'tabar fī al-Ḥikmah al-Ilāhiyah* (Baghdad & Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jaml, 2012), 484ff; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, "Chapter II Fī Bayān Ann al-Mudrik li Jamī' al-Mudrakāt bi Jamī' 'Aṣnāf al-Idrākāt Huwa al-Nafs," in *al-Mabāḥīth al-Mashriqīyyah fī 'Ilm al-Ilāhiyāt wa al-Ṭabī'īyyāt*, *taḥqīq* by Muḥammad al-Mu'taṣim al-Baghdādī, 2 Vols. (n.p.: Dhawī al-Qurbā, 1229 A.H), 2: 345-357; See also Wan Suhaimi Wan Abdullah, "Kreativiti dan Imaginasi dalam Pengamatan al-Baghdādī [Creativity and Imagination in al-Baghdādī's Thought]", and Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran, "Kreativiti dan Imaginasi dalam Pengamatan al-Rāzī [Creativity and Imagination in al-Rāzī's Thought]" in *Kreativiti dan Imaginasi dalam Psikologi Islami: Pengamatan al-Ghazzālī, al-Baghdādī dan al-Rāzī [Creativity and Imagination in Islamic Psychology: The Thoughts of al-Ghazzālī, al-Baghdādī dan al-Rāzī]*, ed. Mohd Zaidi Ismail (Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), 2011).

[124] Al-Taftāzānī, "Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id," in *al-Majmū'ah al-Sanniyah 'alā Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah*, 121.

estimation (*al-wahm*); fourth, memory (*al-ḥāfiẓah*); and fifth, rational imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*). The explanation of their functions and their specific location in the brain, according to al-Taftāzānī are as in the following Table 1:

Table 1: Al-Taftāzānī' Classifications of Functions and the Locations of Internal Senses

Senses	Functions	Locus
1. Common senses (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*)	It receives all the forms which are imprinted on the five senses.	In the forepart of the frontal lobe of the brain. (*quwwah martabah fī al-tajwīf al-awwal min al-dimāgh*)
2. Imaginative (*al-khayyāl*)	It preserves the representative receives from the common senses (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*) in the absence of the sensed objects.	The end part of the forepart of the frontal lobe of the brain. (*quwwah martabah fī ākhir al-tajwīf al-muqaddam*)
3. Estimative (*al-wahm*)	It perceives the particulars non-sensible meaning, which is not perceived from the sensible object. For example, the intention or feeling of the animosity of Zayd and the friendship of 'Umar.	The end part of the parietal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī ākhir al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh*)
4. Memory (*al-ḥāfiẓah*)	It preserves the particulars meaning perceived from the estimative (*al-*	At the occipital lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī al-*

	wahmiyyah) faculty.	*tajwīf al-ākhīr min al-dimāgh*)
5. Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*)	It combines and separates between the form of the sensible objects perceived from the common sensus (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*) and the meanings perceived in the estimative (*al-wahmiyyah*) faculty, for instance, a man with two heads, or a man without a head. And the meaning of this is perceived from both aspects.	The first part of the parietal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī al-juz' al-awwal min al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh*)

Even though al-Taftāzānī follows Ibn Sīnā's function of the internal senses, based on his classification as shown in the Table 1 above, he significantly departs from Ibn Sīnā's arrangement on the estimative, memory, and the rational imaginative. He does not follow the sequence of the working of the functions by Ibn Sīnā. Fazlur Rahman's study on Ibn Sīnā's internal senses based on *Kitāb al-Najāt* found that Ibn Sīnā's arrangement on the function of internal senses are as follows: 1) common senses (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak* or *fanṭāsiā*); 2) representation (*al-khayāl* or *al-quwwā al-muṣawwirāh*); 3) imagination (*al-quwwah al-mutakhayyalah* in relation to animal, and *al-quwwah al-mufakkirah* in relation to man); 4) estimation (*al-wahm or*

al-quwwah al-wahmiyyah); and 5) retention and recollection (*al-quwwā al-ḥāfiẓah al-dhākira*).[125]

Al-Taftāzānī's classification, however, follows intensely al-Ghazālī's classification of the internal senses in *Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifah al-Nafs*.[126] Harry

[125] Fazlur Rahman, *Avicennas's Psychology*, 30-31.

[126] See in the Chapter of the Faculty of Apprehension (*al-Quwwāh al-Mudrikah*), 41-48. Al-Ghazālī writes enormous discourse on mind and the intellect in various domain of his works; in the theological work is *al-Maqṣad al-Asnā*; in the ontological and cosmological work is *Mishkāt al-Anwār*; and in the epistemological and psychological works are many, such *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, including the *Ma'ārij*. See Mohd Zaidi Ismail, "Kreativiti dan Imaginasi Dalam Pengamatan al-Ghazzālī", 11-12. However, the authenticity of the *Ma'ārij* became questionable after Montgomery Watt considered it to be among the spurious or at least dubious works of al-Ghazālī. His judgement was made without studying the content of the work, but based solely on a list of *Ma'ārij* chapters provided by Miguel Asın Palacious. The work was again critically scrutinized its contents especially by Binyamin Abrahamov's *Ibn Sina's Influence on al-Ghazali's Non-Philosophical Works* (1991) who offered some philosophical and historical justification; and Jules Janssens's *An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sīnā: Including Arabic and Persian Publications and Turkish and Russian References* (1993), who looked at the text closely and produced a useful survey of correspondences (1) Avicennan, (2) Ghazālīan and (3) unidentified elements of the *Ma'ārij*. Given that al-Ghāzālī's *Ma'ārij* text, which is used by the following scholars after him, such as al-Taftāzānī becomes the matter of contentious, it posts a question on its reliability. The credibility of the work, nevertheless, has been strongly defended by Afifi al-Akiti who argues that while the contents of al-Ghazālī are exceptionally close to Ibn Sīnā, they are nonetheless not quite the same. He adds, "…Still, the *Ma'ārij* is far from mere plagiarism, for as we have seen, there are some carefully edited portions of the text which make subtle, but crucial, departures from Avicenna. So could the *Ma'ārij* play the part of a corrected blueprint of Avicennan psychology to which al-Ġhazālī and his students (the specialist or "those who are fit for it") have access?" See M. Afifi Al-Akiti, "The Three Properties of Prophethood in Certain Works of Avicenna and al-Ġazālī", in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the*

Austryn Wodlfson's study on the *Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts*[127] reveals that Ibn Sīnā seemed undecided as to which of the faculties should be combined, and which one precedes the other, as a result, various combinations are to be found in different texts: *al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb*,[128] *al-Shifā'*,[129] *al-Najāt*,[130] and *Risālah fi al-Nafs*.[131]

It is due to Ibn Sīnā's fragmented faculties, such as the *al-quwwah al-mutakhayyalah* in relation to animal, and *al-quwwah al-mufakkirah* in relation to man, instead of making it one—the faculty of imaginative.[132] Despite Ibn Sīnā's brilliant exposition on the internal senses that had impacted many scholars after him, Wolfson observes, occasionally those scholars departed from him in the combination of the various faculties, or in the order of their arrangement, and even in the description of the functions of some of them.[133] This includes al-Ghazālī and al-Taftāzānī.

In al-Taftāzānī's description of the internal senses, he asserts the prominence of the fifth internal sense—the

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Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 190-212.

[127] Harry Austryn Wodlfson, "Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *The Harvard Theological Review* 28(2) (April 1935), 69-133.

[128] See in the chapter of the *Anatomy of Brain* (*Fī Tashrīḥ al-Dimāgh*) onwards in 2nd Vol., edited by Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḍannawī, 3 Vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1999).

[129] See in the *Books of Nature* (*al-Ṭabī'īyat*) in *al-Shīfā'*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥālīm Muntaṣir, Sa'īd Zayid & 'Abdullāh Ismā'īl, 10 Vols. (Qum: Maktabah Āyatullāh, 1406 H).

[130] See in the Chapter of Internal Senses (*Faṣl fī al-Ḥawwās al-Bāṭinah*) in *al-Najāh min al-Gharq fī Baḥr al-Ḍalālāt*, edited (*taḥqīq*) by Muḥammad Taqī Dānish (Tehran: n.p., 1387 A.H)

[131] See the work in Persian, *Risālah Nafs*, introduction by Mahdī Mohaghegh, and edited (*taḥqīq*) by Mūsā 'Amīd (Iran: n.p., 1383 A.H).

[132] *Ibid.*, 96-97.

[133] *Ibid.*, 101.

Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*)—above all the other senses. According to him, the Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*) has dual functions: in the event the soul employs it through the agent of the estimative faculty (*al-wahm*)[134] alone, it is described as imaginative (*al-mutakhayyalah*).[135]

However, in the event the soul employs it through the agent of rational faculty (*al-quwwah al-'aqliyah*) alone or together with the estimative faculty (*al-wahm*), it is called Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*).[136] Succeeding Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā, the function of the imaginative (*al-mutakhayyalah*) is not for reproductory only, but it also performs in creating (*ibtikār*) a new form, which the form has not been imagined by the senses before.[137] In other words, it potentially creates new knowledge.

Al-Taftāzānī's exposition on the faculties of the senses in *al-Talwīḥ* is supported, but with a slight diversion in his epoch-making work on *kalām*, the *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*.[138] In *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, he adds and refines some of the concepts — for instance, on the nomenclature of the fifth internal sense. In *al-Talwīḥ* he names it as the Rational Imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*), but in *Sharḥ al-*

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[134] The Estimative Faculty (*al-quwwah al-wahmiyyah*) is the main addition originally by Ibn Sīnā that he made it as a separate faculty with cognitive objects of its own. This faculty apprehends only the *ma'ānī* (meanings or intentions) that they somehow accompany the special sensibles (eg: colours, shapes, pictches) or are contained in them, yet differ from them in kind (benevolence/desirability, enmity). See Robert E. Hall, "Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sīnā: Systematic Synthesis and Development of the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic Theories", in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 63.

[135] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 159

[136] *Ibid.*

[137] See Muḥammad 'Uthmān Najātī, *al-Idrāk al-Ḥissī 'ind Ibn Sīnā* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1961), 204.

[138] See al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, 3: 298-360.

Maqāṣid he calls it with another name, the Inventive faculty (*al-mutaṣarrifah*),[139] which deals with forms (*al-ṣuwar*) and meanings (*al-ma'ānī*) through the combination and separation (*al-tarkīb wa al-tafṣīl*).[140] When this faculty is functioning through the intellect (*al-'aql*) it is called rational (*mufakkirah*), and when it is functioning through the estimative faculty (*al-wahm*), it is imaginative (*mutakhayyalah*).[141]

According to al-Ghazālī, the forms (*al-ṣuwar*) are the sensible objects apprehended by the external senses and by the internal senses.[142] This apprehension takes place in the common senses (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*) and the Imaginative (*al-khayyāl*) faculties. Whilst meanings (*al-ma'ānī*) are the non-sensible objects apprehended by the internal senses, without mediation by the external faculties.[143] This occurs in the estimative, memory, and the rational imaginative faculties.

Al-Taftāzānī explains in *al-Talwīḥ*, as in the Table 1, the locus of each of the internal senses in the brain (*dimāgh*). The Common Senses faculty is in the forepart

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[139] It refers to an internal faculty which function is combining forms and meanings and separating them, and then inventing them into something which has no reality. It can be classified into the following examples: 1) combining forms with other forms, eg: a man with two heads; 2) combining forms with meanings, eg: friendship between two good friends; 3) combining meanings with other meanings, eg: the friendship of two friends with love and respect; and 4) separation of forms from other forms, eg: man without a head, or food without its colour. All these separation and combination are possibly led to anything, but an imaginary without their reality. This faculty does not reside permanently, nor hibernate in the soul, but the other way around, the soul uses it according to the orders. If the soul uses it with the estimative, it is named as *al-mutakhayyalah*, and if the soul uses it with the rationality, it is called *al-mufakkirah*. See al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf al-Iṣṭilāḥāt*, s.v. "al-mutaṣarrifah".

[140] *Ibid.*, 3: 293.

[141] *Ibid.*

[142] Al-Ghazālī, *Ma'ārij*, 45.

[143] *Ibid.*

of the frontal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī al-tajwīf al-awwal min al-dimāgh*). The Imaginative faculty is in the end part of the forepart of the frontal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī ākhir al-tajwīf al-muqaddam*). The Estimative faculty is in the end part of the parietal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī ākhir al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh*). The Memory faculty is at the occipital lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī al-tajwīf al-ākhīr min al-dimāgh*). The Rational Imaginative faculty at the first part of the parietal lobe of the brain (*quwwah martabah fī al-juz' al-awwal min al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh*).

Interestingly, he explains the logical reasoning behind the locus of each of the internal faculties in *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*. The Common Senses must be at the forepart of the frontal lobe of the brain, because it is near to the external senses and it is easier for the acquiring of the *sensibilia*.[144] The Imaginative faculty is at the end part of the forepart of the frontal lobe of the brain, which is at the back of the Common Senses' locus.[145] It is near to the Common Senses, because it functions as the storage for the forms of the *sensibilia* received from the Common Senses.[146] The Estimative faculty must be that of near its locus to the Imaginative faculty, because to make the particulars forms (*al-ṣuwar al-juz'iyyah*) are side by side with the particulars meanings (*ma'ānīhā al-juz'iyyah*).[147]

The Memory faculty is at the occipital lobe of the brain, behind the Estimative faculty. Its function is to store the particulars meanings from the Estimative faculty.[148] Last but not least, the Rational Imaginative faculty is at the first part of the parietal lobe of the brain (*quwwah*

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[144] Al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, 3: 295.
[145] *Ibid.*
[146] *Ibid.*
[147] *Ibid.*
[148] *Ibid.*

martabah fī al-juz' al-awwal min al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh), which is the middle part of the brain. It is at the middle brain for easy perceiving the forms and meanings.[149] Al-Taftāzānī asserts that his understanding on the functions and locuses of all these internal faculties is agreeable with the understanding of those people of discernment among the scholars of legal before him (*al-muḥaqqiqūn min 'ulāma' al-tashrī'*).[150]

In other words, he follows the tradition of the scholars who were earlier than him that they laid down the scientific explanation on the function of the senses and their locations in mind. He even clarifies Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's lack of explanation on the orders of the existence (*mawjūd*) and the places (*maḥall*) of these faculties.[151] Al-Taftāzānī argues that each sense has their proper functions and places. If there is a defect (*al-āfah*)[152] in the place of the senses, it is necessary, that the action of the particular faculty will also be defected. It implies that all these faculties are operating at the equivalent mode, therefore it must be well maintained. Al-Taftāzānī's primary idea is that the function of the external and internal senses has the potentiality to create new knowledge.

The Creation of New Knowledge

Al-Taftāzānī reiterates several times the prominent of the fifth function of the faculty of the rational imaginative (*al-*

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[149] *Ibid.*

[150] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 159.

[151] Ibid. Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah briefly mentions the five internal senses without explaning their particular functions.

[152] *Al-āfah* is a verbal noun of *āwf*. Ibn Manẓūr in *Lisān al-'Arab* defines it as *al-'āhah* (defect, handicap in a body condition). Al-Barakātī in his work *al-Ta'rifāt al-Fiqhiyāh*, defines the *al-'āhah* as the condition that does not comply with the established practice (*'adam muṭāwa'ah*). See al-Sayyid Muḥammad 'Amīn al-Iḥsān al-Mujaddadī al-Barakatī, *al-Ta'rīfāt al-Fiqhiyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2003), s.v. "al-'āhah".

mufakkirah), above all the other internal senses, in apprehending the forms and meanings — either through the cognitive faculty or the imaginative faculty. The rational imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*), al-Taftāzānī argues, is that the soul itself i.e the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nātiqah*) that has the potentiality of extracting knowledge (pl. *'ulūm,* s. *'ilm*).[153] The nature of the knowledge is in the universal forms or meanings (*ṣuwar aw ma'ānī kulliyah*).[154] At the rational imaginative (*al-mufakkirah*) level, the soul has the faculty of separation (*al-taṣarruf*) and combination (*al-tarkīb*) of intelligible object of knowledge, from the state of materiality to the state of universality.

This is also known as the process of abstraction (*tajrīd*), which means extracting of an object of knowledge from the material form to the universal form. Abstraction does not mean that the abstracting of something from nothing. Muslim thinkers have established their position that the process of abstraction is indeed a part and parcel of the knowledge framework and itself is knowledge. At this particular state of apprehension, according to al-Taftāzānī, is recognized by the Active Intelligence (*al-'aql al-fū''āl*) because of its triumphant in apprehending the universal forms.[155] This marks the end perceptive functions of the internal senses, and the beginning of the apprehension of the intellect (*al-'aql*).[156]

Al-Taftazānī's epistemological-psychological elucidation of *mukallaf* demonstrates a unique treatment; hitherto, no explanation of this kind has been made by other authorities. Firstly, because Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah and other commentators of *uṣūl al-fiqh* did not make an

[153] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 159.
[154] *Ibid.*
[155] *Ibid.*
[156] *Ibid.*

attempt to explain thoroughly the *mukallaf* as he did.[157] However, he admits that his explanation on that matter should not be too long because it might divert readers from delving into the key issue.[158]

Secondly, he intends to make a distinction between the apprehension of the intellect (*'aql*) and the senses (*al-ḥiss*), because the distinction would make man characteristically different from other creatures. Animals do have external faculties to perceive sensible objects, but they do not have the internal senses and the intellect to process the sensible objects to be *intelligibia*. He also incorporates the discussion on the stages of the intellect and its potentiality from pure latent to perfection, as the *faylasuf*'s understanding, to denote the fact that the stages of the intellect exclusively applies only to those of sound men (*al-'uqalā'*), not to the infants, unsound men, and even animals.[159] The distinction characteristic that possessed by the intellect *vis-à-vis* the senses is its ability to apprehend the universals from the particulars and also the apprehension of the unseen from the observable objects.[160] It is unlike the senses, even though it has the faculty of apprehension, but the faculty is limited to apprehend particular and sensible objects of knowledge only.

According to al-Taftāzānī, the soul requires knowledge — as in the light analogy — that makes it possible to understand, move or make an action. In other words, real lights will bring about the real understanding of something, clarifying ambiguity, and guiding the soul from being astray.[161] It is not possible for a man to perform

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[157] *Ibid.*
[158] *Ibid.*
[159] *Ibid.*
[160] *Ibid.*
[161] Al-Taftāzānī makes an analogy of the emanation of the Sun. Lights from the Sun enlightens man's vision to see the *sensibilia*. Such

an action without a prerequisite knowledge or something that could enlighten him. The knowledge, or *what-the-things-that-could-be-known* (*ma'lūmat*) to man is called theoretical knowledge (*naẓarī* or *'ilmī*), or illuminative knowledge (*ma'rifah*). An action that stemmed from a particular knowledge or understanding cannot be neutral — like a *tabula rasa*.[162] It also cannot function by its own, because it must be driven by a preconceived knowledge, framework, or something that associated with knowledge.[163] From this understanding the Muslim thinkers come out with the division of wisdom (*al-ḥikmah*) into the theoretical (*al-naẓariyyah*) and practical (*al-'amaliyyah*).

According to the philosophers, the theoretical wisdom is made to perfect the soul, whilst the practical wisdom is to perfect both the soul and the body. The way the practical wisdom perfecting the soul and the body is by preventing and avoiding the body from evilness (*shurūr*) and making it inclines towards goodness (*khayrāt*). Al-Taftāzānī argues that for the practical wisdom to achieve its perfection in the body, the soul itself must be occupied with propositional knowledge on *what good is* and *what bad is*. The ability to comprehend the meaning, reality of the thing as it is, and the distinct attributes between *what good is* and *what bad is* — is key to understand the deeper meaning of God's injunctions. Without this ability, the soul is constantly at the state of

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lights, given by God, also enlighten the soul to see the *intelligibia*. See al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 159.

[162] According to Simon Blackburn's *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, '*tabula rasa*' was used by scholastic scholars like Thomas Aquinas to indicate the state of mind, which no sensation or experience has been impressed. It is also frequently subscribed to John Locke's belief that there are no innate ideas. In other words, *it is nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu* (nothing in the intellect unless first in sense).

[163] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 159.

perplexity and conjecture because it could not identify and distinguish the reality between *what good is and what bad is*.[164]

Al-Taftāzānī makes it clear that the different state of the soul of every individual has a tremendous impact on the individual's quality and ability of apprehension of knowledge and understanding of God's injunction. The states of the soul, according to al-Taftāzānī are of two kinds: first, where the soul is at the state of newly created (*ḥuduthān*); and second, where the soul is at the state of aiming for the eternity (*baqā'an*). At the first state, the nature of the soul is impure and imperfect, due to its attachment to the physical body.[165] If the condition of the soul and the body are put in their rightly places — which the soul is treated superior and higher than the body, not the other way around — therefore, the soul makes itself ready to receive the light (*nūr*) emanation from God for the perfection of good soul and inclination to good ethics.[166] Al-Taftāzānī describes this condition is when the soul is experiencing the serenity and subtlety (*ṣafā'i wa laṭāif*).[167] He illustrates an analogy of how the state of perfect soul in receiving God's lights and its overflowing to the surrounding, by referring to a clear mirror in receiving lights.

The second state of the soul is where the soul is aiming for its fullest potentiality to achieve the eternity purpose (*baqā'an*). This state of the soul is possible to be achieved by virtue of the soul constantly and intensively trains itself to increase right knowledge and refine ethics.[168] When the soul has arrived at this state, it makes

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[164] Badness is pleasuarable to the body, and congruent to the desire and anger. Whilsts goodness is hardship and burdernsome contravene to the desire. See al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 2: 160.
[165] *Ibid.*
[166] *Ibid.*
[167] *Ibid.*
[168] *Ibid.*

itself perfecting both the theoretical faculty (*al-quwwah al-naẓariyah*) and the practical faculty (*al-quwwah al-'amaliyah*).[169]

Intellect is the faculty (*qūwwah*) in the theoretical domain that has the function to obtain knowledge as well as to create knowledge. Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah states the philosophers' ideas on the four degrees (*marāṭib*) of human intellectual development from mere potency to perfect actualization for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, in the chapter of *al-Maḥkūm 'Alayhi* in *al-Tanqīḥ*. The first is *al-'aql al-hayulānī* (*hyle*; material intelligence; *intellectus materialis*); second, *al-'aql bi al-malakah* (intelligence in habitus; *intellectus in habitu*); third, *al-'aql bi al-fi'l* (intelligence in act; *intellectus in actu*); and fourth, *al-'aql bi al-mustafād* (acquired intelligence; *intellectus acquisitus*). Al-Taftāzānī concurred these degrees of the intellect and indicated that as for the *mukallaf*, it is at least to acquire at the second level of the intellect; *al-'aql bi al-malakah* (intelligence in habitus; *intellectus in habitu*), because the intellect at this level has already acquired the necessary knowledge[170] and the conceptual knowledge of the Sharī'ah,[171] that allow *mukallaf* to act accordingly.

Al-Taftāzānī's brilliant epistemological-psychological explanation of *mukallaf* in the *uṣūl al-fiqh* corpus, in our view, is exceptionally original. He employs philosophers' sources which might be controversial to some *mutakallimūn* and *fuqahā'*, but he knows where to appropriate it. He puts forth the importance of metaphysical understanding of *mukallaf* as a man, comprise the meaning and function of the senses *vis-à-vis*

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[169] *Ibid.*

[170] For instance, the whole is greater than the part and that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another.

[171] For instance, the permissible (*ḥalāl*), not permissible (*ḥarām*), *rukhṣah*, etc.

the intellect in acquiring right and sound knowledge. Al-Taftāzānī's approach suggests his overarching framework of knowledge and scientific tradition following the scholars like Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī.

Although he agrees with Ibn Sīnā on the basic structure of the emanation of the intellect, he echoes Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticism on the idea that 'out of one, only one entity can issue' (*ann al-wāḥid lā yaṣdur 'anh illā wāḥid*).[172] He views this idea is built based on a weak foundation because how come The First Being gives rise to the first intellect, which in turn gives rise to second intellect and so forth until the ninth intellect?

Al-Taftāzānī's adoption and later creative appropriation of Ibn Sīnā's theory of potency and actuality of intellect shows his interest of developing it within the realm of legal theory. The potency and actuality of intellect is originally Aristotle's.[173] Aristotle's explanation on the potentiality of the intellect has to do with his interest in biology.[174] He illustrates an example of seeds grow into trees. The growing of seeds to become trees denotes a biological progression of a thing. It is a paradoxical situation to describe 'this very thing was a seed and is now becoming a tree'; because how can the same things be both seed and tree?[175] Potentiality and actuality theory provides a way of describing such natural change: the seed.[176] The same goes for the intellect.

Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah initially incorporates the philosophical elements in the discussion of *mukallaf* in his work, *al-Tawḍīḥ*, but it is briefly. Al-Taftāzānī makes a

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[172] *Ibid*., 2: 157.

[173] See Aristotle, *De Anima*, with translation, introduction, and notes by R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907).

[174] John Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction* (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 96-97.

[175] *Ibid.*

[176] *Ibid.*

thorough explanation and extensive philosophical elucidation on the senses and intellect of the *mukallaf* in *al-Talwīḥ* because he believes that both senses perceptive functions and the intellect are not merely descriptive, but prescriptive.

He understands that the intellect is always in the state of *active* and *alive*, because intellect is one of the realities of the soul.[177] Given the active and alive nature of the soul, the *mukallaf* must constantly train his soul and intellect in order to reach perfection of apprehension and refinement of ethics. This requires constant and intense training on the part of the cognitive, the thinking faculty, because it is the place where the subtly of knowledge appears. This whole understanding deeply revolves around the responsibility of a person as exemplified in Abū Ḥanīfah's definition of *al-fiqh*, which, 'the knowledge of the self on rulings for and against him' (*ma'rifah al-nafs mā lahā wa mā 'alayhā*).[178]

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it shows to us al-Taftāzānī's brilliant exposition on the relation of senses and the intellect as the two key channels of knowledge in Islām for the *mukallaf*. Senses and intellect are inside and inherent in man, but they are there not for the sake of being reservoir of sensible and intelligible objects. Both the senses and the intellect must be preserved as well as be trained to bring their potentiality to achieve at the stage of perfection. The intellect, particularly, must be constantly trained through reading, contemplation, discussing, and engaging with ideas and scholars.

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[177] Four spiritual substances of man are: the heart (*al-qalb*), the self (*al-nafs*), the spirit (*al-rūḥ*), and the intellect (*al-'aql*). All these refer as the elements of the one reality of the Soul (*al-rūḥ*). See al-Ghazālī, *Ma'ārij al-Quds*, 15-22; and also al-Attas, Chapter on The Nature of Man, in *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islām*, 143-176.

[178] Al-Taftāzānī, *al-Talwīḥ*, 1: 10.

Al-Taftāzānī's thorough explanation on the nature of *mukallaf* is that man is *conditio sine qua non* to *mukallaf*. Therefore, *mukallaf* should be an active interpreter of God's injunctions, not a passive receiver. More importantly, *mukallaf* is bestowed with the creative faculty that has the potentiality to create new knowledge and to acquire insights that are useful in the process of making *ijtihād*. However, it must be reminded that knowledge obtained from the senses and the intellect *per se* are not sufficient, because they require another channel of knowledge, the true reports (*khabar ṣādiq*) to make the knowledge more valid and sound.

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