ENFORCEMENT GAPS AND SANCTIONS RESILIENCE: NORTH KOREA’S ADAPTATION UNDER U.S.-LED PRESSURE

Abstract

United States (U.S.) sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have expanded significantly since the 1990s, yet Pyongyang has continued to advance its nuclear and missile programmes while adapting to sustained external pressure. Focusing on the first Trump administration (2017–2020), this article examines why intensified sanctions failed to produce denuclearization by analysing how North Korea navigated the sanctions environment rather than by assessing sanctions outcomes. The study identifies three interrelated factors: the DPRK’s long-standing economic isolation, which limited vulnerability to external pressure; persistent enforcement gaps within the sanctions regime, shaped in part by selective compliance from major regional actors such as China and Russia; and increasingly sophisticated sanctions-evasion strategies, including cyber operations, alternative trade mechanisms, front companies, and covert financial networks. This period is particularly significant because it combined unprecedented sanctions escalation with high-level summit diplomacy between a sitting U.S. president and a North Korean leader. Drawing on United Nations Security Council resolutions, U.S. legislation, policy reports and scholarly literature, the article shows that sanctions alone were insufficient to alter North Korea’s strategic calculus. The findings suggest that future policy would benefit from improved multilateral coordination, sustained diplomatic engagement, and more coherent sanctions implementation that recognises the DPRK’s capacity for adaptation and resilience.