

COMMENTARY**FIGHTING THE BOKO HARAM:
MILITARY OFFENSIVE OR SOCIO-ECONOMIC SOLUTION?****Njoku C. Ekele and Jatswan S. Sidhu**

The Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (or Boko Haram) like any other extremist/terrorist group, has been notoriously known in Nigeria mainly due to the terror that it has been unleashing on civilians in the country. It has carried out numerous acts of indiscriminate violence against civilians and government officials thus resulting in the destabilisation of northeast Nigeria. In terms of impact of terrorism, in 2017 Nigeria ranked 3rd in the world after Iraq and Afghanistan.¹ The Boko Haram's brutal war against the Nigerian state saw it become the most lethal terror organisation in 2014 when it caused some 6,664 deaths², the same year that it declared a caliphate. In 2015 alone, the Boko Haram killed no less than 5,478 people, thus making it the second deadliest extremist group after the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).³ Further, in 2015, the Boko Haram became internationalised when it pledged allegiance to the ISIS.⁴ Its indiscriminate killings have also given rise to displacement of people in the north-eastern states such that many Internally Displaced Persons' Camps (IDPc) have been established in these states. Following its decade-long war of terror against the Nigerian state and its neighbours, Nigeria is now faced with an enormous security threat and humanitarian crisis, with the displacement of more than 2.6 million people.⁵ In fact, more than 14 million people in the northeast are in dire need of humanitarian aid.⁶

The militant group is also responsible for the death of more than 20,000 Nigerians.⁷ Worthy of mention here is the fact that Boko Haram also captured and controlled many territories in the northern part of Nigeria.⁸ In a bid to arrest the violence, the Nigerian government, in 2013, declared a state of emergency in three northern eastern states namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.⁹ This however did not do much in reducing the unrest.

The internal security threat posed by the Boko Haram and the inability of then President Goodluck Jonathan to arrest the insurgency was part of the reason why many Nigerians supported and elected President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. Many Nigerians believed that Buhari, a retired military general, had the capability and knowledge to address the threat posed by this extremist group. In his inaugural speech of May 2015, President Buhari strongly avowed that the "Boko Haram will soon know the strength of our collective will", adding that Nigeria "should spare no effort until we defeat terrorism."¹⁰ To achieve this, President Buhari ordered the military to defeat the Boko Haram by the end of 2015.¹¹

In December 2015, a few months after coming into power, Buhari asserted that the Boko Haram militants had been 'technically defeated'.¹² This military success was attributed to Nigeria's intelligence in counter-insurgency according to General Buratai, Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff.¹³ In December 2016, General Buratai presented a flag and a copy of the Quran (purportedly recovered from the Boko Haram) to President Buhari as a sign of victory against the group.¹⁴ This move attracted much criticism from detractors who argued that "presenting a fake flag as a sign of victory against the sect is "unfortunate and a disgrace to Nigeria's sovereignty."¹⁵ Security analysts argued that such a statement (technically defeated) was not

only misleading but also delusional due to series of attacks and killings carried out by the Boko Haram following that assertion. They viewed the claim by President Buhari as not only premature but also hyperbolic, arguing that the war against the Boko Haram had by no means ended.

Despite the difficulty experienced by the media in recent times in terms of accessing the degree of President Buhari government's victory against the Boko Haram as claimed by the government, one might be forced to believe that the Boko Haram and the threat it presents to the Nigerian security is on the decline. It was alleged that the Nigerian security forces had recorded substantial military successes against the extremist group. While it is worthy to commend the government on its military efforts and gains made so far against the militant group, it is also important to note that such military effort can only be enduring and long-lasting when combined with socio-economic efforts.

According to the Nigerian government and its media, the Boko Haram no longer controlled large territories like before and does not capture new ones either.¹⁶ Similarly, incessant attacks on government institutions like schools, banks, churches, police stations have also declined. In October 2015, while confirming the killing of 30 Boko Haram militants, the Nigerian military said that it had rescued about 338 captives of Boko Haram.¹⁷ In October, 2016, the Nigerian government secured the release of 21 Chibok girls after 'negotiations' with the extremist group.¹⁸ In May 2017, the government confirmed the release of 82 Chibok school girls "after lengthy negotiations...in exchange for some Boko Haram suspects held by the authorities."¹⁹ While it can be argued that Boko Haram extremist group no longer holds large number of territories as it were and that Boko Haram's security threat to Nigeria has waned following series of military successes recorded so far by the present administration, it is important to point out that any military success that is not supported or backed up by a political, economic and social success is destined to fail. Noteworthy also is the fact that territorial gains against the extremist group does not indicate the defeat of the militants.

Historical evidence shows that Nigeria is notable and quite familiar with either a quick fix solution or a total reliance on the use of military might against any internal uprising/conflict be it political, economic or ethnic without addressing the underlying drivers of the militancy. The resultant effect is that none of the peace achieved by the use of force has lasted for a long time. They remain a simmering challenge and a hydra-headed national question. For instance, the use of the 'amnesty programme'²⁰ to assuage the feelings of the Niger Delta agitators/youths did not answer the underlying issues that led to the insurgency. Although it can be argued that not all national issues or security challenges can wait for a long-term solution, an over reliance on short-term military approach to the threat of the Boko Haram will never provide the solution to radicalisation and extremism. With military success, Nigeria might win the battle but lose the war on radicalism. The Boko Haram did not come from a vacuum, it arose as a result of socioeconomic issues and until those issues are addressed, the remedy to this social menace will never be found. Military offensives cannot identify neither will it tackle the root causes of youth extremism and radicalisation like poverty and hunger, illiteracy and corruption.

Despite abundant mineral resources and crude oil exports and a rapidly growing economy, the Nigerian government has been reluctant in investing in social services for the benefit of the poor masses. Between 2005 till date, Nigeria's social spending is among the lowest in the world. Poverty remains endemic in the northern part of the country such that it

has become a fertile breeding ground for radicalisation and extremism. With limited economic opportunities, wealth disparity is therefore high.

When asked about the level of poverty in his house, a man angrily replied that: “Don’t ask me what poverty is because you have met it outside my house. Look at the house and count the number of holes. Look at my utensils and the clothes that I am wearing. Look at everything and write what you see. What you see is poverty.”²¹ For some people, “that person is poor who for 20 days out of the month eats boiled potatoes without butter, drinks tea without sugar, and doesn’t have enough money to buy subsidized bread.”²² Yet for others, poverty is buying of flour with their money, the cheapest of flours, only to bake the bread and found out that it was not consumable. Confronted with the obvious reality that you have nothing else, you are forced to eat it.²³ Poverty creates room for deprivation. Over 15 million people face severe food insecurity in the northeast Nigeria. It is also saddening to know that life expectancy in Nigeria is one of the lowest in Africa. It leaves the youths vulnerable to radicalisation and no amount of military offensive will answer the question.

For Agbibo, it is no coincidence that one of the worst forms of political violence in Nigeria today originates in the most socioeconomically deprived parts of the country. He added that:²⁴

While the overriding goal of Boko Haram is to wrest control from the Nigerian state and to impose Sharia legal code across the entire country, the cocktail of political corruption, chronic poverty, and youth unemployment in northern Nigeria continues to fuel members and supporters of Boko Haram.

Similarly, Paul is of the view that:²⁵

The increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemployment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs, and you can understand the growing violence in the north. Government statistics show that the northern states have the highest proportion of uneducated persons. If you link a lack of education and attendant lack of opportunities to a high male youth population, you can imagine that some areas are actually a breeding ground for terrorism.”

Many Nigerians especially those in north-east are poverty-stricken in the midst of huge wealth. The 2010 poverty report released by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics shows that the poverty rate in the north-east geo-political zone stood at 76.3 percent.²⁶ Poverty and hunger are drivers of radicalisation and extremism and efforts should be made to tackle these issues. A former Boko Haram militant who spent about three years with the group revealed that he joined the group to earn a living. “We had nothing to eat, therefore when this group came, they provided us enough food and we were forced.”²⁷ Sadly, the government is doing nothing to ameliorate the level of poverty and hunger in this war-stricken part of the country. It is therefore safe to contend that any military war or success made against the Boko Haram that excludes programmes to ameliorate poverty and hunger in the region can only exacerbate the conflict, if not now, certainly later.

In Nigeria, one can comparatively talk about north-south divide. This division is based on the chasm that exists between the poor North and the wealthy South. It is therefore not out of place to see many youths getting radicalised and recruited into the Boko Haram fold in the northern part of the country due to lack of basic needs. The poverty is blamed on the government and leaders who instead of striving for developmental projects that could impact positively on the lives of the masses, instead swindle the people and keep them perpetually poor. A large number of youths and community members who collaborate with the BH in the pillage and war in the northeast do so out of hunger and poverty.²⁸ The Boko Haram utilises such a vacuum to recruit them through the provisions of money and food.

Hunger and diseases are so endemic in Internally Displaced Persons' Camps (IDPs) across the northern part of the country that many have died as a result.²⁹ Often times, food meant for those in the IDP camps are stolen.³⁰ In all these things, it is regrettable to know that the government has no action or long term plan on the ground to confront hunger and poverty ravaging the people despite media information stating the opposite. There is an urgent need for Nigerian policy makers to understand that any durable resolution to the Boko Haram menace in the north-east requires identifying and addressing underlying drivers of radicalization. Military offensives might have in one way or other helped to reduce the security threat posed by the Boko Haram but military efforts alone without efforts to combat hunger and poverty that radicalise youths will be meaningless in a long term. There should be a commensurate effort in ameliorating or bringing down the level of poverty in the northern Nigeria. A deeply impoverished youth is easily radicalised. The need for infrastructure development that will in turn create jobs for these impoverished youths cannot be overstated.

While talking about the need to confront poverty, the alarming rate of illiteracy in the north is also worrisome and can no longer be ignored. The fact remains that many foot soldiers of the Boko Haram do not know what they are actually fighting for. Many Nigerians have the strong conviction that low level of education in the north-eastern part of the country is one of the drivers of the Boko Haram militancy and they strongly argue that without education, it will be difficult for peace efforts to yield positive results. For former President Olusegun Obasanjo, "most of the intolerant sections of the African society were illiterate."³¹ There is need for educational reforms in the country especially in the northeast to complement military efforts in fighting the Boko Haram.

The *Almajiri* is an informal education system practiced in northern Nigeria where students are allowed to roam the streets in search of food and alms under the guardianship of a semi-literate Islamic scholar. For some Nigerian Islamic leaders, the system represents hunger and poverty³² and its continuance contributes to radicalisation. These children, neglected and rejected by their parents due to extreme poverty, easily become preys of radicalised groups such that a significant number have been recruited into the Boko Haram. According to one source, "some of these children are *Almajiris* (Islamic pupils), they are going on the street with nothing to eat so when you give them some small amount, something to eat, they get convinced to join."³³ Based on reports by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the north-east geo-political zone of Nigeria, the hotbed of the Boko Haram militancy, remains the zone with the highest illiteracy rates in the country.³⁴ With high levels of illiteracy, insurgency and violent conflict has easily made its way into the area. Comparatively speaking, while the north-east geo-political zone had only 18.1 per cent literacy rate in 2010, some geo-political zones like the south-west had 77.9 per cent of literacy rate, followed by the south-east with 66.8.³⁵ It is not difficult to know why the Boko

Haram started from the northern part of the country when, 10.5 million, out of the 12 million out-of-school children in Nigeria, are from the northern part of the country.³⁶

Though it can be argued that corruption is a global phenomenon, it is however in Nigeria. Endemic corruption and mismanagement of public resources by government officials and leaders have undermined economic development in Nigeria and consequently had negative effects on the lives of Nigerians. While Nigerian corrupt public officials enjoy opulent lifestyles with impunity, millions of Nigerians are deprived of the most basic necessities of life. It is alleged that between 2006 and 2013, public officials in Nigeria embezzled some US\$9 billion.³⁷ According to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, about 92.4 percent of Nigerians live on less than US\$2 a day.³⁸ Despite the presence of abundant natural resources, Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In the 2014, 2015 and 2016 *Corruption Perception Index*, Nigeria ranked 136 out of 176 countries.³⁹ Earlier in 2013, Nigeria was the 15th most corrupt country in the world.⁴⁰ The Global Financial Integrity Group believes that about US\$160 billion had illegally left the shores of Nigeria between 2004 and 2013⁴¹, thus making Nigeria one of the ten largest countries for illegal financial flows globally.⁴²

Following President Muhammadu Buhari's promise to tackle corruption, since 2015 many officials from former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration are currently under investigation corruption-related cases. Many people also argue that corruption in Nigeria has largely undermined the war against the Boko Haram. The need to adopt stringent anti-corruption measures and strengthen anti-corruption laws and institutions in Nigeria cannot be overlooked. It is also important to align with the international community in the fight against corruption so as to tackle the root of extremism and radicalisation. In line with the above position, Onuoha argued that:⁴³

Widespread corruption in Nigeria has not only deprived communities of needed amenities and infrastructure but has created an environment conducive for recruitment and radicalization. Pervasive malfeasance provides a key referent around which extremists can frame antisecular ideology and radicalization.

Corruption in Nigeria has also infiltrated the military. It is an opinion held by many Nigerians that the top Nigeria military echelons do not want the war against the Boko Haram concluded because they are enriching themselves through it. The integrity of the Nigerian judges has also been questioned. Public government officials who loot the common wealth with impunity are usually let free by a corrupt judicial system. While arguing that bribery has become the prevailing part of administrative procedure in the Nigerian Police Force, the NBS also asserted that the Nigerian judiciary has become the biggest bribe-takers in Nigeria. It is also saddening to observe that about US\$4.6 billion (which represented 39 percent of the combined federal and state education budgets in 2016) was paid out as bribes to Nigerian public officials yearly.

It is sad to know that some of the Boko Haram militants who were caught during the former administration and were awaiting trial, have allegedly been released by the present government. This is detrimental to the fight against the extremist group. Every effort towards long-lasting peace and stability in the northeast must aim to disarm, demobilize and finally reintegrate these militants. Here, the government must implement various socio-economic activities necessary for reintegration of these militants. The disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration of former Boko Haram recruits is a prerequisite to immediate post-conflict peace and stability as it will also reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence and help in reintegrating former combatants of the Boko Haram into civilian society. The ICG alluded to this when it observed that:⁴⁴

Children are dying....suffering from lack of food, clean water and medical care. They are the most tragic manifestation of the humanitarian fallout of the Boko Haram insurgency and the state response to it, a crisis that now impacts the lives of millions. The insurgency itself, the aggressive military response to it, and the lack of effective assistance, both national and international, to those caught up in the conflict threaten to create an endless cycle of violence and depredation. Unless efforts to contain and roll back the current crisis are quickly scaled-up, peace is likely to remain a distant prospect in this region of Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Critics of the present government and security analysts have continued to dismiss the government's claims of military success against the Boko Haram based on continued the latter's attacks and violence against innocent civilians, security personnel and government institutions. The government has also argued that the Boko Haram's inability to seize and control territories is a sign of decline. Be this as it may, if the claim of military success by the government is anything to go by, it is pertinent to remind the government that military success alone cannot provide a permanent solution to any type of insurgency, especially an ideologically-based one like the Boko Haram. Military offensives, no doubt, can significantly reduce or degrade the degree of the Boko Haram's threat to national security but more than weapons are needed to defeat it. Olawale argues that most African states are preoccupied with addressing violent extremism alone instead of its structural undercurrents related to preventing and interrupting the radicalisation process. By doing so, he posited that this overemphasis on counterinsurgency and military offensives distorts the security realities of these states and further worsens the security situation in Africa."⁴⁵

Contemporary Nigerian society is a fertile ground for radicalization and extremism. The Boko Haram's emergence is not unconnected to bad governance and the inability of the government to reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. With this gap, extremist groups will always find it easy to spread their influence amongst the vulnerable. There is an urgent need to address this and other radicalising factors. The former Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai, acknowledged this when he asserted that the Boko Haram threat is a political issue, a social issue and an economic issue, adding that until these issues are confronted, the military cannot provide the needed solution.⁴⁶ To some extent, religious-based militias like the Al-Shabaab are impossible to defeat, since ideologies cannot be defeated on the battlefield. Nigeria and even the other African states must seriously tackle issues pertaining to youth unemployment, poverty and human rights violations by state security forces which in turn act as pull-factors for radicalization, extremism and insurgent recruitment.⁴⁷

In other words, the war on the Boko Haram will not be won by military offensive alone. Clearly, to ensure sustainable peace and development, the Nigeria government must meaningfully address the range of social, political, and economic challenges facing the country. There is an urgent need for a recourse to the rule of law, reduction of

unemployment, interfaith dialogue, creation opportunities for the Nigerian youth and provision of social services.⁴⁸

NOTES:

¹ Global Terrorism Index 2017, Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017, p. 10.

² Rose T. Buchanan, "Isis overtaken by Boko Haram as world's deadliest terror organisation," *The Independent*, 17 November 2015, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.html>>

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Islamic State 'accepts' Boko Haram's allegiance pledge," *BBC News*, 13 March 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31862992>>

⁵ "Displaced: faces of some of the world's 63 million people fleeing disaster," *The Guardian*, 31 December 2016, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/31/far-from-home-60-million-people-displaced-un-war-climate-change-terrorism>>

⁶ "75,000 children in Nigeria could starve to death within months, says UN," *The Guardian*, 16 November 2016, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/75000-children-in-nigeria-could-starve-to-death-within-months-says-un>> (Accessed 10/08/2017)

⁷ "Boko Haram attack on oil team in Maiduguri killed more than 50: sources," *Vanguard*, 28 July, 2017, <<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/07/boko-haram-attack-oil-team-maiduguri-killed-50-sources/>>

⁸ Ben Ezeamalu, "Fact-Check: Buhari's claim that Boko Haram 'not holding any territory' in Nigeria exaggerated," *Premium Times*, 1 February 2016, <<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/197785-fact-check-buharis-claim-boko-haram-not-holding-territory-nigeria-exaggerated.html>>

⁹ "Nigeria President Jonathan declares State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa," *Premium Times*, 14 May 2013, <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/134244-breaking-jonathan-declares-state-of-emergency-in-borno-yobe-adamawa.html>>

¹⁰ Hassan Adebayo, "Buhari issues Boko Haram vow, says sect will 'soon know our strength,'" *Premium Times*, 15 April 2015, <<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/180455-buhari-issues-boko-haram-vow-says-sect-will-soon-know-our-strength.html>>

¹¹ Michael Kaplan, "President Buhari Gives Nigeria's Military 3 Months to Defeat Boko Haram," *International Business Times*, 13 August 2015, <<http://www.ibtimes.com/president-buhari-gives-nigerias-military-3-months-defeat-boko-haram-2052656>>

¹² "Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically defeated' – Buhari," *BBC News*, 24 December 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618>>

¹³ "Buratai lists lessons learnt from Bangladesh in B'Haram fight," *The New Telegraph*, 23 April 2017, <<https://newtelegraphonline.com/2017/04/buratai-lists-lessons-learnt-bangladesh-bharam-fight/>>

¹⁴ "Nigerian Army presents captured Boko Haram flag to President Buhari," *Daily Trust*, 31 December 2016, <<https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/nigerian-army-presents-captured-boko-haram-flag-to-president-buhari/178493.html>>

¹⁵ "Presentation of 'fake' B/H flag to Buhari a disgrace to our sovereignty – PDP," *Vanguard*, 2 January 2017, <<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/pdp-says-presentation-of-fake-bh-flag-a-disgrace/>>

¹⁶ Ben Ezeamalu, "Buhari's claim that Boko Haram 'not holding any territory' in Nigeria exaggerated," *Premium Times*, 1 February 2016, <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/197785-fact-check-buharis-claim-boko-haram-not-holding-territory-nigeria-exaggerated.html>>

¹⁷ "Boko Haram: Nigerian army rescues 338 captives," *BBC News*, 28 October 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34656907>>

¹⁸ Abdulkareem Haruna, "How 21 missing Chibok girls were freed — Officials," *Premium Times*, 13 October 2016, <<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212665-how-21-missing-chibok-girls-were-freed-officials.html>>

¹⁹ Bashir Adigun, "Freed Chibok schoolgirls 'were released in exchange for five Boko Haram commanders," *The Independent*, 7 May 2017, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/chibok-schoolgirls-freed-nigeria-boko-haram-prisoner-exchange-a7723186.html>>

²⁰ Following the outbreak of hostilities against Nigerian oil installations in the Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta during former President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua by some militant youths who became dissatisfied with environmental degradation of their area due to oil exploration, the Nigerian government came up with a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme known as Amnesty programme. Under this programme, former militants (numbering about 30,000) are granted 'pardon' and are entitled to a stipend of about \$400 each month. Whenever it becomes difficult for the government to continue with the programme due to sharp fall in oil prices, tensions and unrest are reignited. This programme failed and even attracted new youths into militancy. Such quick-fix solution did not arrest that militancy till today because the government has failed to identify and tackle deep-seated economic and socio-problems in Niger Delta. The government failed to understand that the militancy is driven by socio-economic grievances and deprivation, lack of social development, poverty and all-time neglect by successive Nigerian governments.

²¹ Deepa Narayan, et al., *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?*, New York: World Bank & Oxford University Press, 2000.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective," *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review (ACPR)*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2013, pp. 144-157.

²⁵ Paul Rogers, "Nigeria: The Generic Context of the Boko Haram Violence," Monthly Global Security Briefing. London: Oxford Research Group, 30 April 2012.

²⁶ "Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%," *BBC News*, 13 February 2012, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873>>

²⁷ Patricia Donli, *Perceptions and Experiences of Children Associated with Armed Groups in Northeast Nigeria*, Research Report 2017, New York: UNICEF, 2017, <<http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Research-Report-Children-Associated-with-Armed-Groups.pdf>>

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Emmanuel Ugwu, "Why Are Nigerian IDPs Starving To Death?," *Sahara Reporters*, 13 December 2016, <<http://saharareporters.com/2016/12/13/why-are-nigerian-idps-starving-death-emmanuel-ugwu>>

³⁰ Abdulkareem Haruna, "Boko Haram victims dying of starvation as Borno officials steal relief materials," *Premium Times*, 18 June 2016, <<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/205489-boko-haram-victims-dying-starvation-borno-officials-steal-relief-materials.html>>

³¹ Sylvester Ugwuanyi, "Obasanjo blames Boko Haram's incursion into Northeast on illiteracy," *Daily Post*, 28 May, 2015, <<http://dailypost.ng/2015/05/28/obasanjo-blames-boko-harams-incursion-into-northeast-on-illiteracy/>>

³² Wale Odunsi, "Almajiri represents poverty not Islam – Sultan of Sokoto," *Daily Post*, 21 May 2017, <<http://dailypost.ng/2017/05/21/almajiri-represents-poverty-not-islam-sultan-sokoto/>>

³³ Donli, *Perceptions and Experiences of Children Associated with Armed Groups in Northeast Nigeria*.

³⁴ "Annual Abstract of Statistics 2012," Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria, 2012, <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/annual_abstract_2012.pdf>

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "Nigeria Says It Has Recovered \$9.1 Billion in Stolen Money and Assets," *Reuters*, 6 April 2016, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nigeria-recovers-9-billion-dollars-stolenmoney_us_5752daefe4b0c3752dc7bf>

³⁸ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

-
- ³⁹ Transparency International, “Nigeria’s Corruption Challenge”, 28 May 2015, <https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigerias_corruption_challenge> Accessed 10/4/2016.
- ⁴⁰ Nicholas Ibekwe, “Nigeria is world’s 15th most corrupt nation – Transparency International,” *Premium Times*, 4 December 2014, <<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/172348-nigeria-worlds-15th-corrupt-nation-transparency-international.html>> Accessed 15/3/2015.
- ⁴¹ Transparency International, “Nigeria’s Corruption Challenge.”
- ⁴² Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013”, *Global Financial Integrity*, 8 December 2015.
- ⁴³ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*. Special Report 348, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), June 2014, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf>
- ⁴⁴ “North-eastern Nigeria and Conflict’s Humanitarian Fallout,” Commentary Africa, Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG), 4 August 2016, <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/northeastern-nigeria-and-conflict-s-humanitarian-fallout>>
- ⁴⁵ Olawale Ismail, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in West Africa: Implications for African and International Security,” *Journal of Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 13, Iss. 2, 2013, pp. 209-230.
- ⁴⁶ Ali Adoyi, “Military will never solve Boko Haram insurgency – Former CDS, Agwai,” *Daily Post*, 29 September, 2013. <<http://dailypost.ng/2013/09/29/military-will-never-solve-boko-haram-insurgency-former-cds-agwai/>>
- ⁴⁷ James Olusegun Adeyeri, “Boko Haram Islamist Insurgency in Nigeria: Transnational Dimensions and Opportunities for Peace and Security,” *Yonsei Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2016, pp. 227-237.
- ⁴⁸ Benjamin Maiangwa and Ufo O. Uzodike, “The Changing Dynamics of Boko Haram Terrorism”, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 31 July 2012, <<http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2012/7/31/20127316843815734The%20Changing%20Dynamics%20of%20Boko%20Haram%20Terrorism.pdf>>