

CARTELISATION IN INDONESIAN POLITICS DURING THE JOKOWI ERA

Zamzami Abdul Karim^{1*} & Jamaie Haji Hamil²

*First author & corresponding author

^{1,2}Centre for Research in History, Politics and International Affairs
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

¹Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (STISIPOL) Raja Haji-Indonesia
(zamikareem@gmail.com, jamaie@ukm.edu.my)

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Abstract

Indonesian politics is synonymous with cartel politics. During the New Order era, the practice of cartelisation was insignificant since Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) became dominant in Indonesian politics weakening the opposition party. However, starting from the Reformasi era until the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), cartelisation grew with the formation of coalition parties. In the Jokowi era, the issue of cartelisation grew with more political parties joining the Jokowi coalition. Jokowi practised this cartel politics since he was not the head of a political party or came from a ruling elite family, hence leaving him with no control over the government. In addition, presidential threshold rules, expensive political costs and the strength of oligarchic politics were factors contributing to the growth of cartel politics in the Jokowi era. This article evaluates cartel political practices and their issues in Indonesia during Jokowi's rule utilising data collected from secondary sources namely books, theses, articles, magazines and official government documents. This article argues that the rapid development of cartelisation in the Jokowi era is contributed by the fat coalition he formed to distribute power and create political compromises, thus impacting the check and balance process, the emergence of laws that only benefit the elite, the erosion of the ideology of political parties, the declining quality of elections, the growth of money politics and corruption, as well as the strengthening of dominant major parties. At the end of the analysis, it was demonstrated that cartelisation is what led to the decline of democracy in Indonesia.

Keywords: cartelisation, political compromise, fat coalition, Jokowi, Indonesia

Introduction

Cartelisation began to be utilised in Europe to describe the existence of political parties working with the state to harness national resources. These parties decided to be in the government as it provides them with financial resources to survive in the political arena of the country since maintaining and growing a party requires substantial funding. In Germany, for instance, cartel practices exist due to political parties wanting funding from the state. The Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the German Social Democrats (SPD) are the two dominant parties that each receive 25% of state funding (Detterbeck, 2005, p. 181). Substantial funding by the state attracted other political parties to team up with the government for financial assistance, such as the Folke Conservative (KF) party and the Danish Party. This situation rendered political parties unable to play their check and balance role as they are already bound and indebted to government assistance. In 2004, political parties in the Bundestag tried to propose a law on small parties, but the motion was rejected by the Constitutional Court as it was considered a violation of basic constitutional principles and could create cartel practices (Detterbeck, 2008).

In developing countries like Uruguay, since 1985, the practice of cartelisation has existed in its legislation dominated by cartel parties. The three main influential parties are the Partido Colorado, the Partido Nacional and the Frente Amplio. With this three-party alliance, the government became strong and able to control the formation of laws and arrange for anyone to get positions and resignations so that the planned policy can be implemented easily without opposition according to the will of the president (Chasquetti, 2013, p. 8).

In Indonesia, the largest democratic country in Asia, the practice of cartelisation also applies. Slater (2018) revealed three reasons for this occurrence. First, to gain majority support from political parties in the parliament. Second, to help reduce the cost of defeat in elections. Third, to strengthen the position of the president. As a result of this action, Slater (2018) stated that the biggest democratic challenge in Indonesia lies in creating a strong opposition party to balance the dominant single party. Indonesia adopts a multi-party system; however, not all political parties act consistently as the opposition since they tend to join government parties after elections, causing an ineffective check and balance process in the country's democratisation.

The cartelisation in Indonesia is not new. It dated back to the time of Suharto's New Order rule when elections were conducted using military force to legitimise his power. Suharto also allowed limited competition between political parties by enabling Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) to become the dominant party and formulated electoral rules that were only in favour of the ruling party. For example, Suharto forbade the establishment of parties at the district level so that

Golkar would dominate the Indonesian political arena, besides forbidding criticism of government policies during the campaign (Liddle, 1987, p. 181). In this era, every member of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) was a member of Golkar (Honna, 2005).

Suharto's main strategy in the election was to direct government officials to pressure village heads in obtaining votes for Golkar, especially in rural districts. All civil servants were also required to join Golkar as the ruling party until 62% of government officials comprised Golkar party members. Similarly, trade unions, student groups, farmers' associations and community organisations were all under Golkar's control (Mietzner, 2017). To further strengthen his power, Suharto controlled the political participation of the people since he believed that uncontrolled political freedom could endanger the political stability of the country. In addition, Suharto also merged many parties into only three, namely the United Development Party (PPP- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) and Golkar (Suryadinata, 1995). PPP was a coalition of Islamic ideological parties such as Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi- Partai Muslim Indonesia), the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII- Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia) and the PERTI Islamic Party (Partai Islam PERTI). Meanwhile, PDIP was the result of a coalition of the Indonesian National Party (PNI- Partai Nasional Indonesia), Murba, the League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI- Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia), the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo- Partai Kristen Indonesia) and the Catholic Party.

The merger of the political parties was Suharto's first step in adopting cartel practices to maintain his power. Although Suharto aimed to create political stability, the reality was that the practice grew undemocratic since other parties became weaker as they were oppressed by the strength of Golkar. Suharto's hostile and autocratic political approach as well as the creation of political parties and parliaments loyal to him resulted in an oppressive rule (Crouch, 2010). It was this tight political control that caused Golkar to win big in every election during its rule from 1971 to 1997. According to Agustino and Yusoff (2009), Golkar's victory in each of these elections was proof that during the New Order, Golkar was the only party funded by the government to win the election by obtaining a majority vote.

In the Reformasi era, civil society and political parties were given more free democratic space under the rule of B.J Habibie, Gus Dus and Megawati. Nevertheless, cartelisation practices persisted since the electoral process was still controlled and regulated by the dominant large parties (Winters, 2013). For

instance, the 1999 election in the Habibie era was followed by 44 political parties as a result of the freedom to form political organisations and parties. However, only Golkar, PDIP, the National Awakening Party (PKB- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), PPP and the National Mandata Party (PAN- Partai Amanat Nasional) got the most votes. Golkar still won big votes in the election as the electoral process was still controlled and regulated by the strength of the dominant party.

During the reign of president Gus Dur, he was faced with strong opposition from the dominant Golkar and PDIP parties when he replaced two economic ministers; Jusuf Kalla of Golkar and Laksamana Sukardi of PDIP with Rozy Munir and Luhut Panjaitan who were loyal figures to him. This resistance caused him to lose support and be accused of committing corruption until he was forced to resign (Slater, 2004, p. 72). Sri Lestari (2017) stated that the process of dismissing Gus Dur was a form of party-wide cartelisation in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). This is because Gus Dur tended to have a conflict with many parties during his leadership and failed to take care of the cartel party groups he created, causing him to lose support from MPR members.

During Megawati's ruling, she formed a Mutual Assistance Cabinet to continue-maintaining her power. The existence of cartel parties in the Megawati era can be seen from her actions that kept PKB members of parliament in the cabinet until Amien Rais stated that no party had lost (Slater, 2004, p. 79). In doing this political cooperation, Megawati did not pay attention to ideological questions during the election campaign so that parties with different religious issues could together become part of the cabinet (Ambardi, 2008). Therefore, either in the era of Gus Dur or Megawati, there were no clear opposition parties as they are all in the government. In the era of Gus Dur, all large and medium parties including PDIP, Golkar, PAN, PKB, PPP, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and the Justice and Unity Party (PKP- Partai Keadilan Persatuan) secured their positions in the cabinet, similar to that in the era of Megawati. This situation weakened the check and balance process due to the ruling party being too strong and the absence of clear opposition.

The 2004 presidential election was no longer determined by the MPR, but for the first time directly elected by the people. The election of the president and vice-president running mate is directly regulated by law number 23 of 2003, which stipulates that presidential candidates who want to contest must meet the requirements of the presidential threshold. Article 5 paragraph (4) of this law stipulates that a presidential candidate can only be proposed by a political party or a coalition of political parties that obtains at least 15% of the total seats in the House of Representatives (DPR- Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) or 20% of the national election valid vote. The goal is to limit the candidates to only those who reach the

threshold. This rule is one of the factors creating the cartel practices as each political party must form a group to be able to meet the presidential threshold of 15% seat acquisition in the DPR that has been set.

In the 2004 presidential election, there were five pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates contesting, namely Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar nominated by PPP, Amien Rais-Siswono Yudohusodo nominated by PAN, Megawati Soekarnoputri- Hasyim Muzadi nominated by PDIP, Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid nominated by Golkar and the SBY-Jusuf Kalla pair backed by the Democratic Party (PD- Partai Demokrat), the Crescent Star Party (PBB- Partai Bulan Bintang) and the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI- Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia). The presidential election took place in two rounds since no pair had obtained more than 50% of the vote. The first round of the SBY-JK and Megawati-Hasyim pair won the top two places. Therefore, a second-round was held to select the pair that gets the majority vote. In this second round, the SBY-Jusuf Kalla (SBY-JK) pair obtained the majority vote defeating the Megawati-Hasyim pair. The impact of this second round of presidential elections shows the strengthening of cartel politics at that time (Tomsa, 2014).

Similar to the previous president of the Reformasi era, SBY-JK also began to divide power entering the first term of his rule by forming its cabinet known as the United Indonesia Cabinet. The cabinet comprised 36 ministers of whom 18 were ministers from political parties, four from the military, three from bureaucratic groups, six from professionals, and five from academics (Yusuf, 2005, p. 8). Slater (2018) observed the distribution of power carried out by SBY-JK as a form of political contract with the parties supporting it during the campaign. However, SBY-JK did not only distribute power to the political parties of its supporters during the campaign but also to parties that opposed it during the campaign including Golkar and PPP. This reciprocity of power is an effort to stabilise his rule and give assurance to himself to continue gaining support in the presidential election in the future.

In the 2009 presidential election, the threshold increased from 15% to 20% of seat turnover in the DPR compared to 2004, making it difficult for political parties to pass to run for president and thus giving birth to a political compromise between the parties to qualify their respective candidates to contest. The effect is that in the 2009 presidential election, only three pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates were eligible to run. The presidential election on July 5, 2009, was won by the SBY-Boediono pair, which started the second term of SBY's government. SBY-Boediono obtained the highest number of votes at 73,874,562 or 60.80% of the national vote, while other pairs including Megawati-Prabowo obtained 26.79% and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto obtained 12.41% of the votes (Komisi

Pemilihan Umum, 2009). Golkar did not support SBY-Beodiono but joined the government during the formation of the cabinet. However, this large coalition is fragile as its formation was based only on the interests of the party, not on the similarity of ideology and direction of national reform (Haris, 2011, p. 6). Slater and Simmons (2013, p. 1366) stated that parties with shared power after the election eliminated political opposition from the opposition parties so that there will be no check and balance function from the opposition party. Therefore, the practice of cartelisation in the second term of SBY was seen as unstable since more political parties that join the government led to more interests that must be accommodated.

SBY's government was replaced by Jokowi who ruled Indonesia for two terms from 2014 until today. Similar to the previous president, Jokowi also practised cartelisation politics in his government. The question is, why is cartel politics more important and influential in Indonesia? This article discusses this by focusing on the two terms of Jokowi's rule and challenges in the democratisation of Indonesia.

The Concept of Cartelisation

The concept of cartelisation was first introduced by two academics, namely Richard S. Katz of the United States and Peter Mair of Ireland. They looked at changes in the pattern of political parties in Western Europe around the 1970s and found the existence of a close mutually beneficial relationship between political parties and countries. They labelled political parties that are close with the state as cartel parties that "employ the resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival" (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 5). Blyth and Katz (2010, p. 38) agreed with this view and stated that the purpose of cartel parties is "... to maximise joint profits of oligopolistic firms through the restriction of competition." This shows that a cartel party has close ties with the state for gaining profit and limiting competition.

Katz and Mair (2018) stated that the idea of cartelisation is derived from cartel practices in economic markets. The nature of cartels is shown by the existence of individual property ownership, partnerships and collective act to dominate the market. The idea is similar to the pattern of practice in cartel politics; there is a tendency to acquire and maintain individual property and power-sharing to dominate a country. Both scholars described cartel parties as 'ruling parties' that often comprise large parties that control and have access to the country. A similar opinion has been also argued by Slater (2004, p. 65) who stated that "in politics, cartels differ from the coalition in that they co-opt all major political parties into a vast national alliance, marginalising small outsider parties in the process." In maintaining their power, cartel parties practise patronage

politics by placing their supporters in a position of policy-making and controlling the workers under them such as clerks, street sweepers and postmen. Slater's (2018) view of cartel politics is that it is a strategic sharing of power divided into two, namely victory and reciprocity. Victory is a style of power-sharing with a supporting party during an election campaign, while reciprocity is a power-sharing effort with any party that is not supportive during an election. Victory sharing of power causes opponent parties to appear automatically since the losing parties become opposition groups, while reciprocity occurs after elections as an effort of political compromise. Despite losing the election, no party would lose their power.

Katz and Mair (1995) in their early writings stated that cartelisation indicates the relationship between society, political parties and a state. Good relations are built between political parties and the state only, while relations with the community are not well built since the parties work as agents or representatives of the state, not the community. When a party is influenced by the state and has close ties, the party will then indirectly become increasingly distant from society. If parties are influenced by the state and getting closer to state institutions, they will only tend to look after each other's shared interests.

Detterbeck (2001) assessed such cartel practices from three dimensions. First, in terms of political role, political parties lose the ability to fulfil the function of representing the society since close ties with the state cause cartel parties to organise governance according to their interests. Second, in terms of the level of party competition, it reduces the impact of electoral competition as it provides an opportunity for the losing party to sit in power and gain resources. Third, in organisational terms, decision-making is determined by cartel parties in the kingdom who have access to the media and other state resources.

In a subsequent paper, Detterbeck (2005) described cartel political practices involving three things at once; competition, conflict and cooperation between groups. These parties eventually dominated the country by placing their representatives in key government positions. In Switzerland, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats are a large coalition that has held power since 1959. Government positions are also shared with four other political parties namely the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Swiss People's party. This shows that cartel parties share power with each other and form large coalitions to control the government.

Katz and Mair (2009) refer to these cartel political parties as 'organs without function' since they do not work as they should. They described the practice of cartelisation as having seven characteristics. First, the goal is to utilise state resources. Second, the style of the cartel party is to curb and limit

competition. Despite competing in elections, these parties form a political compromise with their rivals for the common good after the election. Third, cartel parties tend to side with the government rather than as opposition parties. They work together not because of ideological similarities, but because of each other's interests alone. Fourth, cartel parties have close ties with the state to obtain party funding and financing. Fifth, the cartel party invites all supporters to participate in the activities and decisions of the party but when in power, its leaders tend to seek personal gain. Sixth, the practice of cartelisation is characterised by the existence of close ties between political parties and the state, but not between parties and society. Seventh, cartel parties place representatives in government positions as they can strengthen their party's position.

In Indonesia, cartel politics has always been common. This is because political parties want to be in government to obtain party funding and utilise the country's resources. This situation has weakened the role of the opposition parties to play the role of check and balance against the government. In addition, cartel politics also makes decision-making limited to only government parties. In the era of Jokowi's rule, most political parties became close to the government and were in power. Elections were labelled as only a platform of democracy since each political party re-evaluates its position and rejoins the ruling party after that. In this regard, this article uses the concept of cartelisation as an analytical tool to identify the factors influencing the growth of cartelisation in Indonesian politics during the era of Jokowi's government.

Literature Review

Studies on cartel politics in Indonesia have been extensively conducted by scholars. Slater (2018) discussed cartel parties in the era of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) up to the first term of Jokowi's rule. He mentioned that after the Reformation era, the expected role of the opposition party did not emerge, but instead created the political practice of cartelisation. Slater (2018) presented the example of Abdurrahman Wahid's (Gus Dur) National Association Cabinet (Kabinet Persatuan Nasional) that divided ministerial seats to PDIP with 5 seats, Golkar with 7 seats, PPP with 2 seats, PKB with 5 seats, TNI/Polri (Indonesian National Armed Forces and Indonesian National Police) with 6 seats, PAN with 4 seats, PKB with 1 seat and PKS with 1 seat to gain majority support to maintain its rule. During Megawati's reign, she introduced a Mutual Assistance Cabinet (Kabinet Gotong Royong) by dividing parliamentary seats in the same way as that during Gus Dur's rule. In the distribution of ministerial seats, PDIP and Golkar were given 5 seats each, PPP 2 seats, PKB 1 seat, TNI/Polri 2 seats, PAN 1 seat and PBB 1 seat. In Megawati's time, PDIP and Golkar as the two major parties in

Indonesia became the dominant parties controlling the country and maintaining party-state relations.

During the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), he introduced a United Indonesia Cabinet, which was different from the previous one. The list of parliamentary seats distributed by SBY to Golkar was 18.9%, PPP 6.8%, PD 26.4%, PAN 8.2%, PKB 5%, PKS 10.2%, whereas, for the ministerial seats, Golkar obtained 3 seats, PPP 2 seats, PD 6 seats, PAN 3 seats, PKB 2 seats and PKS 4 seats. The distribution of ministerial seats was also practised by Jokowi. In the first term of his rule, the PDIP was given 4 cabinet posts, PKB with 4, Nasdem with 3, Hanura with 2 and PPP with 1 post.

From the above data, Slater (2018) concluded that the distribution of cabinet seats had proved that party cartelisation has influenced coalition politics in Indonesian democracy. He said that although this distribution of power was good for the president to gain support from the parties that joined forces to stabilise the government, it harmed democracy as it prevented small parties from competing in politics and eliminated the check and balance role that should be played by the opposition parties. Slater's study is interesting but only examined the practice of power-sharing from the time of Gus Dur to the first era of Jokowi's rule, while this article also evaluates the practice of cartelisation in the second era of Jokowi's rule and its impact on Indonesian democratisation.

Muhtadi (2015) discussed Jokowi's challenge as a president caught between implementing reform and oligarchic politics. He assessed that Jokowi failed to carry out political reforms due to a combination of personal and external factors. The personal factor is because Jokowi was not a leader of any political party and did not come from an influential family; so he does not have strong political support within the government. Meanwhile, the external factor is that the multi-party system in Indonesia causes any president to form a coalition with many parties. In the first term of his rule, Jokowi was supported by several political parties but then faced instability in the government which weakened his position as president. This led Jokowi to restructure his position and offer cabinet posts to parties that support him. In addition, Muhtadi (2015) also stated that Jokowi failed to create a stable government as the parties that joined him were not based on ideological similarities, but merged solely to maintain their power and defend the status quo. His analysis concluded that cartelisation in Indonesia resulted in party ideology being an unimportant indicator in forming a coalition, political competition that only occurred during the campaign and weak opposition parties in the parliament, which weakened the democratisation of Indonesia.

Hargens (2019) examined the practice of oligarchic cartelisation after the Suharto era. He stated that after Suharto's rule, the practice of oligarchy or pure

cartelisation no longer existed since the two have been mixed; the practice of oligarchy in cartel ways. This is because the 2017 election law setting the presidential threshold has led to competition between the oligarchs against democratisation. Since then, the power of the oligarchy began to control the parties and government institutions until it was referred to as the oligarchic cartelisation. The point of Hargens (2019) was that oligarchs are beginning to be influential in influencing government and parliamentary policy-making. Hargens (2019) assessed the ability of oligarchs in using cartels as an attempt to maintain their power in government and the status quo. This has had an impact on the spread of corrupt practices, the weakening of the functioning of parliament and the unfriendly policy-making process.

Sri Lestari (2017) discussed the role of cartel parties in the political corruption in Indonesia. She noted that the huge political capital in the election caused political parties to seek positions in the government to cover the cost of election expenses until they were caught in the criminal practice of corruption. She illustrated an example of the Century Bank corruption case during the SBY era, which found no clear solution until now. According to her, the matter was due to the abuse of power committed by the party elites that formed the political alliance, which then formed cartel groups to support the government to control the country's financial resources. At the end of her analysis, Sri Lestari (2017) concluded that cartelisation practices have resulted in the existence of corruption crimes, ineffective check and balance processes, as well as limited civil liberties.

The above literature shows that cartelisation in Indonesia is practised using power distribution to weaken the function of the opposition. For this reason, although Indonesia entered the Reformation era after Suharto's autocratic rule, it did not experience much political change. This is because this cartel politics has resulted in an ineffective check and balance process due to rampant corruption and political interference in the government. Hence, this article discusses cartel politics during the Jokowi era.

Research Methodology

This article utilised a qualitative research design and descriptive analysis to identify the factors behind the occurrence of cartelisation in the era of Jokowi's rule, examine its implementation and evaluate its impact on the democratisation of Indonesia.

This article collected secondary data obtained through library research. According to Babbie (2012), secondary data involves data that has been interpreted and recorded. In this article, the data was obtained from books, theses, journals, newspapers, official government reports and news portals. This data collection

technique allowed the researcher to examine, interpret and critically analyse the data to construct the main arguments of this article. This type of data collection method saves cost and energy as it does not require data collection through questionnaires or surveys. In addition, it facilitates researchers in collecting data and information since it involves available documents that can be found online or in the library.

Findings and Discussion

Cartelisation in the First Term of the Jokowi Era

On April 9, 2014, the presidential election was held directly for the first time in the history of the Indonesian presidential election. The 2014 presidential election was only followed by two pairs of candidates owing to the large threshold value that must be met, causing only a few political parties to be able to nominate candidates in this election, thus leaving only two candidates contested namely the Prabowo-Hatta pair supported by the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya), PKS, PAN, PPP, PBB and Golkar, as well as the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pair supported by PDIP, the National Democratic Party (NasDem), PKB and the People's Conscience Party (Hanura- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat).

In this presidential election, the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla (JK) coalition won with 53.15% of the vote (Agustino & Yusoff, 2019). After his victory, Jokowi promised to be different from previous presidents by forming a lean (small) coalition filled with professional groups and not to practise cartelisation. Thus, he established the United Indonesia Cabinet, which has 34 ministers consisting of 15 ministers from political parties and 19 professionals. Among the political parties that supported Jokowi-JK in the election, PDIP won 5 seats, Nasdem 3 seats, PKB 4 seats, Hanura 2 seats and PPP 1 seat. Slater (2018, p. 30) stated that this distribution of power is in the form of victory and reciprocity; victory in terms of the distribution of power to the parties that supported him during the campaign such as PDIP, Nasdem, PKB and Hanura. Nevertheless, the PPP, which did not support him during the regular campaign, also won a ministerial seat, indicating that Jokowi also practised a style of reciprocity. However, the number of seats for the supporting party during the campaign was more than that of the opposing party.

These appointed ministers were those who contributed to winning the 2014 Presidential Election. For example, Andrinof Chaniago, the leader of the Jokowi Success Team in the election, was appointed Minister of National Development Planning (Bappenas), Amran Sulaiman as one of Jokowi-JK's largest donors to become the Minister of Agriculture, and Andi Widjajanto, one of the

thinkers in the Campaign Team, was appointed to be the cabinet secretary (Nathaniel, 2020).

Entering the second year of his rule, the Golkar and PAN parties followed the footsteps of the PPP to support Jokowi's rule. As a result, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan and Asman Abnur from the Golkar and PAN parties were appointed as ministers, leaving only Gerindra, PKS and PBB alone in the opposition (Sendhikasari, 2015, p. 19). This coalition is referred to as the 'fat coalition' as it leaves only a small number of parties as opposition. This fat coalition was Jokowi's effort to maintain his power and political stability since a very strong opposition in parliament would make his policies difficult to be approved by the parliament. Soon after, only PKS, PKB and Gerindra became opposition parties, which were weak as they do not have a similar ideological direction. This made it difficult for them to form constructive criticism.

During this first term, the Jokowi's government was also influenced by several actors including Megawati, Surya Paloh, Sofyan Wanandi and Jusuf Kalla. As PDIP president, Megawati has a great influence on the Jokowi government, such as on the issue of Budi Gunawan's candidacy as police chief of the Republic of Indonesia, which was deemed unfit by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Tempo.co, 2015). Furthermore, Surya Paloh, media owner and chairman of the Nasdem party, has a good relationship with Jokowi. Another entrepreneur was Sofyan Wanandi, a former Golkar supporter at the time of the New Order and the team leader of the Vice President's Economists in 2014-2019. According to Fukuoka and Djani (2016, p. 204), Jokowi's actions disappointed the people as he failed to realise his campaign promise to create a clean government; in fact, he paved the way to help the interests of the oligarchs around him. The oligarchs and political elites realised that embracing Jokowi who had a good image in the eyes of the people was an effective step to further develop their cartel practices. The next section discusses cartel politics in the second term of Jokowi's rule.

Cartelisation in the Second Term of the Jokowi Era

In the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi renominated himself and once again competed with Prabowo as the presidential candidate. Jokowi was paired with Ma'ruf Amin, whereas Prabowo was with Sandiaga Uno. Jokowi was proposed by the PDIP Party, while Prabowo was proposed by the Gerindra Party. In contrast to the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi-Ma'ruf garnered enormous support from nine political parties (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PKPI, Nasdem, Hanura, the United Indonesia Party [Perindo- Partai Persatuan Indonesia] and the Indonesian Solidarity Party [PSI- Partai Solidaritas Indonesia]) compared to Prabowo-Sandiaga, which was only supported by four political parties (Gerindra, PD, PAN

and PKS). Additionally, Stott (2019, p. 4) even mentioned the Jokowi-Ma'ruf coalition as the largest coalition after 1998.

From the composition of the supporting parties, Jokowi-Ma'ruf gained 61.25% support, while Prabowo-Sandiaga obtained 36.38% of the vote (Ekawati, 2019, p. 168). The support for Jokowi was a result of the fat coalition he developed in the first term of his rule, which stood alongside him in the 2019 presidential election without considering the factor of ideological alignment. After succeeding in the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi-Ma'ruf set up the Onward Indonesia Cabinet by appointing 38 ministers, 15 deputy ministers and 14 special staff. They were representatives from political parties, businessmen, military circles and even professionals since Jokowi wants to accommodate all the strengths to support him (Nathaniel, 2020).

In addition, Jokowi brought Prabowo into the cabinet and appointed him as defence minister while Edhy Prabowo (Gerindra politician) was appointed as a marine and fisheries minister. Not only Prabowo and Edhy, but at the end of 2020, Jokowi also appointed Sandiaga Uno who was Prabowo's partner in the presidential election as minister of tourism and creative economy (Isaliani & Firdaus, 2020). For the first time in Indonesian history, opponents of the coalition during the presidential election joined the president who succeeded in the presidential election. This phenomenon has made competition during the election to become meaningless since, after the election, there would be no competition except collusion between the elites. With Jokowi's efforts to embrace all his political opponents, the coalition of Jokowi's supporters then became so fat.

To further strengthen his position, Jokowi not only formed a fat coalition but also adopted a political dynasty. This practice is not a new thing as it has been practised since the time of Suharto until SBY. In 2020, his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, was elected as mayor of Solo while his son-in-law Bobby Nasution was elected as mayor of Medan (Gunanto, 2020, p. 180). The strategies of the fat coalition and political dynasty were Jokowi's step in maintaining political power and becoming part of the oligarchy in Indonesia as well as increasing support for him through cartel practices.

Moreover, Jokowi also extended the practice of this cartelisation to influential political figures such as Megawati, Surya Paloh, Hendorpriyono, Budi Gunawan and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan. Budi Gunawan was the Head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) who played a role in bringing Jokowi and Prabowo together. Luhut was a coal miner and his good friend who holds various government positions such as coordinating minister of political, legal and security affairs, minister of energy and mineral resources, communications minister, coordinating minister of maritime and investment affairs, minister of marine

affairs and fisheries, as well as minister of industry and trade (Kompas.com, 2020). The distribution of power presents Luhut as one of the cartel actors in Jokowi's government. In fact, he is considered the minister of all affairs since almost all solutions to problems are entrusted to him. Meanwhile, Hendorpriyono, who was a former military man, has been with Jokowi since the 2014 presidential election. Megawati is the party leader who supports him. In August 2019, at the PDIP Congress in Bali, Megawati tabled to Jokowi who was also present at the congress to give the most seats to PDIP members. This indicates that the practice of cartelisation in the Jokowi era was not entirely the decision of Jokowi, but also Megawati who organised anyone eligible for the distribution of power in his government.

In addition, Jokowi also embraced various former TNI such as Wiranto who held positions as head of the presidential deliberative council, Fachrul Razi as religion minister, Prabowo as defence minister, Ryamizard as first term defence minister and Meoldoko as the president's chief of staff (CNN Indonesia, 2019). This distribution of power was Jokowi's strategy to embrace all powers so that they are centralised to him. Therefore, the practice of cartelisation developed during the Jokowi era was not only driven by the desire of political parties to become the ruling party, but businessmen and ex-military figures also participated in colouring the practice of the distribution of power, until the coalition of presidential supporters became fatter as it was filled with various backgrounds leading to an impact on the democratisation of Indonesian politics.

The Impact of Cartel Politics on the Democratisation of Indonesia

The practice of cartelisation in Jokowi's first and second terms had left a negative impact on Indonesia's democratisation. First, cartel politics resulted in the democratic process being carried out only during campaigning. This is because, after the campaign, the party elites move according to their personal and organisational interests. For instance, the Gerindra party that opposed Jokowi during the election joined the Jokowi cabinet and became the ruling party after the election. This eroded public confidence in elections and the quality of political parties in Indonesia as it rendered the representation system ineffective, the check and balance process that is passive, besides restricting competition and prone to maintaining the status quo. In addition, cartel politics also limited the people's choices as it limits everyone's opportunity to run for office. This is contrary to the purpose of democracy, which emphasises good competition between parties.

Second, cartel politics has resulted in the weakening of opposition parties, thus restricting their check and balance role. In the first term of his rule, Jokowi-JK practised cartel practices through power-sharing that led to the formation of fat

coalitions involving his supporters in the working cabinet he formed in strategic government positions such as the minister, staff member president and even deputy minister. This caused the strength of the opposition coalition to be only 31% in parliament. In the second term of his rule, Jokowi's coalition became very fat due to the support of nine parties namely PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PKPI, Nasdem, Hanura, Perindo and PSI. It became even more fattening when Prabowo and Gerindra along with Sandiaga Uno joined Jokowi in the post-election government causing the pro-government party to grow even bigger. Meanwhile, the opposition coalition was getting weaker as it consisted only of members of the Democrats, PAN and PKS who are a minority in parliament. In the end, PAN changed direction to support Jokowi and also proposed Jokowi for a third term. Whereas democrats and PKS remained weak in opposition. This is contrary to the spirit of reformation where society aspires the government to value the democratic rights and choices of the people.

Third, cartelisation practices caused political parties to be agents of the state rather than the people. During the election, they promised to support the people, yet after the election, they became supporters of the government and became elites seeking power in government. Thus, in the enactment of laws, political parties represent the interests of the elite and the oligarchs, which causes a huge loss to the people and the country hindering the development of democracy. This is due to the role of political parties that only act as a political vehicle for a group of elites in power to impose certain policies. This makes the people to be increasingly left behind and only act as spectators in a democratic country, which contradicts the notion that society has a big role and is not to be discriminated against (Asrinaldi, Yusoff, & Abdul Karim, 2021). Small opposition coalitions in parliament are unable to deliver significant changes in governance and tend to be oppressed by majority parties.

Fourth, cartel politics resulted in the fading of political parties' ideology and the quality of elections. The fat coalitions during the Jokowi regime demonstrated the insignificance of ideological similarities in a coalition. For example, in his first period, PPP, PAN and Golkar were the three parties that did not support Jokowi during the campaign. However, there was a political compromise after the campaign that made them turn to the Jokowi government. The same thing happened in the 2019 presidential election, where Prabowo of the Gerindra Party was invited by Jokowi to join him after losing the presidential election. This phenomenon is a form of ideological erosion between political parties that the direction of each political party becomes unclear as it is driven by the same interest, which is to control and utilise the country's wealth for their own benefit. This has given an impact on the decline in the quality of elections since the

competition held was only momentary. After the election, the parties redefined their ruling coalition through political compromise and distribution of power.

Fifth, the cartel politics resulted in limited electoral competition. One of them was the 20% threshold rule, which is a challenge for small parties or new parties to introduce alternative candidates. For that reason, the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections were only able to witness a contest between Jokowi versus Prabowo since other small parties did not have enough of the set thresholds. Thus, the election, which was originally a platform for political competition, has turned into a place of compromise for the political elites that is now dominated by oligarchs who ultimately make them the political parties representing the elites, not the people. This event will only make the existence of elections a condition to show that Indonesia is a democratic country, yet yielding poor quality results. This destroys the credibility of the country's democracy since the people are only needed during the campaign, but after that, the political party becomes a group that represents the interests of the elites and oligarchy groups. The erosion of political party ideology and the declining quality of elections in Indonesia were resulted from the growth of cartel politics.

Sixth, cartel politics resulted in major parties becoming dominant in the Indonesian political system. This is because these big parties are more concerned with political compromise than the competition, thus creating a fat coalition in the Jokowi regime from 2014 until the 2019 presidential election. Small parties that do not have many votes have no choice but to be part of a coalition of large parties. Their presence cannot be a party full of innovations and new alternatives, but merely a complement and follower of the big party. This causes small and new parties to tend to follow the dominant big parties as they do not have the same opportunities as the big parties. For example, the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections were only able to present Jokowi against Prabowo. Therefore, the democratisation that took place in Indonesia was not a government controlled by the people, but a system that has been dominated by the dominant parties and political elites who strengthen their power and sought to maintain the status quo.

Seventh, cartel politics lead to corrupt practices due to the spread of money politics. Money politics is a practice that has been considered normal in political life in Indonesia in the run-up to elections, such as vote-buying as well as money to join political parties or for candidacy. Therefore, many political parties acted as cartel parties to ally with the state and utilise state resources to reduce costs in their political activities. Competition between political parties became blurred as they are more interested in compromising and supporting each other in governance. Therefore, many civil servants from political parties became stuck with corruption cases as a result of high political funding and those who sit in the

government that organise and enjoy the country's financial system for personal gain.

Conclusion

Cartel politics is not new in Indonesia; in fact, it has been practised by leaders before Jokowi. From the New Order controlled by Golkar as a dominant party during the reform period until entering the direct presidential election, the practice of cartelisation remained fresh in Indonesian politics. The practice of cartelisation was marked by the sole dominance of Golkar causing other parties to become weak as they were unbalanced. Entering the post-New Order era, cartel politics was characterised by the distribution of power and political compromise as there was no single dominant party such as that in the New Order regime. Such political parties tend to form coalitions, become ruling parties and provide support to the government to maintain power and profit.

In the era of the Jokowi regime, the discussions have shown that cartelisation practices can be seen with the formation of fat coalitions. The reason for this is because Jokowi does not have the political power to legitimise his position as president. He does not come from an elite family nor is he the head of any political party. He is only a member of the PDIP party who must submit to the leader of the political party. Therefore, being the president elected by the majority of the people was not enough as Jokowi still needs strong support from political parties as well as elite figures in government. This is what caused Jokowi to practice cartelisation to strengthen his government. In addition, the multi-party system in Indonesia also contributed to the occurrence of cartelisation practices since these parties tend to form coalitions to form dominant groups in government. Even so, the analysis showed that the multi-party system becomes ineffective due to the presidential threshold that weakens the function of political parties and tends to be dominated only by large parties. This is because the setting of a threshold causes no political party to be dominant, hence requiring them to form a coalition of political parties to propose a presidential candidate. In the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi was proposed by PDIP, Nasdem, PKB and Hanura while in the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi was supported by PDIP, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, Golkar, Hanura, PKPI, Perindo and PSI. The PDIP party alone cannot support Jokowi as the presidential candidate without forming a coalition with other parties. Therefore, while Jokowi is successful in the presidential election, he must form a government consisting of various political parties. This rule limits competition between political parties since the power is controlled by large parties that sit in government and implement cartel practices.

In addition, expensive political costs are also one of the factors causing cartel practices in the Jokowi era. Political elites, as well as political parties, tend to sit in government to reduce political costs during the campaign. When sitting in the government, they have the opportunity to utilise the resources and wealth of the state. Thus, after the election, the political party that was once the opposition during the campaign sought career continuity utilising cartels such as allying with the state and becoming the ruling party to reduce the cost of defeat in the election.

Finally, the strength of oligarchy in Indonesian politics makes it difficult for leaders to escape the interests of the elites and oligarchs. The oligarchs played a big role in the winning of Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections with many oligarchs who owned the media funded the campaign and became Jokowi supporters. For example, Surya Paloh, Hary Tanoesoedibyo, Chairul Tanjung and Luhut Binsar Panjaitan were among the oligarchs who have helped Jokowi won. The strength of this oligarchic politics caused the government to be dominated by the elites to control wealth and continue to consolidate their power in the government. As such, the Jokowi regime was prone to cartelisation owing to the elites' interests that he must patronise.

Cartel practices in the Jokowi regime have had an impact on Indonesia's democratisation such as the ineffectiveness of the check and balance process, the emergence of laws that only benefit the elites, the erosion of the ideology of political parties and the declining quality of elections, the proliferation of money politics and corruption, and the strengthening of the position of the dominant large parties. From the analysis, small parties only exist as a complement to the multi-party system since it was shown that in the Jokowi era, the elites and dominant political parties are almost similar; in fact, they are oligarchic figures who existed since the New Order such as Prabowo and Megawati. This situation resulted in many people's interests being neglected during Jokowi's rule leading to the decline of democracy.

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